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Strategic outsourcing revisited


Buehler, S; Haucap, J (2005). Strategic outsourcing revisited. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 61(3):338.

Abstract

This paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing the production of a non-specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input market. We apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) to characterize the different equilibria and find that outsourcing generally softens competition in the final product market. If firms anticipate the impact of their outsourcing decisions on input prices, there may be equilibria where firms outsource so as to collude or to raise rivals’ costs. We illustrate our analysis using a linear Cournot model.

This paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing the production of a non-specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input market. We apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) to characterize the different equilibria and find that outsourcing generally softens competition in the final product market. If firms anticipate the impact of their outsourcing decisions on input prices, there may be equilibria where firms outsource so as to collude or to raise rivals’ costs. We illustrate our analysis using a linear Cournot model.

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23 citations in Web of Science®
31 citations in Scopus®
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:6 September 2005
Deposited On:11 Feb 2008 12:21
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 12:17
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0167-2681
Publisher DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.11.008
Permanent URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-1182

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