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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-51998

Feld, Lars P; Frey, Bruno S (2002). Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 98, University of Zurich.



"Tax compliance has been studied in economics by analysing the individual decision of a representative person between paying and evading taxes. A neglected aspect of tax compliance is the interaction of taxpayers and tax authorities. The relationship between the two actors can be understood as an implicit or ""psychological"" contract. Studies on tax evasion in Switzerland show that the more strongly the political participation rights arendeveloped, the more important this contract is, and the higher tax morale is. In this paper,nempirical evidence based on a survey of tax authorities of the 26 Swiss states (cantons) isnpresented, indicating that the differences in the treatment of taxpayers by tax authorities cannbe explained by differences in political participation rights as well."


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Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Date:January 2002
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 21:26
Last Modified:09 Jul 2012 05:02
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

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