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Ruloff, D (1999). The positive incentives in arms control. South Carolina. ISBN 1-57003-301-3.

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Abstract

Side-payments, compensation, and other material incentives have been used throughout the history of international relation to influence the behavior of recipient countries and facilitate cooperation, but only in recent years have analysts of international politics started to amass systematic empirical evidence on the use of such incentives in fields as diverse as international trade, environmental policy, and arms control. Theorizing about the pros and cons of various incentive strategies lags even further behind real-world developments. The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control poses the question of whether or not it is sensible to "buy" cooperation form critical states and examines various recent cases of nuclear non proliferation diplomacy, including experiences with Ukraine and North Korea.In exploring the conditions under which positive incentives are effective and efficient in resolving international collaboration problems, editors Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff and four other contributors draw on a vide range of empirical research. They difine positive incentives as transfers of positively values resources, such as money, technology, or know-how, form one actor to another with the aim of driving the behavior of the recipient in a direction that is desirable form the viewpoint of the provider.
To assess the validity of their propositions, the contributors examine seven explicit transactions in nuclear nonproliferation policy. They illuminate two of the transactions through detailed case studies: the freeze and eventual closure of North Korea's nuclear weapons program in exchange for two light water reactors and oil deliveries, and the denuclearization of Ukraine, which has involved sizable resource transfers, provided largely by the United States.
As arms control issues continue to rank high on the international agenda, this timely volume shows that positive incentives can contribute to the resolution of global governance problems.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Monograph
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Political Science
DDC:320 Political science
Language:English
Date:1999
Deposited On:24 Mar 2009 08:45
Last Modified:22 Apr 2013 12:18
Publisher:University of South Carolina Press
Series Name:Studies in International Relations
Number of Pages:202
ISBN:1-57003-301-3

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