Cultural differentiation or self-exclusion. On young Turks’ and Repatriates’ dealing with experiences of discrimination in Germany

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Abstract: Based upon Bourdieu’s ‘theory of capital’ and Willis’s ‘theory of cultural production’, the article scrutinizes the interrelation between perceived discrimination, self-exclusion and cultural differentiation. The empirical analysis is based on a longitudinal study by the German Youth Institute, which was set up to explore the transition of young Turks from school to vocational training and employment. The data point out that young immigrants who are dealing with experiences of devaluation of their (origin-)specific cultural capital and who are disadvantaged regarding the accessibility of dominant cultural capital bring about a production of a counterculture. They are less likely to exclude themselves in the sense of internalizing the rightness of the dominant culture.

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Cultural Differentiation or Self-Exclusion: On young Turks’ and Repatriates’ Dealing with Experiences of Discrimination in Germany

I have my own rights my own rules
I have my own fights my own fools
I know my friend and my enemies
I know who I am and how to be

If you punch me I will punch you back
Punching you I will swing my flag
I’m a warrior against the time
My weapon is my lyric and my power is my rhyme

There are some they don’t understand me
They think I’m running for money
But I won’t cry when I am sad
And I won’t run when I’m afraid

I’m not the black man
I’m not the white man
I’m just the type between them
I’m a Turkish man in a foreign land

Rap of the “Turkish Power Boys” (Tertilt, 1996:5)

1.Problem description

The current debate about understanding German society as an immigration society is largely dominated by the implicit assumption that individuals should be integrated into a social order, the normative patterns of which are generally agreed upon. If such an adjustment fails, this is quickly put down to a reluctance to integrate or, perhaps more sinister, to the young migrants’ retreat into so-called ethnic parallel societies. There is a too easy agreement on the causes of this: the “party at fault” when integration has failed are the immigrants themselves, because they do not do as they should. Any deviation from the so-called “majority or guiding culture” is suspected of endangering the reproduction of that which is assumed to be a seemingly unchangeable backdrop of a supposed “common sense”.¹
Whatever the reasons, one thing is rarely addressed: that what seems like the migrants’ “adherence” to their (origin-)specific culture is not reluctance to integrate or their lagging-behind the demands of modern western societies, but an expression of their reaction to experiences of social exclusion from this society – and this although there are by now plenty of empirical indications of this correlation, not only since the civil unrest in Great Britain in early 2000 and in France in 2005 (Berry et al., 2006a; Berry et al., 2006b; Dubet and Lapeyronnie, 1994; Groenemeyer, 2003; Heitmeyer; Müller and Schröder, 1997; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2006; Kalin and Berry, 1996; Solga, 2005; Wieviorka, 1992).

It is this interrelation between perceived discrimination and cultural differentiation that we would like to examine more closely in the following discussion. We will focus on the link between objectively disadvantaged life situations, the subjective perception of this situation, and cultural differentiation. To begin, we will, following Pierre Bourdieu and Paul Willis, reflect on coping with discrimination by looking at it both in terms of the creative shaping of one’s environment and structural conditionality. This will result in a theoretical model which will then be tested empirically using a dataset of immigrant youth who are attending German Hauptschule² or following a comparable track in German comprehensive schools. Finally, the findings will be interpreted with regard to our preliminary theoretical considerations; this will yield some useful socio-political conclusions.

2. Theoretical frame: Bourdieu and Willis

For the analysis of social discrimination in general and of cultural disadvantaging in particular Bourdieu (1983) provides the concept of cultural capital which facilitates both the conceptual surveying of the active engagement with their environment of immigrant youth and their structural embedding within the class society. Despite the fact that the concept of cultural capital is widely used in inequality research, its explanatory potential with regard to matters of discrimination and cultural differentiation has yet to be fully realised. Moreover, the studies that regard as assets those (specific) capitals which fail even to find acknowledgment in the process of symbolic struggle are rare. Some suggestions in this direction include studies that, in following Bourdieu, draw predominantly on the concept of “subcultural capital”, thus highlighting the “value” of alternative cultures, that is, their constructive counter stance to the “dominant culture” (Jancovich, 2002; Basu and Werbner, 2001; Lareau and Weininger, 2003; Skrobanek and Jobst, 2006; Thornton, 1996; Vester, 1995; Yosso, 2005). Although, thus far, these specific cultural capitals have hardly been taken into account, more recent publications point out that Bourdieu’s
Pages contain arguments for a broader and more dynamic understanding of cultural capital that stands in opposition to purely high-culture interpretations. Based on this “alternative” approach to the theory of capital assets, we inquire what happens if youths feel disadvantaged or discriminated against with regard to their assets of (origin-)specific cultural capital which cannot be accumulated in institutional contexts, such as school. Our assumption is that these conditions lead to a revaluation of (origin-specific) cultural capital assets in that these advance to resources for the management of disadvantage or discrimination. But, since Bourdieu’s and Passeron’s approach does not give much information regarding young people who do not follow processes of self-exclusion, we will draw on Paul Willis’s concept of cultural differentiation. The latter shares with Bourdieu an integration/exclusion model which conceptualizes society as a class society in which there is no such thing as mutual approval of diverse life practices. Instead, a dominant social group possesses a monopoly of resources which it seeks to uphold through processes of social closure. Furthermore, Willis draws attention to processes of cultural differentiation and offers some hints why collective, non-hegemonic cultures become attractive for young people.

2.1. Cultural capital and cultural differentiation

According to Pierre Bourdieu (1982, 1983, 1998; with Passeron 1971) and Paul Willis (1981, 2004) cultural capital is the key concept in the analysis of social discrimination processes because it mediates between the objective position within the social structure and the subjective, creative engagement with this reality. In making this dialectical thought more concrete, the two authors have a somewhat different outlook concerning exclusion and its handling. As Bourdieu sees it, culture is an action resource, though not as an individual, rationally deployable quality, but as a resource that individuals or groups reproduce and accumulate in symbolic power relations. If capital is universally recognized, Bourdieu refers to it as symbolic capital, while the recognition of the capital happens “when it is known through the categories of perception it imposes” (Bourdieu, 1989:21). In this regard, symbolic capital forms the foundation of symbolic power, that is, the power to lend absolute worth to a certain perspective. Bourdieu and Passeron (1971) see one of the key functions of the educational system as fostering the acquisition of a mode of self-exclusion, i.e. in the students’ adopting interpretation patterns that do not or no longer attribute their failure in school to their positioning within the social field – caused by the unequal allocation of symbolic power – but to their personal shortcomings. Thus, with regard to the educational system Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) maintain: “In any given social formation, the PW (Pedagogic Work) through which the dominant PA (Pedagogic Agency) is carried on always has the function of keeping order, i.e. of reproducing the structure of power relations between
the groups or classes, inasmuch as, by inculcation or exclusion, it tends to impose recognition of the legitimacy of the dominant culture on the members of the dominated groups or classes, and to make them internalize, to a variable extent, disciplines and censorships which best serve the material and symbolic interests of the dominant groups or classes when they take the form of self-discipline and self-censorship” (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977:40). Within the institutional context of school this leads, among others things, to self-exclusion, due to the fact that pupils are expected to learn, on the one hand, to ascribe their failure in the venture into the institutional symbolic world to their own shortcomings and not to their position in the social class system – caused by the unequal allocation of symbolic power – and, on the other hand, to desire nothing that their respective class position does not give them access to (Bourdieu, 1974:38; Littlewood, 1999:167).

Crude put, teaching in schools keeps order and therefore contributes to the reproduction of symbolic power – that is, keeping power relations as they are – by forcing people “to internalize the superiority or rightness of the dominant culture and the inferiority of the culture of the dominated social groups and categories” (Littlewood, 1999:167). Mindful of the reproduction mechanisms of the class society, Bourdieu and Passeron point out that variable achievement in school is not attributable to individual endeavour or giftedness, but to class-specifically allocated cultural capital. This in general ensures the success of the dominant groups and thus the reproduction of class structure in capitalist society. As regards cultural capital, Meritocratic Ideology (Helland/Storen, 2006:342) conceals the objection that there are no agreed benchmarks for the assessment of cultural capital (“merit”) (Breen/Goldthorpe, 2001). From this it can be clearly seen, however, that the effective value of what counts as “merit” or – in different terminology – as acknowledged cultural capital depends on whether it is in fact defined by particular groups within a society as “merit”/“cultural capital”. Seen from this perspective, class position and privilege cannot be defined in terms of the specific endowment with and composition of capital, but in terms of the power of groups to define what capital is and thereby place a value on it. If these assumptions are correct, it rapidly becomes clear that cultural capital represents a category of “for us”, not one of “in itself”, and thus always remains relative to the interests of the groups concerned with exchange (Bourdieu, 1996). Inequality of cultural capital assets thus affects the endowment of individuals and the assessment of that endowment on the basis of dominant cultural patterns of classification. If young persons with immigrant backgrounds do not have the same access to (cultural) capital assets as their German age-contemporaries, this may therefore be attributable to the fact that specific capital assets – that they possess – are, by reason of the definition imposed by one or more dominant groups, not suitable assets for accumulation. Thus, in the view of Bourdieu and Passeron it is to be assumed that the specific cultural capital – which is not recognised by the institutional context – cannot
constitute a vital subjective action resource. But what happens if persons do not internalize the superiority or rightness of the dominant culture, if they resist accepting the inferiority of the culture of their (dominated) own group, if they refuse disciplines and self-censorship which best serve the material and symbolic interest of the dominant groups or classes?

At this very point Willis’s (1982) considerations about daily-produced collective practice come into play. In contrast to Bourdieu and Passeron, whose works emphasise (though, as just pointed out, not solely) the reproduction of class structures, Willis highlights the productive aspect of class practice, which he examines by using the example of working class teenagers who represent a resistance culture to the dominant culture of the ruling class demanded in school. In particular, he demonstrates that in order to manifest itself creatively as a counterculture, the structurally disadvantaged culture – in his study the working class culture – needs the institutional frame which the school provides. Willis uses the term differentiation to label these processes:

“Differentiation is the process whereby the typical exchanges expected in the formal institutional paradigm are reinterpreted, separated and discriminated with respect to working class interests, feelings and meanings.” (Willis, 1981:62).

The way the disadvantaged group copes with structurally or institutionally experienced unequal treatment, therefore, becomes intelligible in relation to the dominant group’s demands. Only in this context does collective practice produce (origin-)specific culture. With reference to the broader concept of cultural production (Willis, 2004), cultural differentiation is directly linked

a) to the creative actions of those objectively discriminated against – because they are the subjects of cultural production

b) to the symbolic materiality of this process – because, as in material production, cultural differentiation needs material, that is, symbolic material, and

c) to the social and cultural effectiveness of cultural practice – because its products are “meanings and expressions useful in themselves but also, in one way or another, useful for making sense of economistic positions and relations” (Willis, 2004:171).

Culture differentiation comes into play in the light of penetrating the ‘meritocratic’ paradigm which in general ensures the success of the dominant groups and the reproduction of class structure. The knowledge of disadvantaged groups “‘sees through’ the tautologous and manipulative modifications of the basic paradigm” (Willis, 1981:126). By penetrating the ‘big illusion’ of the dominant culture, counterculture “helps to liberate its members from the burden of conformism and conventional achievement. It allows their capacities and potentials to take root elsewhere” (Willis, 1981:130).
According to Willis, it is the requirement to adjust to the dominant culture in school and the accompanying processes of devaluation of (origin-)specific cultural capital which lay the grounds for the production of these specific countercultural capitals (Willis, 1981:63). In this sense, processes of cultural differentiation can be understood as a way of denying self-blame, i.e. self-exclusion or self-censorship, whereas psychic recruitment to hegemonic, i.e. dominant, culture reproduced in individualized capitalist society does not. Therefore, cultural differentiation is not an invariant propagating itself somehow through mechanical transmission and socialisation. Instead, it is a dynamic, contextual, and institutional element to hypostatization about class (Willis, 1981). With regard to the question pursued in this article, it can be assumed that, due to the demanding character of the dominant culture, children and teenagers with an immigrant background are permanently exposed to the danger of (origin-)specific capital devaluation, that is, patterns of orientation and action, common-sense knowledge, norms and values – crucial aspects of their socio-cultural origin. At the same time an immigrant background entails symbolic material that can provide collective belonging and confidence within the subordinated class position. By accepting the dominant culture and the cultural practice it directly requires, the youths are continuously at risk of losing, devaluing, or becoming alienated from their (origin-)specific capital assets. The stronger those perceptions are, the more likely it is that youths will refuse the dominant culture: they refuse to collude in its own cultural suppression (Willis, 1981:128). If the proposed assumptions apply, this would lead to a situation in which teenagers evaluate aspects of their (origin-)specific everyday culture more positively in its distinction from the dominant cultural assets of the dominant culture, the more pronounced they perceive tendencies of devaluation and discrimination against their (origin-)specific everyday culture or life practice. To compare the dominant cultural assets with the assets of the in-built collectivity of subordinated (origin-)specific culture: this is what relieves the psychic shame of the feeling of being disadvantaged/discriminated against. Moreover, cultural differentiation allows the commonality of their specific cultural praxis to be realised, and therefore it provides an alternative for finding satisfaction and particular meaning in daily life.

Under the current constellation of de-industrialization (Willis, 2004) and the aggravated processes of closure on the vocational training and job market it brings (Seibert and Solga, 2005; Solga, 2005), this correlation seems particularly volatile – especially for those with few educational capital assets. While, on the one hand, young people today, even when they come from a deprived social class, commonly acquire more education certificates than their parents and need to spend more time in institutional learning, they, on the other hand, experience the devaluation of their diplomas due to the increased accumulation of educational capital across all social classes as well as the amplified squeezing-out of “lower school diplomas” from the labour market. The
accompanying exclusion from working life renders investment into performance in school increasingly questionable. If, additionally, one considers the fact that immigrant youths have, on average, worse prospects in making a smooth transition from school to the dual system of vocational education than youths without this property, it may appear sensible to this group to increasingly produce counter resources to establish those in their symbolic struggle for recognition.

This tendency is subject to even more amplification if teenagers have initially made efforts to accept the dominant culture, but failed. Efforts that have come to nothing very likely intensify processes of differentiation owing to the negative consequences involved for personal as well as social identity, because they are disappointed about the absence of the expected and desired accesses and recognition (Berry et al., 2006a; Groenemeyer and Mansel, 2003; Heitmeyer, Müller and Schröder, 1997; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2006; Skrobanek, 2007). Consequently, there is all probability for a negative reciprocity that responds to failure with active differentiation (Berry et al., 2006a; Kalin and Berry, 1996).

2.2. Perceived discrimination and cultural differentiation: Conclusions

How can the options for coping with discrimination be characterised for immigrant youths? From the considerations just laid out, three fundamental conclusions can be drawn.

Firstly, the Hauptschule pupils with an immigrant background who participated in our study constituted a social group that was particularly subject to *processes of social closure and exclusion.* In this respect the young immigrants here can be considered as members of working class possessing (origin-)specific cultural capital.

Secondly, with reference to Bourdieu and Willis, immigrant youths are in a *paradoxical situation* which is a result of conflict between their cultural background and the social situation frequently experienced in the context of institutions. In terms of ideal types, teenagers cannot carry out the internalization of the prevailing standards of the dominant culture without devaluing the standards of their (origin-)specific culture.

Thirdly, what happens in dealing with this paradoxical situation is either self-exclusion in the sense of Bourdieu or an increased reference to (origin-)specific cultural capital assets – a process that, following Willis, can be called cultural differentiation. We expect *cultural differentiation* to be more likely, the more keenly the constraints to assimilate into the dominant culture are felt, or the less successful the efforts to assimilate prove to be due to structural restrictions.

Figure 1 shows the causes of cultural differentiation in order to give an overview of our subsequent empirical inquiry. The left hand side of the theoretical model displays what we expect to be causes for perceived discrimination. It is assumed that among the structurally disadvantaged
group of Hauptschule pupils with an immigrant background, discrimination is subjectively perceived especially:

a) when the youths surveyed by us had (relative to the sample) a lower degree of institutionalized (higher education diplomas) and incorporated cultural capital (German language) and
b) when they had to look back upon a less successful school history or transition history from school into training or employment.

In this context, indicators that point to non-recognition or devaluation of (origin-)specific capital are deemed identified when immigrant youths display a noticeably deprived capital endowment compared to youths without such a background, especially with regard to dominant (institutionalized) cultural capital.

We, furthermore, proceed on the assumption that the effects of non-recognition or devaluation of (origin-)specific capital on self-exclusion and cultural differentiation are mediated by subjectively perceived discrimination. In other words, perceived discrimination acts as an intermediary for the direct impact of the independent variable. Regarding the effects of perceived discrimination, we offer the following theoretical assumptions according to Bourdieu and Willis:

c) those who do feel themselves culturally disadvantaged have a less developed tendency to exclude themselves, that is, they less frequently adopt the frame of interpretation for class-related inequalities dictated by the dominant culture than those who do not perceive these disadvantages and
d) those who do feel themselves culturally disadvantaged have an increased tendency towards cultural differentiation.

3. Cultural differentiation and discrimination

3.1. Data and methods

The following analysis is based upon the transition panel of the German Youth Institute which was set up for the purpose of monitoring and explaining the transition of Hauptschule pupils from school to vocational training and employment. The dataset available to us currently comprises six waves, covering the time from the middle of the (presumably) last school year 2004 through
autumn 2006, that is, the second year after the transition. The data were collected using questionnaires among 126 Hauptschulen and Hauptschule-tracks at comprehensive schools all over Germany in altogether 254 classes and groups of participants in school-refusal projects.\(^8\) In total, a net sample of \(N=3,922\) (baseline) pupils was obtained. In subsequent waves the teenagers were surveyed by means of computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI).\(^9\) The design and research interest of the study did not permit random sampling.\(^{10}\) However, this circumstance does not present a problem under the given research question, since the focus is on testing interaction hypotheses rather than estimating parameters of the population (Diekmann, 2004: 369). One of the key advantages the sample at hand presents is that it is the first of its kind to provide extensive quantitative data of the surveyed social group – that is, pupils from the Hauptschule – which have so far been underrepresented in population samples (Solga, 2005). A further advantage of this dataset is the fact that the effect of perceived discrimination on self-exclusion and cultural differentiation in the transition from school to vocational training can be tested controlling for other important mediator variables among a relatively homogeneous group of young people (the pupils of the Hauptschule).

The following empirical analyses are based upon data from the fifth wave, because it was then that the desired variables “perceived discrimination” and “cultural differentiation” were asked about. Additionally, data from the previous waves were drawn upon since they contained information on self-exclusion, cultural capital assets, school history, and the position immediately after school-leaving. The variables discrimination and cultural differentiation were exclusively answered by youths with a Turkish background\(^{11}\) and by repatriates\(^{12}\). In total we have complete data on 289 youths with Turkish background and on 346 repatriates.

Because of space limitations we will restrict the demonstration of our measuring tools to those that found access to the core model of the multivariate analyses.\(^{13}\)

To measure perceived discrimination, teenagers with a Turkish background or young repatriates were asked how strongly they feel disadvantaged in comparison to Germans in school, youth centres, discos and clubs, government offices, and state agencies. Response options ranged from “not at all” (1) to “very much” (4).

The variable cultural differentiation was measured by agreement to the following four indicators which were amalgamated to a scale:\(^{14}\) a) Turks/repatriates living in Germany should only speak German if absolutely necessary; b) a Turk/repatriate should marry a Turk/repatriate rather than a German; c) when there is trouble with Germans, Turks/repatriates should stick together, and d) Turks/repatriates should hire only Turkish employees or repatriates. The response options ranged from “totally disagree” (1) to “totally agree” (4).
In order to account for at least one sub-aspect of Bourdieu’s concept of self-exclusion, the teenagers were asked to answer four questions, two of which targeted the internal attribution of causes (e.g. success is a result of one’s own skills and capacities) and two of which aimed at the external attribution of causes for personal success (e.g. success is a result of economic and political circumstances). The youths had the following range of response options: “totally disagree” (1) through to “totally agree” (4). Regrettably, the data available to us does not provide information on the causes teenagers attribute to their failure in school.

The variable migration background was measured from information given on the country of origin and the citizenship of the youth/youths’ parents as well as, in the case of the repatriates, from data on “ethnicity” and residence status.

With regard to institutionalized cultural capital two indicators were considered: the youths’ school-leaving certificate, comprising the response options “without school-leaving certificate” (1), “basic Hauptschule certificate” (2), “qualifying Hauptschule certificate” (3), “Realschule certificate” (4), and the grade in German language “1-2” (1), “3” (2), “4” (3), “5-6” (4).

The indicator used for the variable group-specific capital “language” was the response to the question which language is commonly spoken at home. The possible responses here were: “only German”, “only a foreign language”, “German and one foreign language”, or “several foreign languages”. The responses “a foreign language” and “several foreign languages” were later combined to one category.

To measure the position after school five alternative responses were used: school, vocational preparation, vocational training or apprenticeship, employment and unemployed/not in training.

Finally, two additional socio-demographic variables were included in the analysis: the sex of the respondent and whether he or she was born in Germany.

3.2. Descriptive findings

3.2.1. Immigrant background, institutionalized cultural capital, and position after leaving school

Looking at table 1 we can see the differences of accumulated credentials and attained positions. We can discern the tendencies that youths without a immigrant background are more successful in accumulating institutionalized educational capital during their years in school than those with such a background.

<Table 1 about here>
Only 20% of immigrant youths as compared to 36% without this property manage to follow up school with vocational training. The opposite tendency can be observed with regard to vocational preparation or continued school attendance. Approximately 30% of youths engage in vocational preparation – next to unemployment and absence of skills one of the least popular options – whereas this proportion is only 22% among respondents without an immigrant background. Finally, it is striking how immigrant teenagers continue to attend school notably more frequently. This could be read as an indicator of the often reported high educational aspirations of immigrant youths. From their perspective, further school attendance allows the attainment of further credentials and thus improves their prospects in the labour and vocational training market.

To summarize, we can note the fact that there are striking cultural imbalances between those youths with and those without an immigrant background concerning the prospects of accumulating institutionalized educational capital as well as concerning access to the vocational training market.

### 3.2.2. Perceived discrimination, self-exclusion, and cultural differentiation

As mentioned above, from the overall sample only those teenagers with Turkish background and young repatriates were asked about cultural differentiation. The following analyses refer only to this subsample.

About 20% of respondents declare a high degree of perceived discrimination. In other words, one in five immigrant youths feels strongly or severely disadvantaged in school, at discos or clubs, or in local government offices and state agencies compared to their peers with German background.

Of the respondents 75% expressed the opinion that occupational success depended on one’s own skills and capabilities as well as one’s commitment. Structural framework conditions or social class position are very rarely seen as the causes of success or otherwise. In Bourdieu’s sense, the majority of youths surveyed here have already learnt to ascribe failure in the institutional symbolic world to their own shortcomings rather than to the external restrictions caused by the unequal distribution of symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1974: 38).

How are things with cultural differentiation? Very similar to the cell distributions regarding perceived discrimination, 20% of respondents display a distinct tendency towards cultural differentiation; that is, these youths have an increased tendency to speak in their native language, to marry a partner of their own (immigrant) group, to mobilise their in-group in times of conflict.
with the dominant out-group, and to prefer employers of their (immigrant) group to hire primarily employees of their (immigrant) group. Accordingly, the proportion of those respondents with little or no cultural differentiation is large.

3.3. Model testing

The key question is now whether or not the theoretical model, and thus the assumptions derived from the theoretical discussion, proves applicable to the youths surveyed here. To test these assumptions, we opted for a hierarchical procedure. At first we tested the effects of the putative influencing factors on the dependent variables perceived discrimination, self-exclusion, and cultural differentiation in a stepwise manner. Those variables found to be significant were then integrated into an appropriate core model and tested once more against one another. They can be found in table 2 – models 1, 2, and 4. If substantial effects were revealed, the concerned variables were then, for instance in the case of self-exclusion and cultural differentiation, ultimately tested against the variable perceived discrimination – models 3 and 5 – in order to analyse the presumed mediation effects.

We will start by looking at the influence of capital assets, school and vocational training history, and selected demographic variables on perceived discrimination. As can be seen in model 1, the final model integrated the variables school-leaving certificate, grade in German, number of siblings, language capital, the post-school status, Germany as country of birth, and sex. The model calculations carried out beforehand revealed no substantial influence of variables such as parents’ occupation, everyday cultural practices, maths grade, year repetition, type of school attended, positive assessment of school, and age. Therefore, they were not considered here.

One result stands out: those youths with a higher school diploma and a better grade in German language perceive themselves to be less discriminated against than those with lower school credentials and a lower grade in German. As a general tendency, also, any integrated position after school, as opposed to exclusion from the market, minimizes the risk for the surveyed sample of youths to feel discriminated against. However, only the continued attendance at school proves to be statistically significant. Conversely, teenagers feel more disadvantaged if they tend to speak a language other than German at home and if they were born in Germany.

Another interesting finding is that it is especially the second generation – i.e. teenagers born in Germany, which in this study are primarily youths with a Turkish background – that perceives
discrimination. This effect is astonishing since they grew up in Germany from birth and thus passed through its social institutions. In this respect much points to the fact that contact with the society and the assimilation demands communicated within it foster the tendency for immigrant youths to experience themselves as disadvantaged. Roughly speaking: the less successful the accumulation of dominant cultural capital is and the lower the recognition of (origin-)specific cultural capital – measured indirectly by the effect of the language practiced at home, the school-leaving certificate, and the grade in German – then the more pronounced the feeling of discrimination teenagers with an immigrant background sense is in comparison with their German peers. With respect to the theoretical approach favoured in this paper, we interpret these findings as a direct pointer to the non-recognition of (origin-)specific cultural capital (as experienced by the individual).

We will now proceed to the subject of self-exclusion. In accordance with the suggested model we first need to test the direct impact of the independent variables on self-exclusion. The second step is to include perceived discrimination into the model as a mediating variable. If the assumptions introduced here apply, all other direct effects on self-exclusion would vanish after controlling for this variable. Model 2 displays the results not controlling for perceived discrimination. It becomes evident that self-exclusion in Bourdieu’s sense – that is, the attribution of success or the lack of it to one’s own skills, competencies, etc. rather than to external restrictions – increases with higher school certifications compared to youths without school-leaving certificates and with better grades in German language. With regard to the sex, it can be shown that young women have a noticeably less developed tendency towards self-exclusion than young men. The other variables included have only minor or insubstantial effects.

What are the results when perceived discrimination is added to the model (model 3)? Contrary to our expectations, the effects of the grade in German and sex remain stable even after controlled for perceived discrimination. School-leaving certificate and post-school status, however, have no evident influence. In keeping with our anticipations, perceived discrimination weakens self-exclusion; in other words, the more a teenager deems himself/herself disadvantaged, the less he/she tends to attribute success or the lack of it to himself/herself. Contrary to the schools’ social mandate (according to Bourdieu), youths who feel discriminated against thus seem to incorporate a tendency towards self-exclusion and attribute success or failure far less frequently to their own skills and competencies than those peers who do not or only marginally feel disadvantaged (according to Willis).

It was our assumption that cultural differentiation becomes more likely, the more discriminated against the youths feel and the more they deem their (origin-)specific capital assets devalued. If this assumption is correct, the variable perceived discrimination would have to have the strongest
effect on cultural differentiation. The substantial influences in model 4 are German grade and language. The lower the German grades are and the greater the tendency of youths not to speak German at home, the more they lean towards cultural differentiation. In contrast to models 1 and 2 the type of school diploma does not have an influence on the dependent variable. Moreover, as with perceived discrimination, it is evident that youths born in Germany – that is, the second generation – have a stronger tendency towards cultural differentiation than peers who were not born in Germany. As suggested above, if one conceives of cultural differentiation as a strategy to deal with processes of negative recognition and experiences of discrimination, it becomes obvious that those experiences can only be made depending on the length of time one spends growing up in the respective (new) context. Moreover, for those not born in the Federal Republic of Germany the so-called honeymoon effect might take on a vital role, which means they might idealise the dominant culture to some extent. If, finally, the perceived discrimination is included into the model (model 5), we find confirmed, quite in keeping with the predictions of the theoretical model, that perceived discrimination mediates the effects of the rest of the variables on cultural differentiation. It therefore applies that the stronger the degree of perceived discrimination, the greater the likelihood for teenagers to respond to this situation with cultural differentiation.

4. Summary and conclusion

It was the aim of this study to develop an explanatory model based upon Pierre Bourdieu’s “theory of capital” and Paul Willis’s “theory of cultural production” which could facilitate the explanation of both perceived discrimination and cultural differentiation as a response to disadvantaging and recognition deficits with regard to (origin-)specific cultural capital. According to Bourdieu and Passeron it is the main function of school (but also that of other institutions which reproduce the order of the class society) to teach children and teenagers that success and failure in accessing symbolic capital are the results of their own individual capabilities, skills, and endeavours. This mode of socialisation is referred to by Bourdieu as self-exclusion. The result of forced self-exclusion is the concealment of the actual key factor for the success of the concerned individuals – namely class position.

However, in contrast to Bourdieu’s and Passeron’s concept of self-exclusion, we had – according to Willis – assumed that it is especially the non-recognition of (origin-)specific cultural capital accompanying processes of adjustment to dominant or symbolic cultural capital assets that brings about the production of a subordinated culture of immigrant youths in the first place. Following Willis, we have conceived this process as one of cultural differentiation. Directly referring to this
standpoint we believe that youths with immigrant backgrounds who are exposed to continuous
devaluation of their (origin-)specific cultural capital in favour of dominant cultural capital in their
everyday lives and who tend to be disadvantaged regarding the accessibility of dominant cultural
capital will have an increased leaning towards cultural differentiation. Conversely, among these
youths, we should less frequently identify self-exclusion as a form of attribution of success and
failure.

On the basis of the transition panel of the German Youth Institute we managed to verify with
respect to two specific groups – that is, teenagers with a Turkish background and teenage
repatriates – that they feel all the more discriminated against, the smaller their assets of
institutionalized – thus symbolic – capital. This concerns the school diploma and the grade in
German as much as it does language practice in the country’s dominant language, German. This
correlation is highlighted when looking at the effects of the variable “country of birth is
Germany”. The data distinctly point to the fact that particularly second-generation immigrant
youths increasingly perceive discrimination. Presumably in the process of socialisation of the
superiority or rightness of the dominant culture, non-recognition of (origin-)specific cultural
capital is likely to be experienced.

The paper at hand also managed to confirm that perceived discrimination is not countered by
self-exclusion, but, as Willis predicted, by cultural differentiation. Experiences of discrimination
and the directly associated devaluation of (origin-)specific capital induce the production of a
counterculture to the dominant culture. Thus, cultural differentiation denotes a process of
revaluating (origin-)specific capital to the disadvantage of symbolic capital in Bourdieu’s sense.

So far, the results of this study suggest that Bourdieu’s and Passeron’s concept of self-exclusion
needs to be broadened to take account of Willis and the productive element of a counterculture.
This is in order to pursue the question – and nowhere in his concept of self-exclusion is this done –
why, of all people, those tending towards self-exclusion who have succeeded in accumulating
dominant or promising cultural capital. Why it is the rather “successful” and those youths who
feel themselves less discriminated against who ultimately adopt an interpretation pattern such as
“self-exclusion”? Here Willis provides a clear answer where Bourdieu and Passeron do not.
Psychic recruitment to dominant, i.e. hegemonic, cultures in the sense of Bourdieu and Passeron
provides no immunity to self-exclusion at all. Instead, more dominant cultures force self-
exclusion as a means of keeping order. Therefore, self-exclusion is primarily attractive for those
who are already successful. For those who are unsuccessful, disadvantaged, or discriminated
against, a collective, non-hegemonic culture in contrast provides an opportunity to resist
successfully – from the perspective of the suppressed group – dominant modes of self-exclusion.
But what do these findings tell us in the context of the ongoing structural change resulting from de-industrialisation? The production of a counterculture assumes a different role now than it did in the 1970s when Willis conducted his studies. In those days the counterculture not only found its cultural equivalent in the working class culture of Great Britain’s industrial metropolises, but it also took on a functional role concerning integration into the structural labour market. As Willis managed to demonstrate, the counterculture functionally fitted in with the demands of the labour market. It prepared the working class youth to be able to act in the respective economic fields in the first place. This aspect is fundamentally different in this day and age. Although the production of counterculture continuously takes place among the disadvantaged immigrant youths, that counterculture fails, for the most part – except for culturally differentiated niches of the job market – to find its functional place in society. Rather, under conditions of a shortage of gainful employment – especially in the low-wage sectors – it exacerbates the exclusion from vocational training and the labour market. This represents a negative dynamic the extent of which is at this stage hard to judge. Although cultural differentiation as a productive way of dealing with objective or subjective discrimination increases the social integration into the in-group of one’s origin (facilitating recognition and identity consolidation), it also intensifies the structural exclusion from training and the job market, because it is less and less compatible with its functional requirements. If there were a distinctly culturally segmented labour market in present-day Germany, surely (origin-)specific cultural productions of countercultures would be functional in serving the habitual demands of the production culture of these labour market segments. But the increasingly standardised and formalised labour markets of today are further from that than ever.

Too often this very assessment of the situation leads to the one-sided political conclusion that immigrant children, in order to better integrate into German society, have to learn exclusively what presents itself as non-negotiable dominant cultural capital to begin with. Looking at the findings we have before us, however, this opinion falls short. It neglects, for instance, the significance of school curricula which take into consideration the local cultural specificities or acknowledge their intrinsic value and which would stand as a countermeasure to the disintegrative effects of curricula that are singularly oriented towards German dominant culture (cf. “monolingual habitus”: Gogolin, 1994; school as the “guardian of the mono-culture”: Allemann-Ghionda, 1994). Berry et al. (2006:327) thus explicitly proclaim that “First cultural maintenance should be desired by the immigrant community, and permitted (even encouraged) by the society as a whole. Second, participation and inclusion in the life of the larger society should be sought by the immigrants, and permitted and supported by the larger society.” Standing in the way of these claims, however, are not only debates such as those about a German Leitkultur, headscarf and language bans at schools, or
scaremongering concerning so-called “parallel societies”, but also the prevailing discrimination against immigrants seeking access to vital resources such as educational capital, vocational training, and employment.

Last but not least, it needs to be noted that certain aspects, for example, the “non-recognition” of (origin-)specific cultural capital or self-exclusion, could only be tested to some (satisfactory) extent with the data at hand.

For a long time now intercultural research has been facing the as yet unsolved problem of making available adequate data to review the situation and to test and develop (new) theories and hypotheses. Especially with regard to the ongoing “culturisation” of public debates and the often directly associated concealment of socio-cultural and economic problems (Griese, 2002:112), the analysis of the processes of cultural differentiation, as one of the obvious results of current processes of social exclusion, is more pressing than ever.

Notes

1. This functionalist perspective not only characterises the discourses on migration, but, as studies conducted by the European Commission have shown, underlies a large number of European studies on the issue of social exclusion (Littlewood and Herkommer, 1999:7

2. The Hauptschule, for which there is no British or American equivalent, caters for the last five years of the compulsory nine years at school in Germany.

3. Bourdieu and Willis can be assigned to the “monopoly paradigm” which, next to “solidarity paradigm” and “specialization paradigm” represents one approach to capture the problem of social inclusion and exclusion (Silver, 1994). While the “specialization paradigm” understands social order as the outcome of a reciprocal exchange between competing interests and while from the perspective of the “solidarity paradigm” (external) moral and normative values form the basis of social cohesion, the “monopoly paradigm” highlights the power hierarchies of societies and regards exclusion as the result of an interaction between classes, social strata, and political power and as an instrument in the hands of the dominant class, that is, of those “included” (Silver, 1994:543). Claiming their due, those excluded against their own will attempt to gain access to the general good (cf. also Littlewood, 1999:4). The unrest in Clichy-sous-Bois, Rouen, Strasbourg, and Marseille is a very recent example of this, since the youths define themselves as revolutionaries who see no other option than to articulate their rights through violence (cf. reports of affected youths at the symposium “Urbane Gewalt und Jugendprotest. Deutsch-Französische Perspektiven auf die Unruhen in den Vorstädten 2005”, Berlin, Centre Marc Block, 23 March 2007).

4. “A credential such as a school diploma is a piece of universally recognized and guaranteed symbolic capital, good on all markets” (Bourdieu, 1989:21).

5. A key requisite for this is the proclaimed formal equality of pedagogical practice which is in fact “a cloak for and a justification of indifference to the real inequalities with regard to the body of knowledge taught or rather demanded” (Bourdieu, 1974:38).

6. The complementary piece to this term is integration, understood as “the process whereby class oppositions and intentions are redefined, truncated and deposited within sets of apparently legitimate institutional relationships and exchanges” (Willis 1981:63).

7. This is demonstrated by the correlation between educational success and immigrant background in the highly selective German school system (e.g. Gomolla and Radtke, 2002; Stanat, 2003; Krohne, Meier and Tillmann, 2004) and also by the increasingly worsening situation of immigrant youths on the vocational training and job market (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 2006; Solga, 2005). More frequently than non-immigrant youths they leave school without a certificate,
concentrate primarily in Hauptschulen, and on average achieve lower positions in the occupation system.

8. The questionnaire was designed under external consultation with the Centre for Survey Research and Methodology (ZUMA) and underwent a pretest.

9. At the end of the first survey teenagers were asked for their willingness to participate in the follow-up interviews. Altogether 2,933 agreed to that. This accounts for the majority of the dropout of the second wave compared to the first.

10. Restrictions are mainly imposed by the officially required evaluation of the federal model programme “Kompetenzagenturen” (“competence agencies”) commissioned by the Federal Ministry for Family, Senior Citizens, Women, and Youth. A systematically structured sample could not be realised due to the predefined field conditions (the Ministry pre-selected the locations the survey was to take place).

11. A Turkish background is indicated if the teenager or the father or the mother was born in Turkey and if the teenager or the father or the mother is a Turkish citizen.

12. Those youths are considered repatriates who themselves or their father or their mother or their grand and great-grandparents are in possession of German citizenship and a certificate of admission. The status (of both parents and the teenagers) had to be reconfirmed by means of questioning. Most of them are from Eastern Europe and from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

13. The variables excluded on account of non-significance were parents’ occupation, everyday cultural practices, maths grade, year repetition, school type attended, positive assessment of school, and age.

14. To generate the scale, indicators were added up and divided by the number of indicators. The same procedure was applied to all subsequent scales. Prior to the scaling, SEM analyses revealed minor differences concerning the proportion of variance accounted for, the reliability of cultural differentiation, and the global values of the group comparison.

15. An index was calculated using the concerned indicators. The external indicators were subtracted from the internal ones.

16. Among these are above all (not yet available) measures to improve vocational training and integration chances (BBE), full-time basic vocational training year (BGJ), first-year students at vocational schools (BVJ), educational measures relating to the preparation for working life (BV), as well as the attendance of domestic science schools.

17. Due to the heterogeneity of the variables the category “miscellaneous” was not considered. Alternative pathways such as military service and voluntary year of social service were not included.

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Figure 1: Model explaining self-exclusion and cultural differentiation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influencing factors</th>
<th>Presumed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capital Assets</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural capital</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic capital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vocational Training and Occupational History</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion from vocational training and labour market</td>
<td>Perceived discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult school history</td>
<td>Self-exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural differentiation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perceived discrimination is not significant.
Table 1: Immigrant background, institutionalized cultural capital, and post-school position (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>immigrant youth</th>
<th>non-immigrant youth</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>School-leaving certificate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>without school-leaving certificate</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>basic <em>Hauptschule</em> certificate</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qualifying <em>Hauptschule</em> certificate</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Realschule</em> certificate</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\phi = .10^{**}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Grade in German</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\phi = .12^{**}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Post-school status</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>school</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vocational preparation</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vocational training or apprenticeship</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployed/without training</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\phi = .20^{**}\]

Source: DJI transition panel 2007
Note: Two asterisks ** indicate p < .01.
Figure 2: Perceived discrimination, self-exclusion, and cultural differentiation (dichotomized scales)
Table 2: Causes of perceived discrimination, self-exclusion, and cultural differentiation – core model (logistic regression; using the antilogarithm of the regression coefficients $\text{Exp}(b)$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>independent variable</th>
<th>perceived discrimination</th>
<th>self-exclusion</th>
<th>cultural differentiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>model 1</td>
<td>model 2</td>
<td>model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>school-leaving certificate [R: no certificate]</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.46**</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>basic Hauptschule cert.</td>
<td>0.38**</td>
<td>1.58**</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qualifying Hauptschule cert.</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
<td>2.00**</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grade in German</td>
<td>1.41*</td>
<td>0.78**</td>
<td>0.68*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>siblings</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>language [R: German]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German and another language</td>
<td>5.78*</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no German, but one/several other languages</td>
<td>16.37**</td>
<td>0.57**</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>follow-up [R: without employment or vocational training]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>continued school education</td>
<td>0.30*</td>
<td>1.42*</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vocational preparation</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vocational training</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>born in Germany [R: yes]</td>
<td>0.39**</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sex [R: male]</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.75**</td>
<td>0.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived discrimination [R: no or minor discrimination]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant ($b$)</td>
<td>-2.36*</td>
<td>1.59**</td>
<td>2.96**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>635</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{model } \chi^2$ / $df$</td>
<td>422.6 / 2228.3 / 464.59 / 670.8 / 614.9</td>
<td>13** / 13** / 12** / 13** / 5**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke's $R^2$</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $^+$ $p < .07$; $^*$ $p < .05$; $^{**} p < .01$; only those independent variables were integrated into the core model which proved to have a substantial influence in the previous stepwise calculations; thus in model 3 only significant variables from model 2 and in model 5 only significant variables from model 4 were considered.

Source: DJI transition panel 2008