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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-35555

Michaelowa, K; Borrmann, A (2006). Evaluation bias and incentive structures in bi- and multilateral aid agencies. Review of Development Economics, 10(2):313-329.

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Abstract

Evaluation is generally considered as an important tool to ensure the effective use of development aid, but it is itself subject to distortions. To derive institutional conditions conducive to effective evaluation, we develop a multi-level principal-agent model focusing on the interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies’ conflicting objectives of transparency and self-legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency.

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:08 University Research Priority Programs > Asia and Europe
06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Political Science
DDC:320 Political science
950 History of Asia
180 Ancient, medieval & eastern philosophy
Language:English
Date:2006
Deposited On:05 Nov 2010 08:43
Last Modified:01 Apr 2014 10:21
Publisher:Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN:1363-6669
Publisher DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9361.2006.00320.x
Related URLs:http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:313-329
Citations:Web of Science®. Times Cited: 8
Google Scholar™
Scopus®. Citation Count: 9

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