Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-51789
Darai, Donja; Grätz, Silvia (2010). Determinants of Successful Cooperation in a Face-to-Face Social Dilemma. Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute No. 1006, University of Zurich.
What makes you a successful cooperator? Using data from the British television game show 'Golden Balls' we analyze a prisoner's dilemma game and its pre-play. We find that players strategically select their partner for the PD, e.g., they bear in mind whether contestants lied. Players' expectations about the stake size strongly influence the outcome of the PD: The lower the stakes, the more likely players successfully cooperate. Most interestingly, unilateral cooperation is encouraged by mutually promising not to defect and shaking hands on it, but a mere handshake serves as manipulating device and increases successful defection.
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|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Socioeconomic Institute (former)
|Dewey Decimal Classification:||330 Economics|
|JEL Classification:||C72, C93, H41|
|Deposited On:||29 Nov 2011 15:09|
|Last Modified:||09 Jul 2012 05:00|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute|
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