Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-51542
Ledoit, Olivier (2011). Choice Democracy. Working paper series / Department of Economics No. 38, University of Zurich.
Democracy is defined by two core tenets: voice and pluralism. Within these constraints, a wide variety of regime types can be designed. We show that the only new, untested form of democracy is when every citizen is governed by the political party of his/her choice. Multiple full-fledged governments would coexist in the same national territory at the same time, each one sovereign only over the people who chose to vote for it - hence the name: "Choice Democracy". Choice Democracy can be regarded as pure polyarchy, the broadest form of political competition, and a robust mechanism for disciplining government agencies. We argue that this system makes democracy more stable by reducing the risk of revolutionary and financial crises. We develop a theory for the optimal number of governments per countries, where the answer is determined by a trade-off between cooperation and competition. We also provide evidence indicating that Choice Democracy would be viable in the real world.
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|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics
|Dewey Decimal Classification:||330 Economics|
|JEL Classification:||H11, H12, H41|
|Deposited On:||25 Nov 2011 10:13|
|Last Modified:||20 Oct 2012 18:14|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Department of Economics|
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