Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-51542
Ledoit, Olivier (2011). Choice Democracy. Working paper series / Department of Economics No. 38, University of Zurich.
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Abstract
Democracy is defined by two core tenets: voice and pluralism. Within these constraints, a wide variety of regime types can be designed. We show that the only new, untested form of democracy is when every citizen is governed by the political party of his/her choice. Multiple full-fledged governments would coexist in the same national territory at the same time, each one sovereign only over the people who chose to vote for it - hence the name: "Choice Democracy". Choice Democracy can be regarded as pure polyarchy, the broadest form of political competition, and a robust mechanism for disciplining government agencies. We argue that this system makes democracy more stable by reducing the risk of revolutionary and financial crises. We develop a theory for the optimal number of governments per countries, where the answer is determined by a trade-off between cooperation and competition. We also provide evidence indicating that Choice Democracy would be viable in the real world.
| Item Type: | Working Paper |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics Working Paper Series > Department of Economics |
| DDC: | 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | H11, H12, H41 |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2011 |
| Deposited On: | 25 Nov 2011 11:13 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Oct 2012 20:14 |
| Series Name: | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| ISSN: | 1664-7041 |
| Official URL: | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
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