Quick Search:

uzh logo
Browse by:
bullet
bullet
bullet
bullet

Zurich Open Repository and Archive 

Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-48546

Bochsler, D (2010). Who gains from apparentments under D’Hondt? Electoral Studies, 29(4):617-627.

[img]
Preview
Accepted Version
PDF
1MB

Abstract

Apparentments – or coalitions of several electoral lists – are a widely neglected aspect of the study of proportional electoral systems. This paper proposes a formal model that explains the benefits political parties derive from apparentments, based on their alliance strategies and relative size. In doing so, it reveals that apparentments are most beneficial for highly fractionalised political blocs. However, it also emerges that large parties stand to gain much more from apparentments than small parties do. Because of this, small parties are likely to join in apparentments with other small parties, excluding large parties where possible. These arguments are tested empirically, using a new dataset from the Swiss national parliamentary elections covering a period from 1995 to 2007.

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Political Science
DDC:320 Political science
Uncontrolled Keywords:Electoral systems, Apparentments, Mechanical effect, PR, D’Hondt
Language:English
Date:2010
Deposited On:28 Jun 2011 11:37
Last Modified:27 Nov 2013 18:01
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0261-3794
Publisher DOI:10.1016/j.electstud.2010.06.001
Citations:Web of Science®
Google Scholar™
Scopus®. Citation Count: 2

Users (please log in): suggest update or correction for this item

Repository Staff Only: item control page