Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-51985
Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs (2002). Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 84, University of Zurich.
A substantial number of people exhibit social preferences, which means they are not solely motivated by material self-interest but also care positively or negatively for the material payoffs of relevant reference agents. We show empirically that economists fail to understand fundamental economic questions when they disregard social preferences, in particular, that without taking social preferences into account, it is not possible to understand adequately (i) the effects of competition on market outcomes, (ii) laws governing cooperation and collective action, (iii) effects and the determinants of material incentives, (iv) which contracts and property rights arrangements are optimal, and (v) important forces shaping social norms and market failures.
506 downloads since deposited on 29 Nov 2011
143 downloads since 12 months
|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
|Dewey Decimal Classification:||330 Economics|
|Deposited On:||29 Nov 2011 21:26|
|Last Modified:||09 Jul 2012 05:01|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics|
Users (please log in): suggest update or correction for this item
Repository Staff Only: item control page