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A trust-incentive-based combinatorial double auction algorithm


Wang, K; Li, L; Hausheer, D; Liu, Z; Li, W; Shi, D; He, G; Stiller, B (2010). A trust-incentive-based combinatorial double auction algorithm. In: IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium (NOMS 2010), Osaka, Japan, 19 April 2010 - 23 April 2010, 209-215.

Abstract

Resource allocations determine an important management task for operational Grids and networks, especially under the constraint of commercially offered resources. Therefore, the need for an optimal allocation of this task arises, and this paper proposes a trust-incentive-based combinatorial double auction algorithm for these resource allocations in Grids. The key and new contribution is the design of a trust-incentive mechanism, which is integrated into an existing combinatorial double auction algorithm (a) to improve the performance of Grid resource allocation and (b) ensure that trust values of participating bidders (typically Grid users, termed peers) are considered. In the newly developed trust-incentive-based algorithm, each peers' trust value is adopted to adjust their bids in the process of the combinatorial double auction. After each transaction, peers participating in the transaction rate each other to setup and update the bilateral trust relationship. Those simulation results obtained demonstrate that the algorithm proposed can improve the efficiency of resource sharing greatly by providing applicable incentives to trustworthy peers to contribute more resources. Moreover, this algorithm can identify and eliminate malicious peers in the system to enhance the Grid security level in that respect.

Resource allocations determine an important management task for operational Grids and networks, especially under the constraint of commercially offered resources. Therefore, the need for an optimal allocation of this task arises, and this paper proposes a trust-incentive-based combinatorial double auction algorithm for these resource allocations in Grids. The key and new contribution is the design of a trust-incentive mechanism, which is integrated into an existing combinatorial double auction algorithm (a) to improve the performance of Grid resource allocation and (b) ensure that trust values of participating bidders (typically Grid users, termed peers) are considered. In the newly developed trust-incentive-based algorithm, each peers' trust value is adopted to adjust their bids in the process of the combinatorial double auction. After each transaction, peers participating in the transaction rate each other to setup and update the bilateral trust relationship. Those simulation results obtained demonstrate that the algorithm proposed can improve the efficiency of resource sharing greatly by providing applicable incentives to trustworthy peers to contribute more resources. Moreover, this algorithm can identify and eliminate malicious peers in the system to enhance the Grid security level in that respect.

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3 citations in Web of Science®
4 citations in Scopus®
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Conference or Workshop Item (Paper), refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Informatics
Dewey Decimal Classification:000 Computer science, knowledge & systems
Language:English
Event End Date:23 April 2010
Deposited On:27 Jul 2010 07:20
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 14:05
Publisher:IEEE
Series Name:IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium
ISSN:1542-1201
ISBN:978-1-4244-5366-5 (P) 978-1-4244-5367-2 (E)
Additional Information:© 2010 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.
Publisher DOI:10.1109/NOMS.2010.5488462
Permanent URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-33391

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