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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-51914

Buehler, Stefan; Gaertner, Dennis L (2009). Making Sense of Non-Binding Retail-Price Recommendations. Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute No. 902, University of Zurich.

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Abstract

This paper provides a theoretical rationale for non-binding retail price recommendations (RPRs) in vertical supply relations. Analyzing a bilateral manufacturer-retailer relationship with repeated trade, we show that linear relational contracts can implement the surplus-maximizing outcome. If the manufacturer has private information about production costs or consumer demand, RPRs may serve as a communication device from manufacturer to retailer. We characterize the properties of efficient bilateral relational contracts with RPRs and discuss extensions to settings where consumer demand is affected by RPRs, and where there are multiple retailers or competing supply chains.

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Socioeconomic Institute (former)
DDC:330 Economics
JEL Classification:D23, D43, L14, L15
Language:English
Date:February 2009
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 21:09
Last Modified:09 Jul 2012 07:01
Series Name:Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

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