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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-33211

Ewerhart, Christian (2002). Backward induction and the game-theoretic analysis of chess. Games and Economic Behavior, 39(2):206-214.

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Abstract

The paper scrutinizes various stylized facts related to the minmax theorem for chess. We first point out that, in contrast to the prevalent understanding, chess is actually an infinite game, so that backward induction does not apply in the strict sense. Second, we recall the original
argument for the minmax theorem of chess – which is forward rather than backward looking. Then it is shown that, alternatively, the minmax theorem for the infinite version of chess can be reduced to the minmax theorem of the usually employed finite version. The paper concludes with a comment on Zermelo’s (1913) non-repetition theorem.

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1 citation in Web of Science®
5 citations in Scopus®
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
DDC:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2002
Deposited On:30 Mar 2010 12:56
Last Modified:27 Nov 2013 23:29
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0899-8256
Publisher DOI:10.1006/game.2001.0900

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