Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-29669
Rost, Katja; Osterloh, Margit (2009). Management Fashion Pay-for-Performance for CEOs. Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), 61(4):119-149.
We show theoretically and empirically that Pay-for-Performance, like many management fashions, has not achieved its intended aim. Our research focuses on previous empirical studies that examine the relation between variable executive pay and firm performance on various different dates. Our results indicate that a variable CEO income contributes very little to the increase of the firm’s performance, and that CEO salary and firm performance are not linked. The example of Pay-for-Performance shows that in the long run, many management fashions do not solve the problems that they promise to solve.
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|Item Type:||Journal Article, refereed, original work|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Business Administration|
|Dewey Decimal Classification:||330 Economics|
|Deposited On:||11 Feb 2010 13:49|
|Last Modified:||23 Nov 2012 15:32|
|Publisher:||Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft für Betriebswirtschaft|
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