Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-51791
Schmutzler, Armin; Muller, Adrian; Polk, Andreas (2010). Lobbying and the Power of Multinational Firms. Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute No. 1008, University of Zurich.
Are national or multinational firms better lobbyists? This paper analyzes the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and firm. We compare the resulting regulation levels for national and multinational firms. We identify three countervailing forces, the easier-to-shut-down effect, the easier-to-curb-exports effect and the multiple-plant effect. The interplay of these three forces determines whether national or multinational firms produce more, depending on such parameters as the potential environmental damages, transportation costs and the in uence of the firm. We also show that welfare levels are higher with multinational firms than with national firms when there is no lobbying, but that lobbying can reverse the welfare ordering.
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|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Socioeconomic Institute (former)
|Dewey Decimal Classification:||330 Economics|
|JEL Classification:||D72, F23, L51|
|Deposited On:||29 Nov 2011 15:09|
|Last Modified:||05 Apr 2016 15:09|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute|
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