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ON A HITHERTO NEGLECTED TEXT AGAINST BUDDHIST PERSONALISM:
Mahāyānasūtrālāṅkāra 18.92–103 and its Bhāṣya

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Abstract

According to the Chinese pilgrims Xuanzang and Yijing, the Sāṃmitīya sect of Buddhism, an offshoot of the Vātsiputriya sect, had become by far the most important among the non-Mahāyānist denominations of the northern half of India by the turn of the 7th century CE. Now, the Sāṃmitīyas were famous for professing a personalist doctrine (pudgala-vāda) that singled them out as “heretics” and triggered off vehement criticism on the part of their “coreligionists.” Whereas only a few Sāṃmitīya works have survived down to us in Chinese translation, most of their opponents’ tracts have been preserved either in Sanskrit or in Tibetan translation, the most celebrated ones being those of Vasubandhu, Candrakīrti and Kamalaśīla. However, one of the earliest extant Yogācāra sources, the Mahāyānasūtrālāṅkāra (bhāṣya), dedicates a section of respectable length to the critique of Buddhist personalism. The present essay provides this neglected early testimony with an introduction, an annotated translation, and text-critical notes.

1 The present study has been made possible by the generous financial support of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF-Projekt P19862 “Philosophische und religiöse Literatur des Buddhismus”) and the Numata Foundation, which allowed me to spend three and a half months in Kyoto (Ryukoku University). Thanks are due to Prof. Shoryu Katsura who invited me in Kyoto and succeeded in making my stay there an unforgettable event; to Kazuo Kano, who generously put at my disposal his still provisional edition of Vairocanaraksita’s Sūtrālāṅkāravivrti; to Kensho Okada for sending me his excellent MA-thesis and two articles he wrote with Sayaka Kishi; to Chizuko Yoshimizu, who enabled me to meet these distinguished young scholars of Tsukuba University (and spend two rainy but happy days in Kobuchizawa); to Isabelle Ratié, who made very insightful remarks on this essay.
1. Buddhist Personalism and its Critique

1.1.
According to Bareau, the Vātsīputrīya sect branched off from the Sthavira group of early Buddhism some time during the first half of the 3rd century BCE. Around the turn of the Common Era, the Vātsīputrīya movement gave rise to four sub-sects: the Bhadrayānīyas, the Dharmottarīyas, the Śaṅgarikas (or: Śaṅdagirikas) and the Sāṃmitīyas (or: Sāṃmatīyas). Except for the Śaṅgarikas, these sub-sects are attested epigraphically from the 2nd century CE on: in Mathurā and Sārnāth (Sāṃmitīyas, resp. 2nd and 4th century CE), in Karle and Junnar (Dharmottarīyas, 2nd century CE), in Nāsik and Kanheri (Bhadrayānīyas, 2nd century CE). While the history and ideas of the first three sub-sects are shrouded in mystery, it seems very likely that the Sāṃmitīyas gained prominence and eventually eclipsed even the mother-sect, the Vātsīputrīyas. And if the testimony of the Chinese pilgrims Xuanzang and Yijing is to be trusted, by the 7th century CE, the Sāṃmitīyas had become by far the numerically most important group among the few surviving non-Mahāyānist denominations (Sarvāstivādins, Sthaviras). Their area of influence extended from the lower Indus to the lower Ganges with nearly hegemonic strongholds in Sindh (about 100 monasteries and 10'000 monks), Mālava (about 100 monasteries and 20'000 monks) and, most importantly perhaps, Valabhī, where a huge monastic complex (vihāraṇamaṇḍala) and intellectual centre flourished since the beginning of the 6th century under Maitraka patronage. Interestingly enough, certain among the doctrines of this important Buddhist denomination have been held consistently by all other Buddhist groups to be a heresy – a deviation – known as “personalism” (pudgalavāda). In other words, whatever the representativity of

2 See Bareau 1955:33 and 114.
3 For a legendary account of this schism, see Bareau 1955:122–123 and Lusthaus 2009:285.
4 See Bareau 1955:36. For references, see Bareau 1955:122nn. 2–3, 127n. 4, 128n. 4.
5 Note, in this connection, Yaśomitra’s explanation of “vātīputrīya” in AKVy 699,3: vātīputrīyā āryasaṃmatīyāḥ. Āryasaṃmitīya also occurs at MAV 268,7 (’phags pa maṅ pos bkur ba pa).
6 See Bareau 1955:36 and 121–122. All in all, the Sāṃmitīya sect amounted to about 65'000 monks and 1'000 monasteries (16'000/500 for the Sarvāstivādins, 20'000/200 for the Sthaviras).
7 On this translation, see Chau 1984:7. Note that the expressions “Pudgalavādin/Pudgalavāda” (in much the same way as “Hīnayāna”) refers neither to an institutional sect nor to a doctrinal school, but rather to the (alleged) representatives of a set of doctrines based on the
personalism within the Sāṃmitīya monastic communities, the most powerful among the non-Mahāyānist denominations was deemed heretic by most of its coreligionists. During centuries, from the Kathāvatthu to Kamalaśīla, the intellectual elite of all other groups and/or schools (Theravādins; Vaibhāṣikas, Mādhyamikas, Yogācāras, Sautrāntika, “epistemologists,” etc.) shaped ever more sophisticated arguments against the Vātsīputrīya and/or Sāṃmitīya pudgalavāda. But what did these Buddhist personalists – apparently a contradiction in terms – teach?

1.2.
While shaping their doctrine of the pudgala, the Buddhist personalists are likely to have attempted to solve several problems they felt were left open by the dominant interpretation of the Buddha’s Law in strict terms of selflessness and impermanence. These problems pertained to issues such as memory and knowledge, serial continuity, ethical responsibility, eschatology, soteriology and, last but not least, salvation and the nature of the liberated saint. Interestingly enough, a good deal of these problems and their solutions clearly

notion of pudgala, and always through the lenses of their opponents. To the best of my knowledge, no Indian Buddhist thinker has ever used this rather deprecative label as a self-designation.

8 If the term is appropriate at all under such circumstances, for the Buddhists of all persuasions who thought of themselves as “orthodox” (i.e., non-Pudgalavādins) held contradictory opinions on the issue of whether the Pudgalavādins were Buddhists or not. “Coreligionists” (svayāthya) appears in MSAVBh (see below, n. 53), MAV 244.8 (rañ gi sde pa ma pos bkur pa; *svayāthyaṃ sāṃmitīyaḥ) and 286,12, and “Buddhist” (bauddha) in MSAVBh (see below, n. 72) and AKV 699.4–5 (na hi vātsīputrīyāṇāṃ mokṣo nesyaḥ / bauddhatvāt i). But to authors such as Vasubandhu, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Prajñākaramati, the Pudgalavādins are at best “pseudo-Buddhists” (saugataṃmanyā) and “outsiders from within” (antaścarañādikā). See AKBh 472,13–15: tasmād drṣṭyabudhau etasmin śāsana utpānṇaṃ ya esa ekeṣāṃ pudgalagrāha ekeṣāṃ sarvanāstītāgrāhaḥ / ye ’pi ca dravyāntaraṃ evātmanāṃ manyante tīrthakārās teṣām eva mokusāhavaḍaṃ niṃkampāḥ /, TS 336: kecit tu saugataṃmanyā apya ātmanam pracaṣṭe / pudgalavāподешена tattvāyatvādiварjitaṃ //, and BCA 328.28–329,1: pudgalavādinas tu pumānantaścarañādikāḥ / skandheḥyāṃ tattvāyatvābhāyāṃ avācyaṃ pudgalanātmanāṃ ātmanam icchat / anyathā tīrtha-siddhāntābhiniveśadarsanāṃ syāt / āha ca – kecic ca saugataṃmanyā apya ātmanam pracaṣktāti / *= TS 336. See also the other texts discussed in Kośa V.228.

foreshadow the later debates on ātman/anātman between Buddhist and non-Buddhists intellectuals.10

1.3.
According to nearly all doxographic accounts, the Vātsīputrīyas’ and Sāṃmitīyas’ main thesis was the following: “La personne (pudgala) est perçue (upalabhyate) comme une réalité évidente (sāksātkṛtaparamārthena). La personne n’est ni identique (sama) aux agrégats (skandha) ni différente (viṣama) d’eux. Elle n’existe ni dans les agrégats ni en dehors d’eux.”11 But did the Pudgalavādins really claim, as all their opponents would like them to do, that the pudgala ultimately exists (as paramārthena would suggest), i.e., that it exists as a substantial (dravyasat), independent (< bhāvāntara) entity? According to most of the rare extant Vātsīputrīya/Sāṃmitīya sources,12 the doctrine of the pudgala was meant to provide a satisfactory account of Buddhism as a middle way (madhyamā pratipad) between the extremes of eternalism (śāsvatavāda) and annihilationism (ucchedavāda). This seems at least to be the meaning of the personalists’ statement to the effect that the pudgala cannot be said (avaktavya) to be either the same as or distinct from the five aggregates. For if the pudgala is the same as the skandhas, it will be as conditioned (saṃskṛta) and hence momentary (kṣaṇika) as they are, and one can no longer account for recollection, continuity and moral responsibility. But if the pudgala is independent from the skandhas, it will be as eternal and unconditioned as the non-Buddhists’ ātman, and then any relationship with psycho-physical reality and need for religious life (brahmacarya) will be lost.13 By claiming that their pudgala was neither an eternal and independent entity nor an impermanent entity reducible to the psycho-physical constituents, the Pudgalavādins expected not only to provide the middle way with a doctrinal foundation, but also to disclose the rationale

10 In this regard, the SŚ provides a fascinating example of a still purely intra-Buddhistic controversy on exegetical and philosophical issues.
11 Bareau 1955:115 (Vātsīputrīya), to be compared with Bareau 1955:123 (Sāṃmitīya).
13 TDS 19c35: “Il est impossible de dire que l’être (sattva: pudgala) est différent des caractéristiques, il serait [en conséquence] éternel (śāśvata); et, s’il était identique aux caractéristiques, il serait non éternel (aśāśvata). Ces deux erreurs ne peuvent être commises.” Translation Chau 1987:40.
behind the Buddha’s refusal to answer the question whether the soul (jīva) is identical to or different from the body.\textsuperscript{14}

1.4.

To claim that the pudgala does not exist as a substantial entity is tantamount to saying that it exists as a designation (prajñaptisat).\textsuperscript{15} This is indeed what the personalists did while developing a sophisticated system supposed to account for the pudgala as a designation.\textsuperscript{16} According to them, the pudgala is liable to three prajñaptis: the pudgala as designated by the basis/bases (*āśrayaprajñaptapudgala), the pudgala as designated by transmigration (*saṃkramaprajñaptapudgala), and the pudgala as designated by cessation.\textsuperscript{17} What does “basis/bases” (āśraya) refer to? First and foremost, to the five agregates, but also, according to the context, to the four great elements (mahābhūta), the twelve sensory bases (āyatana) and the eighteen sensory elements (dhātu). The pudgala as designated with reference to these bases is that which appropriates (upādā-) and sustains the body, serves as an agent of perceptual awareness (vijñāna),\textsuperscript{18} affective sensation (vedanā) and ideation (saṃjñā), provides the basis for recollection and knowledge, is the possessor of serial continuity (santāna). And according to the Buddhist personalists, the relationship between the pudgala and the psychophysical basis is the same as that between fire and fuel, which are neither identical nor distinct.\textsuperscript{19} As for the pudgala as designated by transmigration, it refers to that which underlies the rebirth stories (jātaka) of the (future) Buddha and passes from one existence to another.\textsuperscript{20} This designation is threefold: desi-

\textsuperscript{14} On the avyākṛtavastus, see below, n. 71.
\textsuperscript{15} On the distinction between dravyasat and prajñaptisat (pseudo-)entities, see below, n. 54. See also Lusthaus 2009:276–278.
\textsuperscript{16} Note the wording of thesis no. 1 in Vasumitra’s account: “The pudgala is neither the same [as] nor different from the skandhas. It is a prajñapti dependent on the skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus.” Translation Lusthaus 2009:284.
\textsuperscript{18} Note thesis no. 15 of the Vātsāputrīyas (according to the Vibhāṣā): “La personne (pudgala) connaît (jānāti) les choses (dharma).” Translation Béreau 1955:118.
\textsuperscript{19} On the analogy of fire and fuel, see below, n. 76.
\textsuperscript{20} Note thesis no. 3 of the Vātsāputrīyas (according to Vasumitra and Bhavya): “Dharmas, if apart from the pudgala, cannot move on from a previous lifetime to a subsequent lifetime. On the basis of the pudgala, one can say there is transference (saṃkrānti).” Translation Lusthaus 2009:284; see also Béreau 1955:116. However, as the SS strongly insists upon, the pudgala is never (until the nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa) without a set of skandhas, and this is the
gnation of (with reference to) the past (*aṭītaprajñapti), designation of (with reference to) the future (*anāgataprajñapti), designation of (with reference to) the present (*pratyutpannaprajñapti). According to Chau, “[t]his explains (i) how personal continuity, being an uninterrupted flow of psycho-physical phenomena, not only flows in the present, but has its source in the past and continues to flow into the future, and (ii) how personal karmic responsibility is possible, such that Buddhism is no longer susceptible to the charge that it is nihilistic and immoral.” 21 Finally, the pudgala as designated by cessation points to the end of appropriation (*upādāna). Its purpose is “to demonstrate that the Ta-thāgata or an arahant after attaining the nirvāṇa without remainder (*nirupadhi-šesānirvāṇa) (…) is the liberated person par excellence [referred to as uttama° or paramapuriso], dwelling in beatitude.” 22 To sum up: “Thus the pudgala, with its three designations, is an ineffable (avaktavya) that avoids the two extremes: annihilation (*uccheda) and eternity (*vātavā). The pudgala is the agent of knowledge, memory, the rebirth process, the ripening of actions (*karmavipāka), and, after eliminating its obstacles, dwells in beatitude.” 23

reason why the Pudgalavādins strongly advocated the existence of intermediate existence (antarābhava). See thesis no. 33 of the Vātsāputrīyas (according to Vasumitra) in Bareau 1955:119, and thesis no. 10 (according to the Kathāvatthu) of the Sānniṭṭhyas in Bareau 1955:124. Note also Venkata Ramanan 1953:187 (and 195): “Therefore leaving the body of the five skandhas, when all that is extinct, the person moves on from this life to another. Hence it is said that there is the person who leaves the five skandhas of this state (viz.) upapattibhava and takes up the five skandhas of the antarābhava.”

21 Chau 1984:11, to be compared with Chau 1987:37.
22 Chau 1984:11.
23 Chau 1984:11. I cannot resist the temptation of quoting the following excerpt from the ŚŚ (465a17–465b1): “Le Bouddha a dit [que l]e pudgala existe en tant que désignation (prajñapti). C’est pourquoi cela s’oppose à [l’opinion de] l’inexistence de la personne. S’il est vrai que la personne n’existe pas, alors il n’y aura pas ce qui tue ainsi que ce qui est tué. Il en est de même pour le vol, l’amour illicite, le mensonge, et l’absorption de l’alcool. C’est [la lacune de l’opinion de] l’inexistence de la personne. Si la personne n’existait pas, il n’y aurait pas non plus les cinq crimes majeurs; [si] les organes des sens ne produisaient pas les bonnes et mauvaises actions, il n’y aurait pas de lien; s’il n’y avait pas ce qui détache les liens, il n’y aurait pas pas ce qui est attaché également, et il n’y aurait ni acteur ni acte, ni résultat [de l’acte]. S’il n’y avait pas d’acte, il n’y aurait pas de résultat. [S’il n’y] avait pas d’acte, de résultat, il n’y aurait ni naissance, ni mort. Mais les êtres vivants, à cause des actes et de leurs résultats, transmigrent dans le cycle de la naissance et de la mort (samsāra). S’il n’y avait ni naissance, ni mort, il n’y aurait pas de cause (hetu) de la naissance et de la mort. S’il n’y avait pas de cause, il n’y aurait pas de cessation de cause. S’il n’y avait pas de cessation de cause, il n’y aurait pas d’orientation vers la voie (mārga); ainsi, il n’y aurait pas
1.5. Among the many critiques of Buddhist personalism, Vasubandhu’s is by far the most systematic and, quite deservedly, the most famous: to the best of my knowledge, AKBh 9 (strictly speaking not a genuine chapter of the AKBh) has been translated in Western languages no less than thrice, not to speak of its partial translations. Still within the Sautrāntika/Yogācāra tradition, Sāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla have dedicated one section of the lengthy Āṭmaparīkṣā of the TS(P) to the refutation of the Buddhist pudgala. TS(P) 336–349 (K125,16–131,9/Ś159,16–166,18), which represents the last stage in the development of anti-Pudgalavāda polemics in this tradition, has been translated into German by Schayer as early as 1931. However, two closely related texts have escaped scholarly attention. The first one is Dharmakīrti’s PVSV 147,2–148,5, which has not even been noticed so far as a critique of Pudgalavāda, and where Dharmakīrti develops an entirely new line of argument. As for the second one, it is MSA(Bh) 18.92–103 (/154,27–160,6), the text translated in the present study. This passage, which is likely to represent the very inception of the Yogācāra critique of the pudgala, has been translated into French as early as 1911 by Lévi and did not go unnoticed until the Second World War. In the rich “Notes préliminaires” to his translation of AKBh 9 (1926), de La Vallée Poussin writes: “[L]e Sutrakāra d’Asaṅga (édité et traduit par S. Lévi, 1907–1911), xviii.92–

les quatre nobles vérités (āryasatya). S’il n’y avait pas les quatre nobles vérités, il n’y aurait pas de Bouddha enseignant les quatre vérités. S’il n’y avait pas de Bouddha, il n’y aurait pas de communauté des moines (saṅgha). Ainsi la réfutation du pudgala entraîne la réfutation du Triple Joyau (triratna) et des quatre nobles vérités. Telle est la réfutation de toutes ces opinions. C’est pourquoi la réfutation du pudgala fait naître les erreurs mentionnées ci-dessus, et d’autres erreurs se produisent également. Si l’on admet que la personne (pudgala), le soi existe, les erreurs mentionnées ci-dessus ne se produisent pas. Comme le Bouddha l’a dit dans le sūtra, il faut le savoir exactement. C’est pourquoi la personne existe vraiment.” Translation Chau 1987:42–43; see also Venkata Ramanan 1953:177–178.

24 See already Kośa V.227.

25 See Stcherbatsky 1970, Kośa V.230–302 and Duerlinger 1989b/Duerlinger 2003; see Duerlinger 2009 and Goodman 2009. Another extremely important anti-Pudgalavādin text (strongly indebted to AKBh 9) is MAV 244,1–288,9 (explicitly against the Sāṃmitīyās [maṇḍ pos bkur pa, MAV 244,8; see above, n. 8]; for a topical outline of the passage, see Tauscher 1981:36–39).


27 This is indeed hardly surprising considering that Dharmakīrti does not even allude to the pudgala in this passage.
103, dépend dans une certaine mesure du Traité de Vasubandhu. But, due maybe to most of our contemporaries’ pitiable unwillingness to read French and failure to take into consideration the finest pieces of 20th century scholarship, this important text has since then sunk into oblivion. That the MSA(Bh) and AKBh quote the same scriptural sources is, in itself, no argument in favour of the AKBh’s indebtedness towards the MSA(Bh), since both had to counter the exegesis made of these loci by the Pudgalavādins themselves, i.e., are very likely to have drawn on their opponents’ treatises (as is made clear by the ŚŚ). As for the discussion on the relationship between fire and fuel, it is no argument either, for it can also be shown to occur in at least one Pudgalavāda source. The issue of the relationship between the two texts is made still more complicated by the question whether the author of the (MSA)Bh and the author of the AKBh were or not one and the same person. Whatever be the case, the MSA(Bh) provides extremely interesting arguments against the pudgala and is to be considered as an important milestone in the history of this debate.

1.6.
There can be no point in attempting to summarize or paraphrase the many arguments put forward in our passage. Suffice it to say that, as nearly all Buddhist polemical tracts before the rise of the so-called epistemological literature, the MSA(Bh) uses a twofold argumentative strategy against the pudgala: first, by reason(ing) (yukti), i.e., by resorting to the first two means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāṇa), and second, by (authoritative) scriptures (āgama), the third means of valid cognition recognized by all the Yogācāras before Dignāga. But what does “against the pudgala” mean in this context? As we have seen, the Pudgalavādin claims that the pudgala cannot be said to be either identical to or different from the skandhas. His adversary summons him to make a choice: either does the pudgala exist as a substantial entity (dravyasat), and then it must be either the same as or distinct

28 Note that the MSA (if not the Bh) predates the AKBh from at least one century.
29 Kośa V.229.
30 No less neglected, and probably for the same reason, is the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra’s interesting refutation of the pudgala, translated into French by Lamotte in 1949. See Traité II.735–750.
31 See below, n. 76.
32 For a summary and new light on this problem, see Franco/Preisendanz 2010:XV–XVII.
from the *skandhas*, or it merely exists as an entity of designation (*prajñaptisat*, a “nominal fiction” [Lusthaus]), and then it can rightly be said to be neither identical to nor different from the *skandhas*. In other words, either the *pudgala* exists (as the Pudgalavādin pretends), and then the claim that it is neither the same as nor distinct from the *skandhas* is false, or it does not exist, and the silence of the Buddha in teachings such as the *Vatsagotra*sūtra finds its justification. As for scriptural argumentation, it is made a rather complicated issue insofar as both parties rely on (supposedly) canonical literature in order to make their point.\(^{33}\) The philosophical quarrel then turns to an exegetical one, for the Buddha, no one would dare to contend, has often made use of the notion of *pudgala*. Now, did he resort to it in a purely pragmatic and didactic purpose, as the adversary of the *pudgala* repeatedly contends, or did his statements concerning the *pudgala* refer to an *ens* – whatever its precise ontological status – as the Pudgalavādin (allegedly) has it?

### 2. The Immediate Context of MSA(Bh) 18.92–103

#### 2.1.

One should be wary of restricting MSA(Bh) 18.92–103 to its polemical dimension, for its intra-textual context suggests yet another, soteriologically oriented meaning. Like the closely parallel chapter of the BoBh (1.17), MSA(Bh) 18 is dedicated to the factors that are “aids” to awakening (*bodhipakṣya* or *bodhipākṣikadharma*).\(^{34}\) In both chapters, these factors (traditionally held to amount to thirty-seven), are discussed at length in a sixteen-item list. In both chapters again, the last two items consist of three concentrations (*samādhi*) and four summary statements of doctrine (*dharmaoddāna*).

#### 2.2.

MSA 18.77–81/MSABh 148,6–149,12 deals with three kinds of concentration endowed each with a specific domain (*gocara*) and purpose (*artha*):\(^{35}\) the con-

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\(^{33}\) For a very suggestive example, see below, n. 103.

\(^{34}\) On the 37 *bodhipākṣikadharma*s and their various classifications, see *Traité* III.1119–1207; see also Dayal 1970:80–164.

\(^{35}\) On these three kinds of concentration (called also the three “doors of liberation,” *vimokṣa-mukha*), see *Traité* III.1209–1232, and Kośa V.184–192; in the context of the thirty-seven *bodhipākṣikadharma*s, see BoBh W276,2–277,4/D187,15–188,8. Note that, properly speak-
centration on emptiness (śūnyatāsamādhi) bears on and aims at the thorough knowledge (parijñā) of the two kinds of selflessness, viz. the selflessness of the (pseudo-)person (pudgalanairūtya) and of the factors (dharmanairūtya); the unfocused concentration (apraṇihitasamādhi) bears on and aims at ridding oneself (prahāna) of the basis of the (false) belief in a self (ātmagrāha) regarding these two selflessnesses, viz., the five constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality to which one clings (upādānaskandha); the signless concentration (ānimittasamādhi) bears on and aims at the direct realization (sākṣātkriyā) of the absolute calmness (atyantopaśama) of the basis of this false belief. One may wonder why, among the numerous concentrations alluded to in Buddhist literature, these three alone are listed as bodhipāksika factors. Whereas the MSA(Bh) remains silent on this point, the BoBh provides an interesting answer: “But why are only

On the meaning of animitta and ānimitta in early Yogācāra thought, see Schmithausen 1969: 121–22n. 79.

36 To be compared with (1) the Abhidharmic understanding of the three samādhīs as summarized by Ghosaka (Abhidharmamṛta T 1553, 975c1–9, translated in Traité III.1214): “Les trois samādhi sont śūnyatā-, apraṇihita- et ānimittasamādhi. C’est parce que la pensée prend pour objet l’Anāsrava, qu’ils sont appelés samādhi. Concentré, l’ascète voit les cinq agrégats d’attachement (upādānaskandha) comme vides (śūnya), privés de moi (anatman) et de mien (anatmya): voilà le śūnyatāsamādhi. Entré en ce samādhi, il ne souhaite plus amour (rāga), haine (dveṣa), aberration (moha) ni renaissance (punarbhava): voilà l’apraṇihitasamādhi. Il est un samādhi dont l’objet (ālambara) est exempt de dix caractères (nimitta). Quels sont ces dix? Les cinq objets, matière, etc. (rupādīpāñcaviṣaya), l’homme (purusa), la femme (stṛ), la naissance (jātī), la vieillesse (jarā) et l’impermanence (anityatā). Voilà l’ānimittasamādhi.” The MSA(Bh)’s ideas are much closer to the “mādhyanamika” Traité (III.1223). Here, the śūnyatāsamādhi has two aspects: “1. Parce qu’elle considère (samānupaśyati) les cinq agrégats d’attachement (pañcā upādānaskandha) comme n’ayant ni identité (ekatva) ni différence (anyatva), elle est ‘vide’ (śūnya). 2. Parce qu’elle considère le moi (ātman) et le mien (ātmya) comme inexistants (anupalabdha), elle est ‘sans moi’ (anatmya).” Among the four aspects of the apraṇihitasamādhi, two are of interest to us: “1. Parce qu’elle considère les cinq agrégats d’attachement (pañcāpādānaskandha) comme issus de causes et de conditions (hetupratyayaja), elle est ‘impermanente’ (anitya). 2. Parce qu’elle les considère comme des tourments du corps et de l’esprit (kāyikamānasikavihethana), elle est ‘douleur’ (duḥkha).” As for the first two aspects of the ānimittasamādhi, they are as follows: “1. Parce qu’elle considère le Nirvāna comme la destruction de toutes les sortes de douleurs (nānvīdahduhkhanirodha), elle est ‘destruction’ (nirodha). 2. Parce qu’elle le considère comme l’extinction du feu du triple poison (trītiṣa) et des autres passions (kleśa), elle est ‘calme’ (śānta).”

AS/EA LXIV•2•2010, S. 291–340
these three concentrations mentioned, [and] not [others] beyond these, not more than these? [Because all] this [consists of] two [things]: that which exists and that which does not exist. Among them, what is conditioned and what is unconditioned are that which exists, [whereas] that which does not exist [consists in] either the self or what belongs to the self. In this regard, the unfocused concentration is singled out (vyavasthāna) because it is not intent upon, i.e., because it is adverse to [that part of] existent [things that is] conditioned. As for signless concentration, it is singled out because it is intent upon, i.e., because it takes perfect delight in the unconditioned nirvāṇa. As for that thing which is non-existent, the bodhisattva should be neither intent upon nor non-intent upon it, but simply consider it correctly as non-existent. And one should know that it is with reference to this way of considering [non-existent things] that the concentration on emptiness is singled out.” 38 In other words, these three samādhīs do not only cover the entire realm of being and non-being. They also encapsulate, so to say as its meditative counterparts, the whole Buddhist path in that they are instrumental in the bodhisattva’s reluctance towards conditioned factors, his fondness for the unconditioned nirvāṇa, and his rejection of false views that are responsible for defilements, entanglement in saṃsāra and suffering. It is, then, hardly surprising that statements of a more doctrinal nature be supplied in order to provide these all-inclusive meditative and salvational devices with a theoretical foundation. And such is indeed the case of the four summary statements of doctrine that form the last item of the bodhipakṣya list. As MSA 18.80ac has it, “four summary statements of doctrine have been preached [by the perfectly awakened buddhas] to the bodhisattvas as [being] the basis (upaniṣad) of [these three] concentrations.” 39 What do these summary statements of doctrine consist of? According to the BoBh, “these four summary statements of doctrine [are those] which both the buddhas and the bodhisattvas teach in order to purify the living beings. Which four [are they]? [First, there is]

38 BoBh W276,15–25/D187,24–188,5: kasmāt punar eṣāṃ eva trayāṇāṃ samādhiṇāṃ prajñāptir bhavati / nātā uttarā nātā bhūyāh / dvayam idam sac ācār ca / tatra saṃskṛtam asaṃskṛtam ca sad asad ātmā vāmīyaṃ vā / tatra saṃskṛte saty apraṇidhiṇataḥ prāttikālayo ’praṇihitasamādhiyavasthānānām / asaṃskṛte punar nirvāṇe praṇidhiṇataḥ samyagabhiratigrahanāto nirnimittasamādhiyavasthānām / yat punar etad asad eva vastu tatra bodhisattvānaḥ na praṇidhiṇām nāpraṇidhiṇām karāṇīyaṃ / api tu tad asad* ity eva yathābhūtaṃ draṣṭavyam / tac ca ārdhasam adhikṛtya śunyatāsamādhiyavasthānāṃ vedītavyam / *asad WT: asad asad D.

39 MSA 18.80ac: samādhyupaniṣattvena dharmoddānacatuṣṭayam / deśitam bodhisattvebhyaḥ [...].
the summary statement of doctrine [saying] that all conditioned factors are impermanent. [Second, there is] the summary statement of doctrine [saying] that all conditioned factors are painful. [Third, there is] the summary statement of doctrine [saying] that all factors are selfless. [Fourth, there is] the summary statement of doctrine [saying] that extinction is peaceful. Since the buddhas and bodhisattvas mainly preach (udirayanti) to the living beings a doctrine whose meaning is related to them, they are called ‘summary statements of doctrine.’ And since they have been constantly proclaimed [and produced], again and again (uditodita), by peacefully minded sages of old, they are called ‘summary statements.’ And since [they are] the path leading to the great[est] prosperity (udaya) and going upwards (ūrdhva) to the peak of existence, they are called ‘summary statements.’

How do these four summary statements relate to the three above-mentioned concentrations? According to the MSABh (149,1–3), “anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ” and “dukhkhāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ” serve as the basis of unfocused concentration, “anātmānaḥ sarvadharmāḥ” as the basis of the concentration on emptiness, and “śāntaṁ nirvāṇam” as the basis of signless concentration.

2.3.
As one of the etymologizing explanations provided by the BoBh has it, “the buddhas and bodhisattvas mainly preach to the living beings a doctrine whose meaning is related” to these four summary statements. Indeed, these summaries of the Law encapsulate at least two among the latter’s most characteristic doctrinal commitments, viz. impermanence and selflessness. Now, as every

40 The BoBh is likely to pun on the two meanings of Skt. udita, viz. “spoken” (< ṣvad) and “born” (< udī), as is testified to by the interpretive Tibetan translation (BoBh tib W146b1): dus rtag tu byun žin byun ba'i phyir (uditoditvat < udī) yam thub pa thugs ži ba sna ma rnam kyis rtag tu brjod cin brjod pa'i phyir (uditoditvat < ṣvad) yam mdo žes bya'o //.

41 BoBh W277,5–15/D188,9–16: catvārīmāni dharmoddānāni yāni buddhāś ca bodhisattvās ca sattvāṇām viśuddhaye deśayanti / katamāni catvāri / anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārā iti dharmoddānam / duḥkhāḥ sarvasaṃskārā iti dharmoddānam / anātmānaḥ sarvadharmā iti dharmoddānam / śāntaṁ nirvāṇam iti dharmoddānam / etatpratisamyeṣṭaṁ yadhīyāsa dharmam udirayanti buddhabodhisattvāḥ sattvāṇām / tasmād etāni dharmoddānātītī ucyante / paurāṇīśe* ca śāntamānasair munibhir uditoditvatān nityākālam uddānānity ucyante / mahodayagamīṇī bhavāgrodhvagamīṇī caīṣā** pratipat tasmād uddānānity ucyante /. *paurāṇīś em.: paurāṇeś D, pūrāṇāś W; **bhavāgrodhvagamīṇī caīṣā DT: bhavāgṛīc ca gāminī W. On the dharmoddānas, see also Aks 150,8–39 and Braarvig 1993:561–565, BoBh W277,5–284,7/D188,9–192,20, BHS s.v. uddenā.
doctrinal statement within Buddhist scholastics, these two ought to be admitted not only on the basis of scripture, but also after an evaluation through reason-
ing), viz. through the two remaining means of valid cognition, perception and inference. This evaluation is nearly coextensive with the insight born of (rational) reflection (cintāmayī prajñā) by means of which a bodhisattva assesses the truth-value of scriptural contents (śrūta) before he subjects them to a nearly endless mental cultivation (bhāvanā). And except for its conclusive statement (MSA[Bh] 18.104/160,9), the rest of MSA(Bh) 18 is devoted to the demonstration (prasādhana) of momentariness (kṣaṇikatva, MSA[Bh] 18.82–91/149,12–154,26) and selflessness (i.e., pudgalanairātmya, MSA[Bh] 18.92–103/154,27–160,6). As we can see, rational argumentation and philosophy are first and foremost aimed at providing soteriologically relevant dogmas and the subsequent meditative practices with indisputable, supposedly value-free foundations. As our text makes clear, the proof of selflessness proceeds in a negative, polemic way by attempting to refute the coreligionists’s claims to the existence of a real pudgala that would abandon the skandhas at death and take on new ones at rebirth. But this polemical endeavour does not cease to belong to the cintāmayī level: the Buddhist scriptures are replete with allusions to the pudgala, allusions out of which fellow Buddhist doctors have developed a systematic doctrine with its own claims to legitimacy and salvational efficacy; these


43 Note that the corresponding passage of the BoBh (W280,18–281,1/D190,17–22) contains no proof of selflessness, but the following statement: punah sarvadharmaṇāṃ bodhisattvāḥ sanskrātā sanskrātāṃ dvividhiṃ nairātmyāṃ yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti / pudgalanairātmyaṃ dharmanairātmyaṃ ca / tatredaṃ pudgalanairātmyaṃ yan naiva te vidyāmāṇaḥ dharmaḥ pudgalāḥ / nāpi vidyāmāṇadharmaṁvinirmukto ʻnyah pudgalo vidyate / tatredaṃ dharma-

44 See above, n. 20.
scriptures are, then, in need of an *ad hoc* exegesis designed to dispell doubts regarding their internal (in)consistency. One or two centuries later, however, the celebrated Buddhist polygraph Sthiramati (500–570 in Valabhi) provides an altogether different interpretation of MSA[Bh] 18.92–103/154.27–160.6: “By showing before [that all conditioned factors are] momentary, selfless[ness] has then been [eo ipso] demonstrated since [all] that which is momentary is [also] selfless. However, outsiders (*ṭīrthika) and ordinary people (*laukika) wrongly believe in the existence of a self (*ātman), of an agent (*kartr), of a seer (*draṣṭr), of an experiencer (*vedaka), of a man (*mānava) and of a human (*manuja)\(^45\) that are distinct from the *skandhas*. [The MSA(Bh) now] demonstrates the selflessness of the (pseudo-)person by [adducing] other [i.e., specific logical] reasons (*hetu) so that [these outsiders and ordinary people] abandon their wrong notion (*viparyāsa).”\(^46\) Although Sthiramati alludes here and there to a Skt./G407/Buddhist opponent,\(^47\) his introductory statement interprets the whole passage as a refutation of the non-Buddhists’ substantialist assumptions, thus mirroring the deep shift that took place at the turn of the 6\(^{th}\) century CE in the aims and the targets of the Buddhist intellectuals.\(^48\)

3. On the Present Translation

My translation is based on Sylvain Lévi’s *editio princeps* (1907, L), on the two extant Nepalese manuscripts of the MSABh (MS A/B), on the Tibetan version of the text (MSABh\(\text{tib}\)) and on Sthiramati’s massive commentary (MSAVBh, preserved in its Tibetan translation only). To these materials, one must add the text-critical footnotes of Sylvain Lévi’s French translation (1911), which often reflect

\(^{45}\) According to TSD 2360b, Tib. *ṣed* may render Skt. *manu*, while Tib. *ṣed bu* may render Skt. *mānava* and Tib. *ṣed bdag*, Skt. *ātman*. However, in an enumeration close to Sthiramati’s, Akṣ 11,29 has *ṣed bu* (var. *ṣed can*) *dañ ṣed las skyes*, which Braarvig (1993:II.44) renders: “mānavamamujā”, and which I follow for want of a better hypothesis.

\(^{46}\) MSAVBh isi D162b6–7/P191a7–b1: goṅ du skad cig mar bstan pa’i sgo nas yañ gañ skad cig ma yin pa de (em.: DP des) bdag med pa yin pas de’i skabs su bdag med par (D: P pa) bsgrubs zin mod kyi / mu stegs pa dañ / jìg rten pa dag phuṅ po la ma tgots pa’i bdag dañ / byed pa po dañ / lta ba po dañ / tshor ba po dañ / ṣed can dañ ṣed bdag la sogs pa yod par phyin ci log tu mñon par ŋen te / de dag gi phyin ci log dañ bral ba’i phyir gtan tshigs gzān (D: P om. gzān) gys kyang gañ zag la bdag med pa sgrub bo //.

\(^{47}\) See below, nn. 53, 72, 73, 83.

\(^{48}\) See Eltschinger forthcoming 2.
a more accurate understanding of the text than the 1907 edition, and the parallel passages of AKBh 9 (generally quoted in their Sanskrit original without translation). The identification of the passages quoted or alluded to in the MSABh and the MSAVBh has been greatly facilitated by the very useful work of Kensho Okada and Sayaka Kishi (2007 and 2008), by La Vallée Poussin’s footnotes to his French translation of AKBh 9 (Kośa V) and by Ejima’s philological notes as reproduced in Lee’s new edition of AKBh 9 (LE). I have also taken much benefit of Vairocanarākṣita’s short glosses on the basis of Kazuo Kano’s provisional edition of the codex unicus (Vairocanarākṣita MS). My translation and annotations owe much to my close reading of Sthiramati’s MSAVBh. But how should we proceed with this bulky commentary? It is fair to say that Sthiramati’s explanations were almost certainly meant for an untrained audience – for bālas.49 In other words, most of this commentary is not worthy of a translation. I have limited myself to summarizing and paraphrasing it while providing Sanskrit equivalents (then always preceded by an asterisk). My own text-critical remarks are to be found in a separate section at the end of the translation. Although much remains to be done, I sincerely hope to have succeeded in making the text intelligible and to attract the attention of scholars to a very significant milestone in the history of the “mainstream” Buddhists’ arguments against the Pudgalavāda.

4. MSA(Bh) 18.92–103/154,27–160,6

In order to demonstrate the selflessness [pertaining] to the pudgala, [the MSA now devotes] twelve stanzas [i.e., MSA 18.92–103] to the elucidation (vibhāga) of selflessness:

The pudgala must be said to exist as a [mere] designation (prajñaptyastitayā), but not as a [real] substance (dravyatā), because one does not perceive [it], because [our pseudo-perception of the pudgala] is [nothing but] a wrong notion (viparyāsa), because it is a pollution (sa/kleśa), because [the personalistic false view] is the cause of [that which is] defiled (kliṣta). (MSA 18.92)
This [pudgala] cannot be said to be either one [and the same] with or distinct from the [basis of its designation, i.e., from the five skandhas], because of the two faults [that would ensue]: for [if the skandhas and the pudgala were one and the same,] the skandhas would be

49 For a good example of this, see below, n. 73.
(prasaṅga) the self, and [if the skandhas and the pudgala were distinct,] the [pudgala] would be a [real] substance. (MSA 18.93)

If [the pudgala] exists as a [real] substance and [at the same time] cannot be said [to be either one and the same with or distinct from the skandhas, then you] have to state the reason (prayojana) [for this], [because a real pudgala] cannot be said to be neither one [and the same with] nor distinct [from the skandhas] without a reason [being provided for the denial of each of the two propositions]. (MSA 18.94)

Because of [their distinct] characteristics, because of [that which is] observed in the [ordinary] world and because of the [authoritative] treatises [that speak to the contrary], it is not correct [to affirm] that fuel and fire cannot be said [to be either one and the same or distinct from one another], for one indeed perceives [them] as [being] two. (MSA 18.95)

Since a cognition arises provided two [factors only] are present,50 the [pudgala] is not [its causal] condition, because [such a pudgala] is useless. Therefore, the [pudgala] cannot be a seer, [and this] up to a liberator. (MSA 18.96)

Or, if [the pudgala] presided over [the rise of a cognition],51 neither would it bring about a [pleasurable cognition that would be] impermanent, nor [would it ever bring about] an undesirable one. [Moreover,] its operation and characteristic are to be established. [Additio-
nally, the Blessed One’s] threefold complete awakening [would get] ruined [if the pudgala existed as a real substance]. (MSA 18.97)

Furthermore, its effort in order to see, etc., is not self-arisen, because of all the three [faults that are to be presented below]. [Nor can the pudgala serve as] the [causal] condition of this effort. Seeing, etc., lacking an effort[, cannot have the pudgala for its agent]. (MSA 18.98)

Because the [pudgala] would no [longer] be an agent, because [the exertion] is imperma-

nent, [and] because [exertion] would occur [all] at once [and] permanently, [this pudgala’s] effort in order to see [something visible], etc., cannot be self-arisen. (MSA 18.99)

Neither a [pudgala] that [always] remains as it is nor a perishable [pudgala] can be the [causal] condition [of the exertion aimed at producing seeing, etc., and this for three reasons:] because [this exertion] does not exist before[, hence cannot be due to a permanent cause]; because [this pudgala] would [ipso facto] be impermanent; and because there is no third hypothesis [i.e., the hypothesis of a pudgala that would be neither permanent nor im-

permanent]. (MSA 18.100)

And [this can also be demonstrated by resorting to scripture,] because [the Blessed One has] taught [that] all dharmas are selfless, [that] ultimately [there is nothing but] emptiness, and [that] to perceive a self is harmful. (MSA 18.101)

Because by [resorting to the designation of] pudgala, one [can, as did the Blessed One,] in-

dicate differences in addiction and [mental] series concerning defilement and purification,52 which vary [each] according to degree and party. (MSA 18.102)

50 On the reading: dvaye sati ca, see below, text-critical remarks (→L157,3).
51 I have read: svāmitve sati vā- instead of: svāmitve sati cā-. See below, text-critical remarks (→L157,5).
52 I have read: samklešē vyavadāne ca instead of: samkleśavyavadāne ca. See below, text-
critical remarks (→L159,3).
[The Blessed One did not have to teach the *pudgala*, because] the view of a self is not to be generated [anew in the living beings], [because their] cultivation [of it] is beginningless [and therefore does not need to be taught], [and because if salvation presupposed the knowledge of the *pudgala,*] all [living beings could] achieve liberation without effort. There is either no liberation [at all] or no [substantially existing] *pudgala.* (MSA 18.103)

[The Pudgalavādins:53] Should one say that the *pudgala* exists, [or] should one [rather] say that it does not exist? [The MSA] answers: *The pudgala must be said*

53 Sthiramati (MSAVBh tsi D163a1–4/P191b2–6) introduces the opponent as follows: 'di litar bcom ldan 'das kyis kyaన so so'i skye bo'i gan zag dan / rgyun du zugs pa'i gan zag dan / lan cig phyir 'on ba'i gan zag dan / phyir mi 'on ba'i gan zag dan / dgra bcom pa'i gan zag dan / byan chub sms dpa'i gan zag dan / gan zag gcig 'jig rten du 'byun ba na 'jig rten kun la phan pa dan bde bar byed pa ste / 'di litar de bzin gsges pa'i gan zag go zes gsun la / ran gi sde pa las kyaన sam (em.: a sam D, a sam P) bi ti pa dag phuŋ po dan gcig pa yani ma yin / tha dad pa yani ma yin po gan zag rdeasley su yod la / tshig gis brjod du med par yan 'dod ci / mu stegs pa dan 'jig rten pa dag bdag dan gan zag yod par 'dod na / khyed gan zag med par 'dod pa rnamz gan zag ces bya ba 'di yod pa žig tu 'dod dam / med pa žig tu 'dod pa smros (D: P smos) sig ces dri'o / "The Blessed One (*bhagavat* has said: 'The [good] ordinary person (*prthagjanapudgala*), the person who has entered the stream (*srotadāpannapudgala*), the person who returns [only] once [to the sphere of desire] (*sakrāgāmipudgala*), the person who does not return [any longer to the sphere of desire] (*ānāgāmipudgala*), the person who is a saint (*arhatpudgala*), the person who is a bodhisattva (*bodhisattvapudgala*), and the one (*eka*) person who, when he appears in the world, causes welfare (*hita*) and happiness (*sukha*), i.e., the person who is a Tathāgata (*tathāgatapudgala*)." Even among [our] coreligionists (*svayūthya*), the Sāṃmitiyas admit that the *pudgala*, which is neither one [and the same] as the constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality (*skandha*) nor distinct (*bhinnat*) [from them], exists as a [real] substance (*dravyasat*) and is unspeakable (*avaktavya*); and the outsiders (*tirthika*) as well as the worldly [persons] (*laukika*) admit that the self (*ātman*) and the *pudgala* exist. [These opponents now] ask: "You who admit that the *pudgala* does not exist ought to say [now] whether you accept that what is called *pudgala* exists or whether you accept that it does not exist."’ *To be compared with Akṣ 118,26–33 (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:93, and Braarvig 1993:II.452–453 for a translation); parts of the sūtra (?) are also quoted in AKbh 468,16/LE90,9 (ekāḥ pudgalo loka utpadaṃśaḥ utpadyata iti), TSP K126,6–7/Ś160,12–13 (ekāḥ pudgalo loka utpadaṃśaḥ utpadyate yadvat tathāgata iti), and SS (463a14 and 463c28 according to LE90n. 343 [see Venkata Raman 1953:170 and 173] with further references to T 2, 561a18, T 2, 569b24, AN I.22 [I, XIII, 1]). The list of the *pudgalas* in Akṣ further includes the person following his faith (śraddhāṃśāri *pudgalah*), the person following religious teaching (dharmāṃśāri *pudgalah*), the person on the eighth stage (astamakah *pudgalah*), the person being an isolated buddha (pratyekabuddha *pudgalah*). For definitions of these *pudgalas*, see Braarvig 1993:II.453–454n. 1. See also below, n. 109. Whatever its exact origin, this text belongs, according to Bareau 1955:115, to the most oft-quoted ones in Vātsīputriya circles. On the Pudgalavādins’ original views regarding the different *pudgalas*
to exist as a [mere] designation (prajñaptiṣṭitaḥ), but not as a [real] substance (dravyatas) [MSA 18.92ab].54 55 And because one can say [with equal legitimacy] that [the pudgala] exists as a [mere] designation [and] that it does not exist as a [real] substance, in thus adopting a conditional position (anekāṁśavādā) [on the pudgala], there is no room at all either for the fault of [affirming its absolute] existence or for the fault of [affirming its absolute] non-existence. [The Pudgalavādin:] But how can one know that this [pudgala] does not exist as a [real] substance? [Answer:] Because one does not perceive [MSA 18.92c1]. Indeed, contrary to [dharma] such as visible [things], this [pudgala] is not perceived as [MSA 19.92c2] a [real] substance. 56 [The Pudgalavādin:57] But what is called “perception” [also


According to MSAVBh tsi D163a6–7/P191b8–192a1, the MSA relies here on Akṣ ('phags pa blo gros mi zad pa'i mdo) 118,34–35 (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:94): gāṇaṇza gis gis de dag thams cad ni de bzin sgses pa'i kun rdzob kyi tshig gi gnas kyis sens can rnam draṇ ba'i phyir bstan pa ste/. “All those words for persons are taught by the Tathāgata from the standpoint of conventional phrases to guide beings.” Translation Braarvig 1993:II.454. According to MSAVBh tsi D163a1/P191b2, words like “designation” (*prajñapti), “mere word” (tshig tsaṃ = vacanamitra?), “mere conventional expression” (*vyavahāramitra) and “mere name” (*nāmamitra) on the one side, and “existing as a [real] substance” (*dravyasat), “existing as a [real] nature” (raṇ bzin yod = svabhāvasat?) and “existing ultimately” (*paramārthasat) on the other side are synonymous (*ekārtha). The pudgala exists as a mere verbal designation, as a noun and a conventional expression only. To be compared with AKBh 461,14–17/LE 38,1–5: yat tarhi vātsiputṛyāḥ pudgalaṁ santam icchanti / vicāryaṇaṁ tāvad etat / kim te dravyaya icchanty āhosvit prajñaptitaḥ / kim cedam dravyata iti kim vā prajñaptitaḥ / rūpādhvadh bāhāvāntaraḥ ced dravyataḥ / kṣīrādhvad samudāyaṃ cet prajñaptitaḥ /. Yasomitra adduces other classical examples of prajñaptisat (pseudo-)entities (AKVy 699,12–14): yathā kṣīrāghrasanādikaṃ rūparasagandhasprastāvyebhyas tṛṇakās-theṣṭikādibhyo hastyaśvarathādibhyas ca na bhāvāntaram iṣyate/. On the (partly parallel) distinction between samvritasat and paramārthasat, see AK 6.4, AKBh 333,23–334,13 and Kośa IV.139–142; see also Katsuura 1976.

According to MSAVBh tsi D163a7–b1/P192a2–3, the Pudgalavādin now objects as follows: Either you adopt (*vgraḥ) the thesis (*pakṣa, *aṃśa) that the pudgala exists (but you don’t say that it exists), or you adopt the thesis that the pudgala does not exist (but you don’t say that it doesn’t exist). Why do you say that it exists as a mere verbal designation and that it does not exist as a real substance? Why don’t you hold an unconditional position (*ekāṃśavāda)?

According to MSAVBh tsi D163b5–7/P192a8–b2, there are two means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa) establishing (*vādha) that entities (*vastu) exist as real substances (*dravyasat): perception (*pratyakṣapramāṇa) and inference (*anumānapramāṇa). And insofar as objects like visible things (*rūpa), etc., up to mental events (*dharma), exist, they are per-
consists in] a cognition by the intellect (*buddhi*). Now, it is not the case that [we] Pudgalavādins do not cognize the *pudgala* through the intellect. Moreover, the Blessed One has said: “In this very life, [the living being] perceives an ātman, designates [an ātman].” How then [can the *pudgala* be said] not [to be] perceived? [Answer:] It is not the case that, when it is perceived in this way, the *upalabdha* by the sense-faculties (*indriya*), the direct perceptual awarenesses (*vijñāna*), etc. But no sense-faculty or direct perceptual awareness cognizes the *pudgala*. Therefore, since it is not grasped by perception, it does not exist as a real substance. Here, Sthiramati refers to the classification of dharmaś into 18 sensory elements (*dhātu*; 6 viṣayās, 6 *indriya*, 6 viṣāñēna). See AK 1.14ab, AKBh 10,10–11 and Kośa I.27. To be compared with AKBh 461,6–8 and 14–15/LE 36,3–6 and 12 (Kośa V.231–232): *pratyakṣānumāṇābhāvāt* / ye hi dharmāḥ sañti teṣām pratyakṣam upalabdhir bhavyat asaty antarāyē / tadyathā saññām viṣayāṇām manasaś ca / anumāṇām ca / tadyathā pañcānām indriyāṇām / [...] na caivam ātmano 'stūti nāstī ātma/.

57 According to MSAVBh tsi D163b7–164a1/P192b3 (*pudgalavādin*). That this is an objection is also testified to by Vairocanarakṣita’s (MS 42b2) gloss: *upalabdhir ityādi codyam/.

58 According to MSAVBh tsi D164a1–4/P192b3–7, one cannot claim that only (*kevalam*) that which is cognized (*dravyasat*) by the (corporeal) sense-faculties exists as a real substance, for there are things existing as real substances which, though they are not perceived by the (corporeal) sense-faculties, are cognized by the intellect (*buddhi*), like thought and the mental factors (*cittacaitta*). Therefore, “perceived” (*upalabdha*) can also refer to things that are grasped by mental awareness (*manovijñāna*). According to the Pudgalavādin, then, insofar as the *pudgala* is made perceptible (*pratyakṣikṛta*) by the intellect, it is grasped by perception (*pratyakṣapramāṇa*) and therefore exists as a real substance. I haven’t succeeded so far in locating any clear-cut Pudgalavādin statement to the effect that the *pudgala* is grasped by mental awareness alone (the ŚŚ remains silent on this important issue). According to the Vātsūputrīya/Sāṃmitīya of AK 9 (AKBh 463,11–14/LE 52,2–7, Kośa V.238), the *pudgala* is grasped by all the six viṣāñēnas, but in an indirect manner: *saḍbhir apiṭy ucyate / katham kṛtvā / caksurviṣījñeyāni ced rūpāṇi pratiṣṭāna pudgaloḥ prativibhāvayati caksurviṣījñeyah pudgaloḥ vaktavyaḥ / no tu vaktavyo rūpāṇi vā no vā / evam yāvan manovijñeyāḥ ced dharmāṇi pratiṣṭāna pudgaloḥ prativibhāvayati / manovijñeyāḥ pudgaloḥ vaktavyo no tu vaktavyo dharmāḥ vā no vā / (Yaśomitra [AKV 701,8] explains prativibhāvayati as: *upalakṣayati tadupādānativāti*, i.e., “one distinguishes [it] in a secondary way, because [the *pudgala*] has these [things] for its basis”). On the manovijñāna, see Kośa V.242–243n. 3 and, in the context of the perceptibility of the *pudgala*, AKBh 467,1–2/LE.580,2–3 (Kośa V.252) and AKBh 463,10ff./LE.52,1ff. (Kośa V.238ff). See also Traité II.735–736 and n. 1.

59 Unidentified (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:94–95).
[pudgala] is perceived as a [real] substance.\textsuperscript{60} [The Pudgalavādin:] For which reason? [Answer:] Because [the pseudo-perception of the pudgala] is [nothing but] a wrong notion (viparyāsa) [MSA 18.92c\textsuperscript{2}].\textsuperscript{61} Indeed, the Blessed One has said that to [take] the selfless as a self is a wrong notion. Therefore, to grasp a pudgala in this way is [nothing but] a wrong notion. [The Pudgalavādin:] How is it known that [to grasp a pudgala is a wrong notion]? [Answer:] Because it is pollution (saṅkleśa) [MSA 18.92d\textsuperscript{1}].\textsuperscript{62} Indeed, this pollution is characterized as [that] defilement [which consists in] the personalistic [false] view, i.e., [that which expresses itself in the form] of “I” [and] “mine.”\textsuperscript{63} \textsuperscript{64}Now, that which is not a wrong notion (aviparyāsa) cannot be a pollution. [The Pudgalavādin:] And how can one know that this very [false view] is a pollution? [Answer:] Because the personalistic false view is the cause of [that which is] defiled

\textsuperscript{60} According to MSAVBh tsi D164b1–2/P193a5–7, the scriptural locus advocated by the Pudgalavādin has not been preached by the Blessed One with a view (*abhipraya) to affirm that the pudgala exists as a real substance (*dravyasat), but rather with a view to affirm that living beings (*sattva) speak erroneously (phīn ci log tu smra ba) when they claim to see (*\textsuperscript{dhṛś})- and to perceive (*upa\textsuperscript{labha}-) the self (*ātman) in spite of there being no self.

\textsuperscript{61} Wrong notions are traditionally held to be four in number: permanent (*nitya), pleasurable (sukha), pure/good (*śuci/śubha), self (*atman). AK Bh 283.5–7 (Kośa IV.21): catvāro viparyāsāḥ / anitye nityam iti / duḥkhe sukham iti / aśucau śucīti / anātmany ātmeti /.[There are] four wrong notions: to take what is impermanent as permanent; to take what is painful as pleasurable; to take what is impure as pure; to take what is impure as pure; to take what is selfless as a self.” On the four viparyāsas, see e.g. Traité II.925n. 1, Lévi 1911:237n. 1, May 1959:190–205.

\textsuperscript{62} According to MSAVBh tsi D164b4–5/P193b1–2, pollution is sixfold: desire (*rāga), hostility (kho kro ba = pratigha?), (self-)conceit (na rgyal = (asmijmāna?)?), nescience (*avidyā), false view (*dṛṣṭi), and doubt (*saṃsaḍa). I am not aware of any other occurrence of this sixfold list. On the meaning of saṅkleśa, see Schmithausen 1987:II.246–247n. 21 and May 1959:97–98n. 226.

\textsuperscript{63} On the satkāyadṛṣṭi, see Kośa V.15–17, Traité II.737n. 3 and Eltschinger forthcoming 1.

\textsuperscript{64} According to MSAVBh tsi D164b6/P193b3–4, the Pudgalavādin now objects as follows: The false view of the pudgala (*pudgaladṛṣṭi) may well have the character of a pollution (*saṅkleśalakṣaṇa), still it does not have the character of a wrong notion (*viparyāśalakṣaṇa).

\textsuperscript{65} According to MSAVBh tsi D164b7–165a1/P193b4–7, all that which is pollution (*saṅkleśa) is wrong notion (*viparyāśa), as to grasp (*graha) something as permanent (*nitya) or good (*śubha), and nothing non-polluted is a wrong notion, as to grasp something as impermanent (*anitya) or offensive (*asubha). Therefore, if to grasp something as the self (*ātman) or the pudgala has the character of pollution (*saṅkleśalakṣaṇa), it must be a wrong notion.
[The Pudgalavādin:] But [according to you,] should one say that the pudgala is one [and the same] with or rather distinct (anya) from the [real] thing (vastu) named “corporeity,” etc., with regard to which the [verbal] designation “pudgala” [takes place]? [The MSA] answers:67 This [pudgala] can be said to be neither one [and the same] with nor distinct from the [basis of its designation, i.e., from the five skandhas] [MSA 18.93ab]68 [The Pudgalavādin:] For which reason? [Answer:] Because of the two faults [that would ensue] [MSA 18.93b].

[The Pudgalavādin:] Because of which two faults? [Answer:] Because [if the

66 According to MSAVBh tsi D165a3–4/P194a1–2, defilements (*kleśa) such as desire (*rāga), hostility (*duśesa) and error (*moha) arise from the false view of a self (*ātmadṛṣṭi). Therefore, since the false view of a self serves as the cause of defilements, the personalistic false view (*satkāyadṛṣṭi) is the nature of the defilements (*kleśasvabhāva). On the genealogy of the defilements out of the false view of a self, see below, MSABh 160,3–4 and n. 123. For similar statements in early Yogācāra literature and in the Buddhist epistemologists’ works, see Eltschinger forthcoming 1.

67 According to MSAVBh tsi D165a4–b2/P194a2–b1, the Pudgalavādin has objected as follows: You claim that the pudgala does not exist as a real substance (*dravyasat), but exists as a designation (*prajñaptisat). Now, a designation (*prajñapti) is impossible (*asambhava) without a basis (gzi = *vastu), as the designation “pot” (*gha iti) is impossible in the absence of a pot, but occurs in dependence of a pot (*ghaṭam āśriyata). On which basis, then, does the designation “pudgala” occur? The reply to this objection is as follows: The designation “pudgala,” far from being based on something existing substantially, is nothing but a designation of the five constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality to which one clings (*pañcopādānaskandha), as it is said in the Sūtra: “O monks, those ascetics or Brahmins who consider that [there is] a self, all these only consider the five constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality to which one clings.”* *MSAVBh tsi D165a6/P194a4–5: dge sbyon ńam bram ze ’am / gan su yaṅ rün ba bdag gan bdag gi žes ’dogs pa de dag ni nê bar len pa i phuṅ po lña ńid la ńa ’am bdag gi žes lta žin ’dogs par zad do žes gsnü so //. To be compared with AKBh 282,1–3 (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:95; Koša IV.17) and AKBh 467,6–7/LE82,2–4 (Koša V.253; see LE82n. 289 for references): ye kecid bhikṣavah śramaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā āmṛeti samanupāṣyantāḥ samanupāṣyante sarve ta imān eva pañcopādānaskandhāni iti ; and SN III.46 (XXII, 47, 3) (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:95): ye hi keci bhikkhave sāmaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā anekavihītam atītaṃ samanupassamāṇā samanupassanti / sabbe te pañcupādānakkhandhe samanupassantā etesaṃ vā anīkataṃ /. The same passage is quoted in MAV 244,15–18 and 254,14–16.

68 According to MSAVBh tsi D165b2–3/P194b1–3, since it exists as a mere designation (*prajñaptisat) but not as a real substance (*dravyasat), the pudgala can be said neither to be of the same nature (*ekasvabhāva) as the skandhas nor to be distinct from the skandhas.
According to MSAVbh *tsi D165b5–166a2/P194b6–195a3, if one holds that the *skandhas and the *pudgala are one and the same (*eka), then, (1a) as the self (*ātman) is of a permanent nature (*nityasvabhāva), the five *skandhas themselves will be of a permanent nature (which is false). Moreover, (1b) if the five *skandhas and the self were one and the same, then, as the the five *skandhas exist as real substances (*dravyasat), the *pudgala also would exist as a real substance (which is false). But if one holds the *pudgala to exist independently of the five *skandhas, then, (2) as the outsiders (*ārthika) claim that what they call “ātman” exists as a real substance independently of the *skandhas, what is called “pudgala” will also exist as a real substance independently of the five *skandhas (which is false). In both Vasubandhu’s and Sthiramati’s interpretations, (1b) = (2). For an argument similar to (1b), see AKBh 461.24–462.24/LE40.9–48.5, quoted below, n. 76.

MSAVbh *tsi D166a2–3/P195a3–5: goṇ du bṣad pa ltar na gaṇ zag rdzas su med par ‘gyur te / btags pa tsam du yod pas na / gaṇ zag gi phun po daṅ rāṇ bžin gcig par mi (em.: DP om. mi) ‘gyur ro // phun po ŋid gaṇ zag gi rāṇ bžin yin no žes kyaṅ ma brjod la / phun po la ma gtogs pa gaṇ zag logs śig na yod par yaṅ mi brjod la / don du na phun po la yaṅ gaṇ zag gi rāṇ bžin med / phun po la ma gtogs pa gaṇ zag ces bya ba logs śig na yaṅ rdzas su med do žes bya ba’i don to //. “As stated before, since the *pudgala does not exist as a [real] substance, [but] exists as a mere designation, the *pudgala cannot have the same nature as the *skandhas. [We] don’t say that the *skandhas are the nature of the *pudgala, and we don’t say that the *pudgala exists independently of the *skandhas. Ultimately, the *skandhas don’t have the nature of a *pudgala, [but] the *pudgala does not exist as a [real] substance independently of the *skandhas. Such is the [intended] meaning.”

According to MSAVbh *tsi D166a4–6/P195a6–8, one says neither that the *skandhas and the *pudgala are one and the same thing, nor that they are distinct things. Therefore, if someone asks whether the *skandhas and the *pudgala are one and the same, one does not answer that they are one and the same thing (*eka ity avyākṛta). And if someone asks whether the *skandhas and the *pudgala are distinct things, one does not answer that they are distinct things (*bhīna ity avyākṛta). And indeed, since the *pudgala is without a nature of its own (*nīḥsvabhāva), it can be taught neither to be the same as the *skandhas nor to be distinct from them, as it cannot be answered that the son of a barren woman (*vandhyāputra) is of dark (*śyāma) or clear (*gaura) complexion. The types of questions are traditionally held to
be four in number (AKBh 292,9–10): sthāpanīyāḥ praśno 'vyākṛta ity uktam / caturvidho hi praśnaḥ / ekāṃśavyākaraṇīyo vibhajavyākaraṇīyāḥ paripṛcchhyavākaraṇīyāḥ sthāpanīyas ca. “A question that should be avoided is called ‘unanswered.’ There are indeed four types of questions: to be answered by absolute affirmation, to be answered by distinguishing [the different aspects involved], to be answered by questioning [the questioner], and to be avoided [, i.e., left unanswered].” (1) AKBh 292,15: kiṃ sarvasattvā marantaḥ ekāṃśa vyākhyāyam marisyaṇīti /. “[The question:] ‘Will all living beings die?’ should be answered by absolute affirmation: ‘[Yes, all] will die.’” (2) AKBh 292,15–16: kiṃ sarve janīṣyanta iti vibhajya vyākhyāyam sakleśā janīṣyante na niḥkleśā iti /. “[The question:] ‘Will all [living beings] be reborn?’ should be answered by distinguishing: ‘[Those] who are defiled will be reborn, not the undefiled [ones].’” (3) AKBh 292,16–19: kiṃ anyaḥ skandhe bhavanty iti sthāpanīyāḥ / sattvadravyasyaṁ bhāgavat vandhyāputraśyām agauratādivat /. “[The question:] ‘Is the human being superior [or] inferior?’ should be answered by questioning [the questioner]: ‘With regard to whom do you ask?’ If he said: ‘To the gods,’ [then] one should answer: ‘Inferior.’ [But] if he said: ‘To [those of] the evil states of existence,’ [then] one should answer: ‘Superior.’” (4) The issue of the pudgala as well as all the other avyākṛta-vastus belongs to the fourth category (AKBh 292,19–20): kiṃ anyaḥ skandhe bhayāḥ sattva ‘nanya iti sthāpanīyāḥ / sattvadravyasyābhāvād vandhyāputraśyām agauratādīvat /. “[The question:] ‘Is the [personal] being other or the same as the skandhas?’ should be avoided, because there is no [such real] substance [as] a [personal] being, as [should be avoided the question] whether the son of a barren woman is of dark or clear complexion.” Other famous examples include: “Is the hair of a tortoise hard or soft?” (kiem kaurmasya romnaḥ kharata mrdutā vā [AKBh 469,12/LE98,5]), or: “The fruits of the mango tree in your palace, are they sour or sweet? – [But, says king Milinda,] there is no mango tree in my palace!” (yas te ‘ntahpure āṃravṛkṣas tasya kim aṃlāni phalāni āhosvin madhurāṇī / naiva mamāntahpure kaściḥ āṃravṛkṣo ‘sti / [AKBh 469,20–21/LE100,3–4]). The reason why the Buddha remains silent on questions such as that of the identity/difference of the self and the skandhas is that he takes into consideration the intention of the person asking the question (praśtur āśayāpeksā) in order to prevent him from falling into the extremes of eternalism (sāśvattānta, if he answers that they are indeed different) and annihilationism (ucchēdānta, if he answers that they are the same), i.e., in false views (dṛṣṭi) and ethical nihilism (the view that there is no good or bad action and no eschatological consequence), the latter being generally held to be more perverse than the former. On the ten or fourteen avyākṛtavastus, see AKBh 292,8–294,4 and Kośa IV.43–48, Traité I.153–161 and 423; for other references, see May 1959:277–278n. 1015. In the specific context of the present polemic, see especially AKBh 469,9–471,19/LE98,1–114,3 (Kośa V.262–270), MAV 250,16–252,2 and Venkata Ramanan 1953:168 and 175–176.
But to those who, violating the Teacher’s Teaching, admit that the pudgala exists as a [real] substance, one should reply as follows: If [your pudgala] exists as a [real] substance and [at the same time] cannot be said [to be either one and the same with or distinct from the skandhas, then you] have to state the reason (prayojana) [for this] [MSA 18.94ab]. [The Pudgalavādin:] Why [should we state such a reason]? [Answer:] [Because a real pudgala] cannot be said to be neither one [and the same with] nor distinct [from the skandhas] without a reason [being provided for the denial of each of the two propositions] [MSA 18.94cd].

But if [, in the absence of any reason,] it were merely due to an example that they accepted that the pudgala cannot be said [to be either one and the same with or distinct from the skandhas, stating:] “As fire can be said to be neither distinct

72 According to MSAVBh tsi D166a6–7/P195a8–b2, MSABh 155,19–156,8 has been criticizing in a general way (*sāmānyena) both the *ātmavādin outsiders (*tūrthika) and the *buddhas who believe in the existence of the pudgala. In MSABh 156,8–24 (see below, n. 83) onwards, the MSABh starts to criticize the Buddhist coreligionists (bstan pa ‘di la žugs pa), more precisely the views of the Sāṃmitiyas (sam [P: D sam] bi ti pa) who admit that the pudgala exists as a real substance. See above, n. 8.

73 According to MSAVBh tsi D166a7–b2/P195b2–5, “those who” refers to the Sāṃmitiyas (sam [P: D sam] bi ti pa); “Teacher” refers to the Blessed Buddha (*bhagavān buddhaḥ); “Teaching” refers to the twelve-membered word of the Buddha (*dvādaśāṅgapravacana), i.e., to the doctrine according to which all factors are impermanent (*aniya), painful (*duḥkha), empty (*śūnya), and selfless (*anātman). To “violate” this teaching is tantamount to expounding its meaning (*artha) erroneously by saying that what is called “pudgala” exists as a real substance (*dravyasat), that it can be said neither to be one and the same with (*eka) nor distinct from (*bhimna) the five constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality (*pañcaskandha).

74 According to MSAVBh tsi D166b2–5/P195b5–196a1, the proponent has stated the reasons (*prayojana = *hetu; in MSABh 156,4–7) why he says neither that the pudgala is one and the same with the skandhas (for if it were the case, the skandhas would be permanent and the pudgala would exist as a real substance) nor that it is distinct from them (for if it were the case, the pudgala would exist as a real substance as the *ātman postulated by the outsiders [*tūrthikaparikalpita]). In the same way, the Pudgalavādin should state the reasons why his substantially existing pudgala cannot be said (*avācyā) to be either one and the same with or distinct from the skandhas.

75 According to MSAVBh tsi D166b7–167a2/P196a4–6, if they cannot be said to be one and the same (*eka) thing, then they must be distinct (*bhimna) things, like fire and water, and if they cannot be said to be distinct things, then they must be one and the same, like fire and fire’s heat (*agnyausṣaya).
According to MSAVBh tsi D167a–b1/P196a–b6, the Pudgalavādin adduces an example of something that exists as a real substance but cannot be said to be either one and the same with or distinct from another. Fire (*agni) and fuel (*indhana) exist as real substances (*dravyasat) but are not distinct things, for once fire has arisen from fuel, they are no longer distinct things; and if they were distinct things, fire could arise even in the absence of fuel; but since one doesn’t observe that fire arises in the absence of fuel, they are not distinct things. Nor are fire and fuel one and the same thing, for fuel is the cause of fire and does not have heat for its nature (*uṣṇatāsvabhāva), whereas fire is the effect of fuel and has heat for its nature; and if they were one and the same thing, then, as one would not burn oneself when touching (*samā/nte) fire, one would burn oneself when touching fuel. On the example of fuel and fire, see AKBh 461,24–462,24/LE40,9–48,5 (Koṣa V.234–237), and especially AKBh 462,1–4/LE42,2–6: na hi vinendhanenāgniṃ prajñāpyate / na cānya indhanānāgīṃ sākyate pratijñātum / nāpy ananyāḥ / yadi hy anyāḥ syād anuṣṣum indhanāṃ syāt / athānanyāḥ syād dāhyam eva dāhakaṃ syāt / evaṃ na ca vinā skandhahiḥ pudgalaḥ pra- jñāpyate / na cānya skandhebhyāḥ sākyate pratijñātum sāśvatprasānggāt / nāpy ananya ucchedaprasānggād iti /. Note AKVy 700,7–8: sāśvatprasānggād ity asamsktavat / ucchedaprasānggād iti skandhavat /. See also above, n. 69. That the/(certain) Pudgalavādins made use of this analogy is made almost certain by a passage of the SŚ (466b3–6, translation Chau 1987:35 [see also Venkata Raman 1953:182]): ‘Qu’est-ce que le pudgala-désigné-par-les-fonements? – Comme le Bouddha l’a dit à Pāpaka: ‘En se fondant sur telles et telles choses composées (samskāra), on nomme [pudgala] ce-qui-est-désigné-par-les-fonements.’ Ce qui est nommé [pudgala]-désigné-par-les-fonements, est comme le feu [par rapport au combustible].” On the *āśrayaprājñaptapudgala, see 1. Buddhist Personalism and its Critique, 1.4. On the fire-fuel analogy, see Duerlinger 1982.

According to MSAVBh tsi D167b5–6/P197a3–5, among the four great elements (*mahā-bhūta), fire is the element fire (*tejodhātu) and has heat for its characteristic (*uṣṇatā-lakṣaṇa); as for fuel, it consists of the remaining three elements, viz. earth (*prthividhātu), water (*abhātu) and wind (*vāyudhātu), which have respectively for their characteristics solidity (*kharalakṣaṇa), fluidity (*mehalakṣaṇa) and mobility (*tirālakṣaṇa). See AK 1.12cd, AKBh 8,18–25, and Koṣa I.22–23. To be compared with AKBh 462,12–14/LE44,11–13 (Koṣa V.235): atha punas tatraiva kāṣṭhādau pradīptie yad aṣṭuṇām tad agnis tattahajātāni bhūtāṃdhanam isyante / tayor api siddham anyatvam lakṣanabhedaś /, and AKVy 700,21–24 thereon: tayor api aṃgaṇādihayor evalakṣaṇayoh Siddham anyatvam.

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in the world [of ordinary experience], one observes [the existence of] fuel such as wood even in the absence of fire, and [of] fire even in the absence of fuel, [their] being other is [well] established. Moreover, in the [authoritative] treatises (śāstre) [preached by Him], the Blessed One has said nowhere that fire and fuel cannot be said [to be either one and the same or distinct]. Therefore, this is incorrect. [The Pudgalavādin:] But how is it known that fire [also] exists without fuel? [Answer:] Because one perceives [that fire can exist without fuel] for [when it is] blown by the wind, [fire can] even go a long way while [still] ablaze. [The Pudgalavādin:] But in this case, the wind [itself] might [well] be the fuel! [Answer:] This is precisely the reason why it is established that fire and fuel are [mutually] distinct [things]! [The Pudgalavādin: But] why? [Answer:] As [being] two, indeed [MSA 18.95d^2]. [This] is to be construed with “Because one perceives.” [And] indeed, here two [things] are perceived, [i.e.,] the flame and, as [its] fuel, the wind.

On the existence of fire in the absence of fuel, see below, MSABh 156,20–21. According to MSABh tsi D168a2–4/P196b2–4, in the Abhidharma (mnon pa’i chos ‘bum gyi gzun = *Abhidharmaśatasāhasrikagrantha?), the Blessed One has not said that fire and fuel are one and the same thing, but that they are distinct things, for he has said: “Fire has heat for its nature (*uṣṇatāsvabhāva), earth has solidity for its nature (*kharasvabhāva), water has fluidity for its nature (*snehasvabhāva), and wind has mobility for its nature (*ṭīrṇāsvabhāva).” According to MSABh tsi D167b2–4/P196b7–197a3, upalabdhi addsuces a fourth reason proving that fire and fuel are distinct things. According to Sthiramati, upalabdhi is to be understood as *upalabdhipramāṇa. According to MSABh tsi D168b1–2/P198a2–3, since the wind performs the action (*karman) of bringing the flame (*jvala) somewhere else (*anyadeśa), it has mobility for its nature (*ṭīrṇāsvabhāva); but since the flame has heat for its nature (*uṣṇatāsvabhāva), wind and fire are established as mutually distinct things. Like Vasubandhu, Sthiramati (MSABh tsi D168b2–3/P198a3–5) seems to interpret dvayena hi as a fifth reason in favour of the difference between fire and fuel, for “dvayena hi occurs in the stanza, but not the word upalabhēḥ” (kā ri kā las giṣ su žes ’byuṅ gi i dmigs pa žes bya ba ni tshig mi ’byuṅ mod kyi, MSABh tsi D168b2–3/P198a4). When the flame is blown by the wind, one perceives them as being two: the wind is perceived as having mobility/motion for its characteristic, whereas the flame is perceived as having heat for its characteristics.
[The Pudgalavādin:] The pudgala, which is the seer, [and this] up to the cognizer, the agent, the experiencer, the knower and the liberator, does simply exist.83 [Answer:] The [pudgala] is no more justified as [being] a seer than it is [as the agent of any action,] up to [being] a liberator. [And] indeed, it could be the agent of the cognitions called “seeing,” etc., either as [their causal] condition or as [their] master.84 Among these [two, let us consider] first [the hypothesis of the pudgala as a causal condition]: Since a cognition arises in dependence of two [factors only], the [pudgala] is not [its causal] condition [MSA 18.96ab].85

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83 According to MSAVBh tsi D168b4–7/P198a5–b2, the false view (*dṛṣṭi) of the Sāṃnipītyas (sam [P: D saṃ] bi ti pa) has been duly refuted (in MSABh 156,8–24, see above, n. 72) so that the MSAabh 156,24ff. can turn to the refutation of those outsiders (*tīrthika) who hold that the self (?ña'i bdag, “the self that is the I/ego”) exists. According to them, the self is the agent (*kāra) of the action (*kriyā) of seeing visible things (*rūpa), etc., up to cognizing mental events (*dharma); it experiences (*anuvābhū) the pleasurable (*sukha) and painful (*duḥkha) results (*kārya) of good and bad deeds (*kuśalākūśalakarman) that are responsible for one’s entanglement in samsāra; the bondage ('chiṅ ba = bandhana, sanyojana?) that ties living beings (*sattva) amounts to three factors: *sattva, *rajas, and *tamas; once it has liberated itself from this threefold bondage, the self liberates itself (*mokṣa), obtains nirvāṇa. Considering that Sthiramati refers here at least inter alia to Sāṃkhya doctrines, Tib. 'chiṅ ba may render an original Skt. bandha (see Frawullner 1953:338); pre-classical Sāṃkhya knew of a threefold bondage: prakṛtibandha (bondage through Urmatierie) vai-kārikabandha (bondage through emotions), and daksinābandha (bondage through the sacrificial fee; see Frawullner 1953:337–339). In the doctrine alluded to by Sthiramati, the three basic constituents of matter have been substituted for the older three factors, so that one may interpret this threefold bondage as the soul’s entanglement in matter and its processes (see Frawullner 1953:374–380). As suggested above (see 1. Buddhist Personalism and its Critique, 1.4 and n. 18), there is no compelling reason to follow Sthiramati’s opinion that the MSA(Bh) is now attacking non-Buddhist doctrines.

84 According to MSAVBh tsi D169b7–169a5/P198b3–199a1, the self could be an agent in the sense of a master (*svāmin): In the same way as a master or a lord (dpon po = pati?) commands (*vāsa-) the slave (*dāsa) and has his wishes fulfilled by the slave due to his command (*vaśa), the self might be in command of cognitions such as the visual cognition (*caṇḍurviṣṇānādiṣaṃkṣipta); due to the power of the self, the cognitions (*ṣaṃkṣipta) would see visible things, etc. (*rūpādi), and the self in turn would see (*dṛṣṭi) or experience (*anuvābhū) visible things as they appear in the cognition (*yathā viśīṇā [pratī]bhāṣate).

85 According to MSAVBh tsi D169a5–6/P199a1–3, a visual cognition (*caksurviṣṇāna) arises in dependence of something visible (*rūpa) and the visual sense-faculty (*caksurindriya). Therefore, what is called the self cannot act as a causal condition in the rise of a visual cognition. To be compared with AKBh 464,12–14/LE 60,6–9 (Kośa V.241): sütre hi nirdhārttamsa dhvayaṃ prathīta viśēṣyāsotapādo bhavattītā tablets caksur bhikṣo hetā rūpāneg pratyayāsā caksurviṣṇānāsotādāya / tat kasya hetoh / yat kimcid bhikṣo caksurviṣṇānam
Pudgalavādin:] For which reason [isn’t the pudgala a causal condition in the production of a cognition]? [Answer:] Because [it is] useless [MSA 18.96c¹], for one does not observe it to have any function (sāmarthya) in this [process].⁸⁶ Or, if [the pudgala] presided over [the rise of a cognition], neither would it bring about an impermanent [pleasurable cognition, nor would it ever bring about] an undesirable one [MSA 18.97ab].⁸⁷ Indeed, if this [pudgala] presided over the production of cognitions, it would [certainly] not bring about a desirable [but] impermanent cognition, and certainly no undesirable one. Therefore, since it is impossible in either of the two ways (ubhayath/g407pi) [i.e., either as a causal condition or as a master], the [pudgala] cannot be a seer, [and this] up to a liberator [MSA 18.96c²d].

Furthermore, if the pudgala exists as a [real] substance, its operation and characteristic are to be established [MSA 18.97a].⁸⁸ [And indeed,] one perceives

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⁸⁶ According to MSAVBh tsi D169a5–6/P199a1–3, when fire has been brought about by the fuel, water is in no way (*na katha/g362 cit) necessary in order to produce it; in the same way, when a visual cognition has arisen in dependence of something visible (*r/g460pa) and the eye (*cak/g380us), the self is in no way necessary in order to produce it. In other words, the self is useless (*nirarthaka), does not perform any action (*akicikara).

⁸⁷ According to MSAVBh tsi D169b2–5/P199a6–b3, if the self experienced visible or audible things as they appear in cognition, then, since the living beings (*sattva) always (*nityam) long for pleasure (*sukha) alone and wish never to be associated with suffering (*duṅkha), the self would always produce pleasurable cognitions, and never undesirable (*aniṣṭa) and unpleasurable (*asukha) ones. For if the self were in command of cognitions and experienced pleasure and suffering as they appear in the various cognitions, it would always bring about pleasurable cognitions and never painful ones. To be compared with Traité II.743: “Si l’Âtman était autonome (svatantra) et actif (kâraka), il devrait tout obtenir selon ses désirs. Or il n’obtient pas [toujours] ce qu’il désire, et il subit [souvent] ce qu’il ne désire pas. […] En outre, tout être déteste la douleur (duṅkha) ; mais quiconque recherche le bonheur (sukha), trouve la douleur. C’est pourquoi, nous savons que l’Âtman n’est pas autonome, ni non plus actif.”

⁸⁸ According to MSAVBh tsi D169b7–170a2/P199b6–200a1, the visual sense-faculty (*cakṣurindriya) and the visual cognition (*cakṣurvijñāna), which exist as real substances (*dravyasat), possess an operation (*karman) and a characteristic (*lakṣana): their joint operation is to perform the action of seeing visible things; the characteristic of the visual sense-faculty is to manifest something visible (*rūpaprasāda); the characteristic of the visual cognition is (*svabhāva) to cognize a colour such as blue (*nilādīrūpa). If one accepts that what is called the self also exists as a real substance, one has to exhibit its
operation and its characteristic, for in their absence, the self is simply similar to a rabbit’s horn (*śaṇāśaṇḍana) and to the son of a barren woman (*vandhyāpūtra). On the rabbit’s horn, see Traité II.738 and Venkata Ramanan 1953:193.

89 Translated from the Tibetan version (MSA Bh tib P262b3): gaṅ ṇig reṇas su yod pa de ’i ni las daṅ mtshan ’bsd kyai dmigs te / dper na mig la sogs pa ’i lta ba la sogs pa daṅ gzugs dad pa la sogs pa lta bu yan na /. Here is the text as edited by Lévi (L157,10–11), with the variant readings of MSS A (156a6–b1) and B (142b2–4) in brackets: yadi dravyato ’sti tasya karmalakṣaṇaḥ upalabdhyate (upalabhyeta MS A, upalabhyaḥ [sic] MS B)/ yathā caṇṣurāḍīnāṃ darśanādilakṣaṇāṃ ca rūpaprasādādī (MS A om. laksanāṃ ca rūpaprasādādī) /. The reading of the Tibetan version can be reconstructed as follows: *yad dravyato ’sti tasya karmalakṣaṇam apy upalabhyaḥ / yathā caṇṣurāḍīnāṃ darśanādī rūpaprasādādī (ca) /. Such a reading is perfectly consonant with Sthiramati’s commentary (see above, n. 88), which reflects a dvandva analysis of *karmalakṣaṇam.

90 According to MSAVBh tsi D170a4–5/P200a4–5: de la saṁs rgyas bcom ldan ’das gaṅ že na / gaṅ gis chos thams cad thugs su chud pa ’i phyir / saṁs rgyas zhes bya ste / des (em.: P des daṅ, D de daṅ) ’phags pa ’i chos kyi sku daṅ šes rabs kyi spyan gis bya chaṅ chub byed pa daṅ slob pa daṅ mi slob pa ’i (em.: DP pas) chos gzig so /. “Among these [things], what does a Blessed Buddha consist of? We call ‘Buddha’ the one who, because he comprehends (*avabodha) all dharmas, sees the [three] dharmas of that which enlightens, of those [still] undergoing training (*śaṅka) and of those no [longer] in need of training through the noble dharmabody and the eye of insight (*prajñācaksu).” According to Sthiramati, a Buddha is called ‘Buddha’ because he correctly comprehends the meaning of all dharmas as many as there are (*yāvadbhāva). If the pudgala existed, this omniscient (*sarvajña) being would see it; but if he saw the pudgala, he could no longer be called a ‘Buddha’ due to comprehending this threefold salvational dharmā.

91 According to MSAVBh tsi D170a7–b5/P200a8–b6, his complete awakening is termed “profound” due to the fact that he comprehends the *dharmanairātya (a feature that traditionally distinguishes him from the Arhats, Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas), “uncommon” due to the fact that he comprehends the *pudgalanairātya (a feature that traditionally distinguishes him from the ātmavādin outsiders), and “supra-mundane” due to the fact that
[then] nothing profound [at all] is perfectly understood [by him], and [nothing]
that is not common to the outsiders, and nothing [that is] unusual (anucita) in the
ordinary world (loka), for such a grasping is accessible to all ordinary people
(loka), adhered to by the outsiders, and adapted to/usual in (ucita) the long
saṃsāra.

Moreover, the pudgala, if it is [an agent such as] a seer, [and this] up to a
cognizer, might either entail exertion or lack exertion in order to see, etc.92 Now
if it belongs to a [pudgala] that entails exertion, this exertion might either be
self-arisen, [i.e.,] spontaneous, or have this [pudgala] as its [causal] condition.
But its effort in order to see, etc., is not self-arisen, because of all the three
[faults that are to be presented below] [MSA 18.98ab]. And it is precisely
because of the three faults that will be presented [below] that [we reject the
second hypothesis also, i.e., the pudgala’s] being the [causal] condition of this
effort [MSA 18.98c].93 [Here in MSA 18.98d, the negation] “na” is to be
supplied. Now if [the pudgala] is lacking exertion, [then] it is established [that
this pudgala is not an agent. And indeed: if] seeing, etc., lacks an effort [MSA
18.98d], i.e., if there is no exertion [on the part] of the pudgala in order to see,
etc., how [can] this [pudgala] be [an agent such as] a seer, [and this] up to a
cognizer?

[The Pudgalavādin:] It has been stated [above]: “Because of three faults.” [But]
because of which three faults? [Answer:] Because the [pudgala] would no
[longer] be an agent, because [the exertion] is impermanent, [and] because [exer-

he comprehends both the *dharmā- and the *pudgalanairātmya (a feature that traditionally
distinguishes him from worldly or ordinary persons [*laukika, but also *prthajana in
MSAVBh tsi D171a1/P201a3]). Alternatively, his complete awakening is termed “pro-
found” because he knows that the *parikalpitasvabhāva does not exist, “uncommon” be-
cause he comprehends the *paratantra (which is devoid of *parikalpitadharmas and *pari-
kalpitapudgala), i.e., that the mind and the mental factors (*cittacaitta) simply exist (yod pa
tsam), and “supra-mundane” because he comprehends the *parinispannalakṣaṇa.

92 According to MSAVBh tsi D171a3–4/P201a5–7, “exertion” (*prayātana) refers to one’s
opening (*unmesa, *unmīlana) one’s eyes, etc.

93 At least as far as the soundness of the argument is concerned, MSABh 157,22 tad°
cannot be
taken to refer to pudgala, an interpretation shared by the Tibetan translations (MSABhτb
P262b8 and MSAVBh tsi D171a7/P201b3: byed pa de’i rkyen [canMSABhtib]). Moreover (and
contrary to MSABh 157,19: tatpratyayaḥ), the compound tadyatnapratyaya- is better not
interpreted as a bahuvrīhi.
tion] would occur [all] at once [and] permanently, [this pudgala’s] effort in order to see [visible things], etc., cannot be self-arisen [MSA 18.99]. If the exertion [made] in order to see [visible things], etc., [and] through which seeing, etc., [occurs,] is spontaneous [i.e., without cause nor condition], then the pudgala is not the agent of these [cognitions]; therefore, how [can] this pudgala be [an agent such as] a seer, [and this] up to a cognizer? Or, if it is spontaneous, [then,] since it does not depend [on any cause or condition, this] exertion would not occasionally fail to occur, would not be impermanent. 94 And if this effort were permanent, [then] seeing, etc., would occur both [all] at once and permanently. 95 Such is the [threefold] fault [alluded to above]. Therefore, the exertion [made] in order to see [visible things], etc., cannot be spontaneous.

Neither a [pudgala] that [always] remains as it is nor a perishable [pudgala] can be the [causal] condition [of the exertion aimed at producing seeing, etc., and this for three reasons:] because [this exertion] does not exist before [, hence cannot be due to a permanent cause]; because [this pudgala] would [ipso facto] be impermanent; and because there is no third hypothesis [i.e., the hypothesis of a pudgala that would be neither permanent nor impermanent] [MSA 18.100].96

94 According to MSAVBh tsi D172a4–5/P202b2–4, since that which depends on a cause (*kāraṇam apekṣate) arises when its cause is present and does not arise when its cause is absent, it can be lacking sometimes; on the contrary, causeless (*nirhetuka) dharmas, since they do not depend on causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya), can never be lacking at a certain point in time. Therefore, if it is spontaneous (*ākasmika), the effort made in order to see something visible, etc., should not be impermanent, i.e., should be characterized as permanent (*nityalakṣana).

95 According to MSAVBh tsi D172a5–b1/P202b4–7, impermanent dharmas do not arise all at once (*sakṛt); some arise and some do not arise; sometimes they arise and sometimes not. On the contrary, permanent dharmas occur entirely (thog thag tu khyab par), like space (*kāśavat), and all the time (*sarvadā).

96 According to MSAVBh tsi D172b1–7/P202b8–203b1, if the self serves as a causal condition (*pratyaya), then this causal condition could be either permanent or impermanent according to whether the self is permanent or impermanent. (1) Since the effects arisen from permanent causes cannot be occasional but occur permanently, the action of seeing should occur when the eyes actually see (or: when the eyes are opened, *caksurunmeṣakāle), but also already before, when they do not see yet (or: when the eyes are shut, *caksurenmeṣakāle; see also MSAVBh tsi D172b7–173a3/P203b1–3). (2) Since the self must be impermanent if the exertion is impermanent, the opponent’s claim that the self is permanent is useless (see also MSAVBh tsi D173a6–7/P203b7–204a1). (3) There can be no third hypothesis according to which the self would be neither permanent nor impermanent because, since “permanent” and “impermanent” are contradictory properties (*viruddhadharma), that which is perma-
But if the exertion [made in order to see something visible, etc.,] had the *pudgala* for its [causal] condition, [then] this *[pudgala], if it always] remains as it is, cannot be the [causal] condition [of this exertion], because [this exertion] does not exist before [the wish to open one’s eyes and see]. For if [this effort] had the *[pudgala] for its [causal] condition, [then,] since the *pudgala* is never without existing, why would [this] exertion lack before, [i.e.,] when it has not [yet] arisen? [But] a perishable *[pudgala] cannot be the condition [of exertion] either, for it would follow that the *pudgala* is impermanent. And there [can] be no third hypothesis according to which it could be neither enduring nor perishable. [Therefore,] the effort cannot have this *[pudgala] for its condition either.

So far (*evaṃ tāvat*), [it is] by resorting to reason(ing) [alone that it has been demonstrated that] the *pudgala* does not exist (nopalabhyate) as a [real] substance." And [this can also be demonstrated by resorting to scripture,] because [the Blessed One has] taught [that] all dharmas are selfless, [that] ultimately [there is nothing but] emptiness, and [that] to perceive a self is harmful (ātmopalambhe doṣaḥ) [MSA 18.101]. Indeed, in the [four] summary statements of doctrine, the Blessed One has taught that all dharmas are selfless. [And] in the [Sūtra entitled] Paramārthaśūnyatā, the Blessed One has taught that the act [really] exists, that the [result of its] maturation also exists, but that

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97 According to MSAVBh tsi D173b2/P204a4–5, reason(ing) (*yukti) consists of arguments made on the basis of perception (*pratyakṣarājñāna) and inference (*anumānārajñāna). In MSABh 158,16ff., our text turns to prove that the *pudgala* does not exist as a real substance by means of scripture (*āgamaraṇā). 98 On the four dharmoddhānas, see MSAVBh tsi D173b3–4/P204a6–7 and 2. The Immediate Context of MSA(Bh) 18.92–103, 2.2. 99 According to MSAVBh tsi D173b4/P204a7, in the Sūtra of the Śrāvakas entitled Paramārthaśūnyatā. See LE92n. 355, which refers to T. 2, 92c18, and the passage quoted in Kośa V.259–260n. 5. See below, n. 102. 100 According to MSAVBh tsi D173b7/P204b3, the good (*kusala) and bad (*akusala) acts (*karman) one has done.
there is no (nopalabhya) agent who [would] leave these skandhas [at death] and take up other skandhas [at rebirth] except a convention[al designation] for the [dependently originated] dharmas.102 [And] in the Pañcakas,103 [the Blessed

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101 According to MSAVBh tsi D173b7/P204b3, the pleasurable (*sukha) and painful (*duḥkha) result (*phala) one experiences (*anubhūta).

102 According to MSAVBh tsi D173b7–174a2/P204b3–5, dharmasanketa (rendered chos su brdar btags pa in MSABh, P263b1–2, but chos kyi tha sīnad in MSAVBh tsi D173b7/P204b3 and D174a1/P204b4) refers to (re)birth in sāṃśāra according to the twelve-membered scheme/principle (*dvādāsāṅganaya) of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda), i.e., “with nescience for their condition (*avidyāpratayā) arise the karmic forces (*sāṃskāra),” etc., up to “with rebirth as their condition (*jātipratayā) arise old age and death (jarāmāra),” etc. Outside/except for this twelfeold scheme/principle, there is nothing [...]. The same passage is quoted in AKBh 129,9–12 (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:98, AKVy 707,13–16, Kośa V.259–260) and AKBh 468,24–26/LE92,8–10, with no variant reading, but with a very useful remark to the effect that, according to Vasubandhu, dharmasanketa amounts to nothing but dependent origination: asti karmāsti vipākaḥ kārakas tu nopalabhya ya imāṁś ca skandhāṃ niṣipatanyāṁś ca skandhāṃ pratisandadhātanyātra dharmasanketā / tatrāyaṃ dharmasanketo yad utāsmin sāttād bhavatīti vistareṇa pratītyasamutpādāḥ / (Note that Yaşomintra explains imāṁ as ahiṁkāra, “this-worldly,” and anITYaṇy as pārātrikā, “other-worldly”). The equivalence between dharmasanketa and the pratītyasamutpāda is strengthened by Yaşomintra’s comments: sanketā hetupalasaṃbandha-vyavasthāḥ (AKVy 283,7), and dharmasanketād iti pratītyasamutpādalakṣaṇāt[1] (AKVy 707,16). So according to Sthiramati, sanketa ≈ naya (scheme, principle, method, behaviour); according to Yaşomintra, sanketa ≈ (hetupalasaṃbandha)vyavasthā (law, rule, status, condition) and sanketa ≈ laksana (token, attribute, characteristic; the particle iti makes it difficult to understand pratītyasamutpādalakṣaṇa as a bhāvavrīhi compound). Should we, then, understand dharmasanketa as the “convention(al designation) for the (dependently originated) dharmas” (as Paramārtha seems to do, see Kośa V.260n. 3), as the “(causal) law (governing) the dharmas,” or simply as “causal origination of dharmas” (as does de La Vallée Poussin, see Kośa V.260)? See the passage of the Chinese Samyuktagama quoted in Kośa V.259–260n. 5 and de La Vallée Poussin’s comments on dharmasanketa in Kośa V.260n. 3. Candrakirti quotes a small part of the same passage in MAV 262,1.

103 Both Sthiramati (MSAVBh tsi D173b5–7/P204a8–b2: nān thos kyi gzun gi geig las brtsams pa dañ / lūn riṇ po žes bya ba la sogs pa gzun man du yod pa las lūn riṇ po ’i gzun gi na nās chos geig las brtsams pa dañ / ghiś las brtsams pa dañ / gsum las brtsams pa dañ / bzi las brtsams pa dañ / lha las brtsams pa’i char gyi naṅ nas (P: D las) lha lhas las brtsams pa’i lha phrugs bsdad pa’i skabs su / gaṅ gi phyir bdag tu bitas (D: P lta) na ņes pa rnam pa lha ’byun no žes gsums te / de bas na gaṅ zab rdzas su yod pa ma yin no //) and Vairocarakṣita (MS 42b4: ekottarikāgama pañcapañcadharmādhikāreṇa nirdeśāḥ kṛtaḥ) refer to the Ekottarikāgama, but the passage seems to have resisted all attempts at identification so far. As pointed out by La Vallée Poussin (Kośa V.250–251n. 3), however, the passage presents a striking phraseological similarity with AN III.246 (CC, 5, and passim, Pañcakanipāta

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One has taught that there are five evils in the perception of a self. [First,] the [false] view of a self [and] the [false] view of a soul (jīva) arise.104 [Second, he who indulges in the perception of an ātman] is not different from the [substantialist] outsiders. [Third, he] engages himself in a wrong path.105 [Fourth,] his mind does not penetrate106 into emptiness, has no faith [in it], is not intent [upon it], is not convinced [of it].107 [Fifth,] he does not purify his noble factors.108 From scripture also it is thus incorrect [to claim that the pudgala exists as a real substance].

Section, to be compared with DN III.240 [XXXIII, 2, 1] and SN III.133 [XXII, 90, 5]: citāmaṁ na pakkhandati na ppaśsidati na santaṭṭhati na vimucaṣṭi. The same passage is quoted in AKbh 466,14–17/LE76,6–9 (see AKVy 704,32–705,2; Kośa V.250–251n. 4) with only a few variants: ātmadṛṣṭe bhavitvat sattvadṛṣṭe jīvaḥ ṛṣita ca ṛṣita bhavitvat jīvaḥ ṛṣitaḥ; tīrthikaiḥ sārdham for tīrthikaiḥ; na vimucaṣṭe for nādhuṁṣṭe. Interestingly enough, the Vatsīputrīya/Sāṃmatiya of AKbh 466,17–24/LE78,1–12 (Kośa V.251–252) does not accept this loci on the grounds that “this [passage, grantha] is not read (recited) in our sect” (na hi kilaiad buddhavacanam), and that “it is not the word of the Buddha because we don’t read (recite) it” (so ’śmaḥhir apāṭṭhaṁ na buddhavacanam).

104 According to MSAVBh tsi D174a2/P204b5–6, if one accepts that the pudgala exists as a real substance (*dravyasat), one will develop the false view of a self and a soul regarding the skandhas that are in themselves devoid of self (*ātman) and one’s own (*ātmiya, or: “what belongs to the self”).

105 According to MSAVBh tsi D174a4–5/P204b8–205a1, the right path is the one that leads to nirvāṇa and liberation (*mokṣa) by means of the mental cultivation (*bhāvanā) of the fact that all conditioned factors (*saṁskāra) are impermanent (*anitya), painful (*duḥkha), empty (*śūnya), and selfless (*anātman). As for the wrong path, it is that of rebirth in saṁsāra and the evil states of existence (*apāya). On pratipanna, see BHSD s.v. pratipanna.

106 On pravṛskanda (Tib. ’jug pa in MSABh P263b3 and MSAVBh tsi D174a5–6/P205a2–3), see BHSD s.v. prasaktanda.

107 According to MSAVBh tsi D174a5–7/P205a2–4, śūnyatā is here to be understood as the absence of self and one’s own (*ātmiya). According to Sthiramati, na ppaśidati na santaṭṭhate nādhuṁṣṭe provides an explanation of na prasaktanda: “has no faith [in it]” refers to the time of listening (*śrutakāla, i.e., the śrutamayī prajñā), “is not intent [upon it]” refers to the time of (rational) reflection (*cintākāla, i.e., the cintāmayī prajñā), and “is not convinced [of it]” refers to the time of mental cultivation (*bhāvanākāla, i.e., the bhāvanāmayī prajñā). On prasāda and adhimokṣa/adhimukti, see Schmithausen 1969:179–181nn. 263–264 and BHSD s.v. prasāda and adhimukti.

108 According to MSAVBh tsi D174a7–b1/P205a5–6, since he does not rid himself of the defilements (*kleśa) that are to be abandoned by (the path of) vision (*darsanaheya) and by
[The Pudgalavādin:] But (hi) the pudgala has also been taught by the Blessed One in such and such [Sūtras] through the classification of [various sorts of] pudgalas such as the one who knows thoroughly (parijñātvin), the burden-bearer (bhārahāra) and the one who follows faith (śraddhānusārin). Therefore, if [the pudgala] does not exist as a [real] substance, why [has it been] taught [by the Blessed One]?\textsuperscript{109} [Answer:] Because by [resorting to the designation of] pudgala, one [can, as did the Blessed One,] indicate differences in addiction and [mental] series concerning defilement and purification, which vary [each] according to degree and party [MSA 18.102].\textsuperscript{110} For in the absence of a designation [such as that] of “pudgala,” one couldn’t, with regard to impurity and purification, [both of] which differ according to degree and party, point to the differences in the addiction to them as well as to the differences in the [mental]

\textsuperscript{109} MSAVBh tsī D174b2–4/P205a7–b2 also mentions the dharmānusāri pudgala. On the form parijñātvin, see BHSG §22.51; on śraddhānusārin, dharmānusārin and the classification (vyavasthāna, AKbh 353,12) of other types of pudgalas in whose mental series the noble path has arisen (utpammāryamārga), see AK 6.29ab and AKbh 353,12–18. See also above, n. 53.

\textsuperscript{110} According to MSAVBh tsī D174b2–175b1/P205b2–206a8, if the name (*nāma) and the conventional expression (*vyavahāra) of “pudgala” were not available, the differences pertaining to samkleśa, vyavadāna, avasthā, vṛtti and santāna could not be indicated. The one who is endowed with dharman belonging to pollution (*samkleśadharma) will be called “a pudgala endowed with pollution” (*samkleśavān pudgalaḥ), whereas the one who is endowed with dharman belonging to purification (*vyavadānadharmā) will be called “a pudgala endowed with purification” (*vyavadānāvān pudgalaḥ). But pollution and purification entail many (*bahu[vi]dh) degrees (*avasthā): those abiding in little, moderate or great pollution will be called “pudgalas of little, moderate or great path” (*mārgaprāpta).” Those who engage in bad actions only (*ekāntākūsālakarmakārin) will be called “inclined towards (*samkleśapakṣapatiita), siding with pollution,” whereas those who engage in good actions only (*ekāntakūsālakarmakārin) will be called “inclined towards (*vyavadānāpakṣapatiita), siding with purification” (see also Vairocanarakṣita MS 46b5–6: yah pudgala ekāntakūsalakāri sa samkleśacchedabhedakaḥ / ya sa caikāntavayavadānakarmakāri sa vyavadānacchedabhedakaḥ /). In the same way, those who are addicted to pollution and to purification will respectively be called “pudgalas given up to pollution” and “pudgalas given up to purification.” Or, one may say, concerning those who abide in pollution or purification: “This pudgala has a polluted mental series,” “This pudgala has a purified mental series.” See also MSAVBh tsī D175b1–5/P206a8–b5.
According to MSAVBh tsi D175b5–176a2/P206b5–207a2, in the Parijñāsūtra (yons su šes pa’i mdo sde), the factors that are to be known (*parijñeyadharma) and the knowledge (*parijñā) are twofold each: the truth of suffering (*duḥkhasatya) and the truth of origin (*samudayasatya) are the factors that are to be known; side with pollution (kun nas ūn mons pa’i phyogs su bsdu = samklesapaksasangrhta?). As for the truth of destruction (*niruddhasatya), they are the knowledge itself, and side with purification (rnam par byan ba’i phyogs su bsdu = vyavadānapaksasangrhta?). In the absence of the designation “pudgala,” it would be impossible to indicate the different addictions (*vyrtti) and (mental) series (*santāna) of those who are said to be persons who are (still) to be taught the things to be known (yons su šes par bya ba’i gan zag) and persons who know thoroughly (yons sur šes par byed pa’i gan zag = parijñātāvipudgala?). Among them, the persons who are (still) to be taught the things to be known, whose mental series is endowed with dharmas belonging to pollution, are engaged on the side of pollution (kun nas ūn mons pa’i phyogs la žugs pa = samklesapaksapraṇyṛttā?); as for the person who knows thoroughly, whose mental series is endowed with dharmas belonging to purification, he is engaged in the dharmas belonging to purification (*vyavadānapakṣapraṇyṛttā). On parijñātāvin, see above, n. 109. For the Pāli Pariññāsutta, see SN III.26 (= no. XXII.23). The sūtra begins thus: pariññeye ca bhikkhave dhamme desissati pariññañca. Here, the parijñeyadharmas consist of corporeity (rūpa), affective sensation (vedanā), ideation (saññā = samjñā), conditioned factors (saṅkhāra = saṅskāra), and direct awareness (viññāna = vijñāna), whereas parijñā consists of the destruction of desire (rāgakkhaya = rāgakṣaya), the destruction of defilements (dosakkhaya = dosākṣaya) and the destruction of error (mohakkhaya = mohakṣaya).

According to MSAVBh tsi D176a2–6/P207a2–7, in the Bhārahaṇasūtra (khur khyer ba’i mdo sde), the pudgala who bears the burden and the pudgala who lays down the burden are twofold each. Here, the truth of suffering (*duḥkhasatya) is called the burden (*bhāra), whereas the truth of origin (*samudayasatya) is called either the bearing (*bhārahāra) or the taking up of the burden (*bhārādānā). Both side with pollution. The laying down of the burden (*bhāraniṣepa[na]) is also twofold: when (*kadā) the burden is laid down (*nikṣipta; at the time of destruction, *nirōdhakāla), and by means of what (*kena) the burden is laid down (by means of the truth of the path, *mārgasatya). Both side with purification. Those pudgalas who haven’t yet eliminated (*aprahaṇa) suffering and its origin are said to be engaged (*pravṛtta) in the bearing of the burden and to have a mental series endowed with a burden. Those pudgalas who have obtained (*prāpta) the truth of destruction and the truth of the path are said to be engaged in the laying down of the burden and to have a mental series endowed with the laying down of the burden. Note Vairocana-rakṣita’s explanation (MS 46b6): bhāra duḥkhasatyaṃ / bhārādānāṃ samudayasatyaṃ / nikṣepaṇaṃ hānir vyavadānāṃ nirodhamārgasatyaṃ. For the Pāli Bhārasutta, see SN
sence of the designations of pudgalas [such as] the pariṇātāvin and the bhārāhāra, it would be impossible to point to their different addictions and different [mental] series. [As for the thirty-seven] factors that are aids to awakening, they possess various degrees according to the different paths [in which they are cultivated, viz., those] of preparation, of vision, of cultivation and of culmination; [and] in the absence of the designation of pudgalas such as the śraddhānusārin, it would be impossible to point to their different addictions and different [mental] series.\(^{113}\)

This is to be known as the reason (naya) why the

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\(^{113}\) According to MSAVBh isi D176a7–b6/P207a8–b8, these 37 factors are cultivated by the candidate while abiding in the path of preparation (*prayogamārgāvasthāyām), in the path of vision (*darśanamārgāvasthāyām), in the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārgāvasthāyām) and in the path of culmination (*niṣṭhāmārgāvasthāyām). In other words, the degrees of their cultivation (*bhāvanāvasthā) are manifold (*bahu[vijdha]). Among these paths, the path of preparation refers to the four *adhimukticaryābhūmis, and the pudgala
Blessed One] has taught the pudgala although [it] does not exist as a [real] substance.

Otherwise,\textsuperscript{114} the [Blessed One’s] teaching of the pudgala [would] indeed be pointless.\textsuperscript{115} First, it cannot have been aimed at generating the [false] view of a self [in the living beings], because \textit{the view of a self is not to be generated [in the living beings]} [MSA 18.103a], since it has arisen well before.\textsuperscript{116,117} Nor was it aimed at [allowing the living beings to] cultivate this [already existing but not yet cultivated view of a self], for of [this] view of a self, [their] \textit{cultivation is beginningless} [MSA 18.103b]. And if it had been taught because [one achieves]

who cultivates the 37 factors at that time is called an *adhimukticāripudgala. At the time of the *darśanamārga, the bodhisattvas have obtained the first stage (*bhūmi), whereas the śrāvakas have obtained the *srotāpattimārga (the srotāpanna is the one who has not yet abandoned the bhāvanāheyaaklesas, AKbh 356,1 and Kośa IV.200; for an etymology of srotāpanna, see AKbh 356,4–5 and Kośa IV.200) and the pudgala who cultivates the 37 factors at that time (*tatkāle) is called a *darśanamārgasthapudgala. According to the method of the Great Vehicle (*mahāyānanayena), the *bhāvanāmārga starts at the second stage, whereas according to the method of the Lesser Vehicle (*hīnayānanayena), it starts at the obtention of the *srotāpattiphala, and the pudgala who cultivates the 37 factors at that time is called a *bhāvanāmārgasthapudgala. According to the method of the Great Vehicle, the *niṣṭhāmārga refers to the *abhisambodhi, whereas according to the method of the Lesser Vehicle, it refers to the obtention of the *arhat(tva)phala, and the pudgala who cultivates the 37 factors at that time is called *aśaikṣapudgala (on the arhat or aṣaikṣa, see AK 6.45ab, AKbh 365,16–20 and Kośa IV.230–231). For an outline of the non-Mahāyānist path, see Kośa IV.iv–xi; for an account of the stages in the bodhisattva’s career, see Dayal 1970:270–291; on the 37 bodhipakṣya/bodhipakṣikadharmanas, see 2. The Immediate Context of MSA(Bh) 18.92–103, 2.1 and n. 34.

\textsuperscript{114} I.e., if there were no rationale behind the Buddha’s resorting to this \textit{flatus vocis}.

\textsuperscript{115} According to MSABh tsi D176b7–177a1/P208a2–3, the Pudgalavādin now objects that the Blessed One has taught the pudgala in order to generate the view of a self (*ātmadṛṣṭi) in the mental series (*cittasatāna) of those living beings (*sattva) in whose mental series the view of a self has not yet arisen (*anutpaṃmatātmadṛṣṭicittasatāna).

\textsuperscript{116} According to MSABh tsi D177a3–4/P208a6, the false view of a self (*ātmadṛṣṭi) is no longer to be generated since it has been present in their mental series (*cittasatāna) since the beginningless time (*anādikāla) of samsāra.

\textsuperscript{117} According to MSABh tsi D177a4–5/P208a6–7, the Pudgalavādin now objects that, although the view of a self (*ātmadṛṣṭi) has arisen in the mental series (*cittasatāna) of the living beings, these do not cultivate (*abhyāsa) it; the Blessed One has taught the pudgala so that these living beings may cultivate the view of a self.
liberation through the vision of the self, then all living beings could achieve liberation without effort [MSA 18.103c], for all those who have not yet seen the noble truths have the false view of a self. Or, it results that there is simply no liberation [MSA 18.103d]. For no one, having first grasped the self as non-self, would grasp it as the self when fully comprehending the truth in the same way as someone who, having first failed to grasp suffering as suffering, will grasp it as suffering afterwards. Thus, since after the full comprehension of truth the non-grasping of the self as the self would be exactly the same as before, there would be no liberation at all. And if the ātman really exists, due to the notion of “I” and the notion of “mine,” craving for the pleasure of the self and all the other defilements caused by this [very view of a self] will necessarily arise. For this reason also,

118 According to MSAVBh tsi D177a6/P208b1–2, although the living beings (*sattva) cultivate the view of a self (*ātmadṛṣṭi) and are only familiar with the self through its name (*nāmamātra), they cannot reach liberation (*mokṣa; *apavarga; *nirvāṇa) because they don’t really see the self, which has the size of a thumb (*anguṣṭhamātra) or the size of a mustard-seed (*sarṣapamātra). The Blessed One has taught the pudgala so that the living beings, by seeing this tiny self, may achieve liberation. Sthiramati alludes here to Upanisadic speculations about the size of the ātman: *anguṣṭhamātra in Katha Upaniṣad 4.12; sarṣapa in Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad 3.14.3. For a similar discussion in the context of the polemic against the Pudgalavādin, see Traité II.744 and n. 1; on sarṣapa, see also Venkata Ramanan 1953:189.

119 According to MSAVBh tsi D177b2–4/P208b5–7, if one achieves liberation through the view of a self (*ātmadṛṣṭi), then, since ordinary persons (*prthagjana) who per definitionem have not seen the truths (i.e., have not yet reached the path of vision) are possessed with the view of a self, all living beings (*sattva) would achieve liberation (*mokṣa; *nirvāṇa) without making any effort towards listening (śruta, i.e., the śrutamayī prajñā), reflection (cintā, i.e., the cintāmaya prajñā) and cultivation (bhāvanā, i.e., the bhāvanāmaya prajñā).

120 I.e., still as an ordinary person, before the full comprehension of truth (satyābhisamaya).

121 According to MSAVBh tsi D177b5–7/P209a1–3, in the religious doctrine (dharma) according to which the self exists (bdag yod pa’i chos), one does not see the self before engaging in the cultivation (*bhāvanā) process, but rather sees selflessness/sees that the self does not exist: bdag med par mthon ba and does not, therefore, achieve liberation (*mokṣa). But once cultivation has taken place, one sees that the self exists and hence achieves liberation.

122 According to MSAVBh tsi D177b5–7/P209a1–3, since one does not see the four truths of suffering, etc. (*duḥkhādhisatyacacatuṣṭaya) before engaging in listening (śruta, i.e., the śrutamayī prajñā), reflection (cintā, i.e., the cintāmaya prajñā) and cultivation (bhāvanā, i.e., the bhāvanāmaya prajñā), one does not achieve liberation (*mokṣa), but after these have taken place, one sees the four truths and achieves liberation.
there would be no liberation [at all]. One should rather not (na vā) accept that the pudgala [MSA 18.103d2] [really] exists, for if it exists, [all] the [afore-mentioned] evils [will] necessarily follow.

5. Text-critical remarks

L155,25 reads: nopalabdhā, against MS A 154b3 (nopalabdho) and MS B 141a5 (nopalabdho). Read: nopalabdhō (see already Lévi 1911:261n. 1).

L155,29 reads: na ca viparyāśaḥ, against MS A 154b3 (na cāviparyāśaḥ), MS B 141b1 (na cāviparyāśaḥ), MSABhtub P262b1–2 (phyin ci ma log pa […] ma yin no) and MSAVBh tsi D164b6–7/P193b4 (phyin ci ma log pa […] mi […]). Read: na cāviparyāśaḥ (to be compared with Lévi 1911:261n. 2).

L155,30 reads: na ca iṣa saṃkleśa iti, against MS A 154b6 (sa ca iṣa saṃkleśa iti), MS B 141b1 (sa ca iṣa saṃkleśa iti), MSABhtub P261b2 (de kun nas ŋon moins pa yin no žes bya bar) and MSAVBh tsi D165a1/P193b7 (de kun nas ŋon moins pa yin par). Read: sa ca iṣa saṃkleśa iti (see already Lévi 1911:261n. 3).

L156,3 reads: ekatvānyatvato vācyas, against L154,30 (ekatvānyatvato ’vācyas), MS B 141b3 (ekatvānyatvato ’vācyas), MSABhtub P261b3–4 (gcig daṅ gzan du brjod bya min), MSAVBh tsi D165b2/P194b1 (gcig daṅ tha dad mi brjod de); the reading of MS A 155a2 (ekatvānyatvato ’vācyas) is of course no argument in favour of ekatvānyatvato vācyas. Read: ekatvānyatvato ’vācyas (see already Lévi 1911:259n. 93.1.a).

L157,3, MS A 156a3, MS B 142a7 and MSAVBh tsi D169a5/P199a2 (gñis la brten nas) read: dvayaṃ praṇītā, against L155,3 (dvaye sati ca) and MSABhtub P268a7–8 (gñis yod [*dvaye sati ca]). I have read: dvayaṃ praṇītā.
L157,5 (but also MS A 153a5 and MS B 140b4, which correspond to L155,5!) reads: *svāmitve sati vā*, against L155,5 (but also MS A 156a4 and MS B 142b1, which correspond to L157,5!), which reads: *svāmitve sati cā*. In other words, L155,5 reads *cā* against the manuscripts (*vā*), and L157,5 reads *vā* against the manuscripts (*cā*). Neither MSABh₂₂ P260b7 = P262a8 (bdag po ŋid cig yin na ni // mi rtag mi ’dod ’byun mi byed) nor the pratīka in MSABh tsi D169b1–2/P199a6 (bdag po yin na mi rtag daň // mi ’dod pa ni ’byun mi byed) does not allow a decision. I have read: *svāmitve sati vā*.

L157,6 reads: *svāmībhavann aniṣṭaṇ vijñānam*, against MS A 156a5 (*svāmī bhavan [sic] īṣṭavijñānam [sic]), MS B 142b1 (*svāmī bhavan [sic] īṣṭaṇ vijñānam), MSABh₂₂ P262a8–b1 (bdag po ŋid gcig yin na ni rnam par šes pa ’dod pa). Read: *svāmī bhavann īṣṭaṇ vijñānam* (see already Lévi 1911:262n. 4a).

On L157,10–11 (*yadi dravyato […] rūpaprasādādi*), see above, n. 89.

L157,15, MS A 156b3 and MS B 142b6 read: *tīrthā*, against MSABh₂₂ P262b5 (gzan mu stegs can [*anyatīrthā*] (no pratīka in MSABh)). Read: *tīrthā*.

L157,17, MS A 156b5, MS B 142b7 and MSABh tsi D171a2/P201a4 (*lta ba la sogṣ pa*) read: *darṣanādiṣu*, against MSABh₂₂ P262b6–7 (*lta ba la sogṣ pa la [*sa darṣanādiṣu*]). Read: *darṣanādiṣu*.

L157,18–19, MS A 156,5–6 and MS B 142b7–143a1 read: *svayambhūr vā bhaved ākasmikaḥ* (*ākasmika MSS A and B) / *tatpratyayo [...]*, against MSABh₂₂ P262b7 (see also MSABh tsi D171a5/P201a7–8), which reads: *raṅ byuṅ ba glo bur ba’am / de’i rkyen las [...], i.e., *svayambhūr vā bhaved ākasmikas tatpratyayo vā /*. I have read: *svayambhūr vā bhaved ākasmikas tatpratyayo vā /* (see already Lévi 1911:263n. 5).

L158,13, MS A 157b1, MS B 143b1 and MSABh tsi D171a2/P201a4 (*de’i rkyen las byuṅ ba yin na ni*) read: *sati hi tatpratyayatve*, against MSABh₂₂ P263a5–6 (*de de’i rkyen ŋid yin na ni [*sati hi tasmin tatpratyayatve*]). Read: *sati hi tatpratyayatve*.
L158,21, MS A 157b7, MS B 143b5 and MSA Bh tsi D173b7/P204b2 (rnam par smin pa) read: vipākaḥ, against MSABhtib P263b1 (las kyi rnam par smin pa [*karmavipākaḥ]). Read: vipākaḥ.

L158,23 and MS B 143b6 read: iti deśitā, which makes no sense in the absence of a feminine subject. MS A 157b9 reads iti dejītā [sic], which might be construed with pañcādīnavāḥ (ātmopalambaḥ [iti] being, then, in the nominative (“five evils have been taught to be/as the perception of a self”). MSABhtib P263b2, however, clearly interprets ātmopalambaḥ as a locative (bdag tu dmigs pa la ņes dmigs lha ste […] ņes bṣad de’i). Moreover, and in the same context, L158,20 and L158,22 read: iti deśitam. I have read: iti deśitam.

L159,3, MS A 158a4 and MS B 144a2 read: saṃkleśe vyavadāne ca, against L155,15, MS A 154a3 and MS B 140b7 (and L159,5, MS A 158a5 and MS B 144a3), which read: saṃkleśavyavadāne ca. saṃkleśe vyavadāne ca can only be in the locative case, while saṃkleśavyavadāne ca can also be, as a dual, in the nominative case (this might have been Sthiramati’s understanding, who puts the six terms involved on the same level in MSA Bh tsi D174b6–7/P205b4–5 (kun nas ņon mois pa tha dad pa dañ / rnam par byan ba tha dad pa dañ / gnas pa tha dad pa dañ / chad pa tha dad pa dañ / ’jug pa tha dad pa dañ / rgyud tha dad pa dag bstan du mi ruḥ gi […])). I am inclined to read both as locatives (for the singular dvandva, see Renou 1996:104, §86B and BHSG §23.2–3), as MSABhtib P263b5–6 and MSABhtib P263b6 (both with genitive particles: “of pollution and purification” in the sense “in/(concerning) pollution and purification”) also seem to reflect. (The pratīkas in MSA Bh tsi D174b5–6/P205b3–4 and MSA Bh tsi D175b1–2/P206a8–b1 are of little use.) In the reading: saṃkleśe vyavadāne ca, the particle ca needs not be interpreted as connecting MSA 18.102 to MSA 18.101, a function that seems to be that of hi. Although the singular dvandva is represented twice (L155,15 and L159,5), I have read: saṃkleśe vyavadāne ca.

L159,11–12, MS A 158b2, MS B 144a7 read: yenāsati dravyato ’stīte, against MSABhtib P264a3 (ci’i phyir [kena?] instead of yena) and MSA Bh tsi D176b6/P207b8 (de’i phyir [tena?] instead of yena). Read: yenāsati dravyato ’stīte.

L159,15 reads: anūtpādyā. Read: anūtpādyā.

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L159,20 reads: sarveṣāṁ na dṛṣṭasatyānāṁ, against MS A 158a6–7 (sarveṣāṁm [sic] adṛṣṭasatyānāṁ), MS B 144b3 (sarveṣāṁ adṛṣṭasatyānāṁ) and MSABh₉₂ P264a5 (bden pa ma mthoṅ ba thams cad). Read: sarveṣāṁ adṛṣṭasatyānāṁ.


Danḍas

L155,27: viparyāsāt tathā. Read: viparyāsāt / tathā
L156,17: ekatvenānyatvena ca agnir. Read: ekatvenānyatvena ca / agnir
L156,21: upalabdhes tathā. Read: upalabdheḥ / tathā
L156,22: tatrendhanam iti ata. Read: tatrendhanam iti / ata
L156,23: dvayena hi upalabdher. Read: dvayena hi / upalabdher
L157,7: anīṣṭaṁ ca / naiva. Read: anīṣṭaṁ ca naiva /
L157,18–19: ākasmikaḥ / tatpratyayo. Read: ākasmikas tatpratyayo (vā)
L158,6: vijnātā sati. Read: vijnātā / sati
L158,20: desitaṁ paramārtha°. Read: desitam / paramārtha°
L158,22: pratisaṁdadhāti / anyatra. Read: pratisaṁdadhāty anyatra
L158,23: jīvadṛṣṭiḥ nirviśeṣo. Read: jīvadṛṣṭiḥ / nirviśeṣo

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