Saller, L (2010). Representations and the Galilean strategy. Conceptus, 94:73-89.
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The aim of this article is to show that, in his
use of the word ‘representation’, Philip Kitcher is committed to a particular notion of representation, which is
essential to his argument for Real Realism in his paper
Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy.
After a short presentation of Kitcher’s original argument
for Real Realism, I show that Kitcher’s notion of representation is not indisputable. By producing an alternative version of Kitcher’s argument, one which does not rely on this term ‘representation’, I show the force and
functioning of the Galilean strategy itself. A comparison
of the two formulations of the argument reveals what is
additionally brought in by Kitcher’s notion of representation: specifically, a particular answer to the question of what truth consists in. This presumed correspondence theory of truth is needed to achieve Real Realism by the Galilean strategy. The positive upshot is, however, that one can support the Galilean strategy as such, without being a Real Realist: One can apply the strategy to any other conception of truth.
|Item Type:||Journal Article, not refereed, original work|
|Communities & Collections:||06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy|
|Dewey Decimal Classification:||100 Philosophy|
|Deposited On:||24 Feb 2011 16:01|
|Last Modified:||23 Nov 2012 12:27|
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