Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-2463
Egger, H (2002). Unemployment may be lower if unions bargain over wages and employment. Labour, 16(1):103-133.
This paper addresses the question under which circumstances unemployment can be lower if unions bargain over wages and employment in a general equilibrium framework. Thereby, it turns out that the unemployment rate may negatively depend on the wage rate, if the unemployment compensation scheme contains a constant real term in addition to the replacement ratio component. This is, compared with a pure replacement ratio scheme, the more plausible formalization of the real world’s compensation systems, at least for European countries. Besides the theoretical analysis, the paper also derives political implications by identifying the relevant parameters for the decision on whether weakening unions will be a good strategy for an economy to overcome its unemployment problem.
|Item Type:||Journal Article, refereed, original work|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics|
|Deposited On:||06 May 2008 15:04|
|Last Modified:||23 Nov 2012 14:17|
|Additional Information:||The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com|
Users (please log in): suggest update or correction for this item
Repository Staff Only: item control page