Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-51881
Goeree, Jacob K; Holt, Charles A; Palmer, Karen; Shobe, Wiliam; Burtraw, Dallas (2009). An Experimental Study of Auctions versus Grandfathering to Assign Pollution Permits. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 429, University of Zurich.
We experimentally study auctions versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution permits that can be traded in a secondary spot market. Low and high emitters compete for permits in the auction, while permits are assigned for free under grandfathering. In theory, trading in the spot market should erase inefficiencies due to initial mis-allocations.nIn the experiment, high emitters exercise market power in the spot market and permit holdings under grandfathering remain skewed towards high emitters. Furthermore, the opportunity costs of “free” permits are fully “passed through.” In the auction, the majority of permits are won by low emitters, reducing the need for spot-market trading. Auctions generate higher consumer surplus and slightly lower product prices in the laboratory markets. Moreover, auctions eliminate the large “windfall profits” that are observed in the treatmentnwith free, grandfathered permit allocations.
285 downloads since deposited on 29 Nov 2011
97 downloads since 12 months
|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
|Dewey Decimal Classification:||330 Economics|
|Deposited On:||29 Nov 2011 20:09|
|Last Modified:||09 Jul 2012 05:01|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics|
Users (please log in): suggest update or correction for this item
Repository Staff Only: item control page