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Best-reply matching in games


Droste, E; Kosfeld, M; Voorneveld, M (2003). Best-reply matching in games. Mathematical Social Sciences, 46(3):291-309.

Abstract

We study a new equilibrium concept in non-cooperative games, where players follow a behavioral rule called best-reply matching. Under this rule a player matches the probability of playing a pure strategy to the probability that this strategy is a best reply. Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld [Games and Economic Behavior 40 (2002) 270] show that best-reply matching equilibria are stationary states in a simple model of social learning, where newborns adopt a best-reply to recent observations of play. In this paper we analyze best-reply matching in more detail and illustrate the concept by means of well-known examples. For example in the centipede game it is shown that players will continue with large probability.

We study a new equilibrium concept in non-cooperative games, where players follow a behavioral rule called best-reply matching. Under this rule a player matches the probability of playing a pure strategy to the probability that this strategy is a best reply. Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld [Games and Economic Behavior 40 (2002) 270] show that best-reply matching equilibria are stationary states in a simple model of social learning, where newborns adopt a best-reply to recent observations of play. In this paper we analyze best-reply matching in more detail and illustrate the concept by means of well-known examples. For example in the centipede game it is shown that players will continue with large probability.

Citations

1 citation in Web of Science®
2 citations in Scopus®
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Best reply, Matching, Equilibrium, Learning, Game theory, Bounded rationality
Language:English
Date:December 2003
Deposited On:11 Feb 2008 12:29
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 12:22
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0165-4896
Publisher DOI:10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00065-9
Permanent URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-2245

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