Quick Search:

uzh logo
Browse by:
bullet
bullet
bullet
bullet

Zurich Open Repository and Archive

Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-51886

Palmer, Dallas Burtraw, Jacob K Goeree, Charles A Holt, Erica Myers, Karen; Shobe, William (2009). Collusion in Auctions for Emissions Permits: An Experimental Study. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 434, University of Zurich.

[img]
Preview
PDF
672kB

Abstract

Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms — uniform and discriminatory price sealed-bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock auction, both with and without explicit communication. The clock appears to facilitate successful collusion, both because of its sequential structure and because it allows bidders to focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and quantity).

Downloads

247 downloads since deposited on 29 Nov 2011
95 downloads since 12 months

Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
DDC:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:September 2009
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 20:09
Last Modified:09 Jul 2012 05:01
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ISSN:1424-0459
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

Users (please log in): suggest update or correction for this item

Repository Staff Only: item control page