Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-51786
Zweifel, Peter; Leukert, Karolin; Berner, Stephanie (2010). Preferences for Health Insurance in Germany and the Netherlands - A Tale of Two Countries. Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute No. 1002, University of Zurich.
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Abstract
This contribution contains an international comparison of preferences. Using two Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE), it measures willingness to pay for health insurance attributes in Germany and the Netherlands. Since the Dutch DCE was carried out right after the 2006 health reform, which made citizens explicitly choose a health insurance contract, two research questions naturally arise. First, are the preferences with regard to contract attributes (such as Managed-Care-type restrictions of physician choice) similar between the two countries? Second, was the information campaign launched by the Dutch government in the context of the reform effective in the sense of reducing status quo bias? Based on random-effects Probit estimates, these two questions can be answered as follows. First, while much the same attributes have positive and negative willingness to pay values in the two countries, their magnitudes differ, pointing to differences in preference structure. Second, status quo bias in the Netherlands is one-half of the German value, suggesting that Dutch consumers were indeed made to bear the cost of decision making associated with choice of a health insurance contract.
| Item Type: | Working Paper |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics Working Paper Series > Socioeconomic Institute (former) |
| DDC: | 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | C25, D12, I18 |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | February 2010 |
| Deposited On: | 29 Nov 2011 16:09 |
| Last Modified: | 09 Jul 2012 07:00 |
| Series Name: | Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute |
| Official URL: | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
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