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PSH: A private and shared history-based incentive mechanism


Bocek, T; Kun, W; Hecht, F V; Hausheer, D; Stiller, B (2008). PSH: A private and shared history-based incentive mechanism. In: Second International Conference on Autonomous Infrastructure, Management and Security, AIMS 2008, Bremen, Germany, 1 July 2008 - 3 July 2008, 15-27.

Abstract

Fully decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) systems do not have a central control mechanism. Thus, different forms of control mechanisms are required to deal with selfish peers. One type of selfish behavior is the consumption of resources without providing sufficient resources. Therefore, incentive schemes encourage peers to share resources while punishing selfish peers. A well-known example of an incentive scheme is Tit-for-Tat (TFT), as used in BitTorrent. With this scheme, a peer can only consume as much resources as it provides. TFT is resilient to collusion due to relying on private histories only. However, TFT can only be applied to peers with direct reciprocity.
This paper presents a private and shared history (PSH) based incentive mechanism, which supports transitive relations (indirect reciprocity). Furthermore, it is resilient to collusion and it combines private and shared histories in an efficient manner. The PSH approach uses a shared history for identifying transitive relations. Those relations are verified using private histories. Simulations show that the PSH mechanism has a higher transaction success ratio than TFT.

Abstract

Fully decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) systems do not have a central control mechanism. Thus, different forms of control mechanisms are required to deal with selfish peers. One type of selfish behavior is the consumption of resources without providing sufficient resources. Therefore, incentive schemes encourage peers to share resources while punishing selfish peers. A well-known example of an incentive scheme is Tit-for-Tat (TFT), as used in BitTorrent. With this scheme, a peer can only consume as much resources as it provides. TFT is resilient to collusion due to relying on private histories only. However, TFT can only be applied to peers with direct reciprocity.
This paper presents a private and shared history (PSH) based incentive mechanism, which supports transitive relations (indirect reciprocity). Furthermore, it is resilient to collusion and it combines private and shared histories in an efficient manner. The PSH approach uses a shared history for identifying transitive relations. Those relations are verified using private histories. Simulations show that the PSH mechanism has a higher transaction success ratio than TFT.

Citations

2 citations in Web of Science®
1 citation in Scopus®
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Conference or Workshop Item (Paper), refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Informatics
Dewey Decimal Classification:000 Computer science, knowledge & systems
Language:English
Event End Date:3 July 2008
Deposited On:13 Nov 2008 08:41
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 12:31
Publisher:Springer
Series Name:Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Number:5127/2
ISSN:0302-9743
ISBN:978-3-540-70586-4
Additional Information:Second International Conference on Autonomous Infrastructure, Management and Security, AIMS 2008, July 1-3, 2008 The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70587-1_2
Official URL:http://www.springer.com/computer/communications/book/978-3-540-70586-4
Related URLs:http://www.csg.uzh.ch/staff/bocek/publications/PSH_v2.pdf
http://www.csg.uzh.ch/staff/bocek/publications/etm08_psh.pdf

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