UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting


Bartling, Björn; Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon (2015). Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting. Journal of Public Economics, 128:133-139.

Abstract

This paper analyzes responsibility attributions for outcomes of collective decision making processes. In particular, we ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process. We conduct an experimental voting game in which decision makers vote about the allocation of money between themselves and recipients without voting rights. We measure responsibility attributions for voting decisions by eliciting the monetary punishment that recipients assign to individual decision makers. We find that pivotal decision makers are punished significantly more for an unpopular voting outcome than non-pivotal decision makers. Our data also suggest that some voters avoid being pivotal by voting strategically in order to delegate the pivotal vote to subsequent decision makers.

This paper analyzes responsibility attributions for outcomes of collective decision making processes. In particular, we ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process. We conduct an experimental voting game in which decision makers vote about the allocation of money between themselves and recipients without voting rights. We measure responsibility attributions for voting decisions by eliciting the monetary punishment that recipients assign to individual decision makers. We find that pivotal decision makers are punished significantly more for an unpopular voting outcome than non-pivotal decision makers. Our data also suggest that some voters avoid being pivotal by voting strategically in order to delegate the pivotal vote to subsequent decision makers.

Altmetrics

Downloads

25 downloads since deposited on 07 Apr 2015
17 downloads since 12 months
Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Collective decision making, responsibility attribution, voting, pivotality, delegation, experiment
Language:English
Date:4 April 2015
Deposited On:07 Apr 2015 12:56
Last Modified:27 Jun 2016 07:14
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0047-2727
Additional Information:Also see Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 138.
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.03.010
Related URLs:http://www.zora.uzh.ch/91449/
http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php?id=817
Permanent URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-110233

Download

[img]
Content: Accepted Version
Filetype: PDF - Registered users only until 1 April 2018
Size: 1MB
View at publisher
Embargo till: 2018-04-01

TrendTerms

TrendTerms displays relevant terms of the abstract of this publication and related documents on a map. The terms and their relations were extracted from ZORA using word statistics. Their timelines are taken from ZORA as well. The bubble size of a term is proportional to the number of documents where the term occurs. Red, orange, yellow and green colors are used for terms that occur in the current document; red indicates high interlinkedness of a term with other terms, orange, yellow and green decreasing interlinkedness. Blue is used for terms that have a relation with the terms in this document, but occur in other documents.
You can navigate and zoom the map. Mouse-hovering a term displays its timeline, clicking it yields the associated documents.

Author Collaborations