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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-51589

Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin (2011). Rotten Kids With Bad Intentions. Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute No. 0919, University of Zurich.

PDF (Revised Version November 2011)
PDF (Revised Version January 2010)


We examine a “Rotten Kid” model (Becker 1974) where a player with social preferences interacts with an egoistic player. We assume that social preferences are intentionbased rather than outcome-based. In a very general multi-stage setting we show that any equilibrium must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players, endogenously generating negative rather than positive emotions. In a large class of two-stage games that includes principal-agent and gift-giving games, this prevents the equilibrium from being materially Pareto efficient. Compared to the subgame-perfect equilibrium without social preferences, efficiency is still generally increased. On the other hand, the materialistic player has lower whereas the reciprocal player has higher material payoffs, so that reciprocity does not increase equity: For sufficiently strong reciprocity concerns, the materialistic player ends up with a negligible share of the gains from trade.


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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Socioeconomic Institute (former)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C72, D03, D86, J01
Uncontrolled Keywords:Reciprocity, Psychological Games, Moral Hazard, Gift Giving
Date:November 2011
Deposited On:25 Nov 2011 14:17
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 15:08
Series Name:Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute
Number of Pages:40
Additional Information:Revised version
Official URL:http://www.soi.uzh.ch/research/wp/2009/wp0919.pdf
Related URLs:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php

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