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What did Socrates know and how did he know it?


Ferber, Rafael (2007). What did Socrates know and how did he know it? In: Brisson, Luc; Erler, Michael. Gorgias, Menon : selected papers from the Seventh Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 263-267.

Abstract

The article is the shortened English version of the article “Was und wie hat Sokrates gewusst?” Elenchos: Rivista di studi sul pensiero antico, 28, 5-39. First, it states a set of seven “knowledge-claims” made by Socrates: 1. There is a distinction between right opinion and knowledge. 2. Virtue is knowledge. 3. Nobody willingly does wrong. 4. To do injustice is the greatest evil for the wrongdoer himself. 5. An even greater evil is if the wrongdoer is not punished. 6. The just person is happy; the unjust person is unhappy. 7. The pleasant is not the good. These claims seem to be the “few” (oliga) (Men. 98 b3) but “very important” (kallista) (Grg. 472 c8) things that Socrates claims to know. Second, it tries to answer the second question and defends the thesis that the supposed “knowledge” of Socrates is dianoetic, but not noetic. The main new idea of this paper is the comparison of the Socratic knowledge-claims with the upper states of the mind symbolized in the Divided Line, noesis and dianoia (cf. R. 511 d7-e1).

The article is the shortened English version of the article “Was und wie hat Sokrates gewusst?” Elenchos: Rivista di studi sul pensiero antico, 28, 5-39. First, it states a set of seven “knowledge-claims” made by Socrates: 1. There is a distinction between right opinion and knowledge. 2. Virtue is knowledge. 3. Nobody willingly does wrong. 4. To do injustice is the greatest evil for the wrongdoer himself. 5. An even greater evil is if the wrongdoer is not punished. 6. The just person is happy; the unjust person is unhappy. 7. The pleasant is not the good. These claims seem to be the “few” (oliga) (Men. 98 b3) but “very important” (kallista) (Grg. 472 c8) things that Socrates claims to know. Second, it tries to answer the second question and defends the thesis that the supposed “knowledge” of Socrates is dianoetic, but not noetic. The main new idea of this paper is the comparison of the Socratic knowledge-claims with the upper states of the mind symbolized in the Divided Line, noesis and dianoia (cf. R. 511 d7-e1).

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Book Section, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Language:English
Date:2007
Deposited On:23 Mar 2009 14:46
Last Modified:30 May 2016 08:18
Publisher:Academia Verlag
Series Name:International Plato Studies
Number:25
ISBN:978-3-89665-357-4
Related URLs:http://www.academia-verlag.de/titel/69357.htm (Publisher)
http://www.recherche-portal.ch/zbz/action/display.do?fn=display&vid=ZAD&doc=ebi01_prod005585873 (Library Catalogue)
http://www.zora.uzh.ch/3270/
Permanent URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-3353

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