Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52020
Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; Tougareva, Elena (2002). Do High Stakes and Competition Undermine Fairness? Evidence from Russia. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 120, University of Zurich.
This paper reports the results of a series of competitive labour market experiments in which subjects have the possibility to reciprocate favours. In the high stake condition subjects earned between two and three times their monthly income during the experiment. In the normal stake condition the stake level was reduced by a factor of ten. We observe that both in the high and the normal stake condition fairness concerns are strong enough to outweigh competitive forces and give rise to non-competitive wages. There is also no evidence that effort behaviour becomes generally more selfish at higher stake levels. Therefore, our results suggest that, contrary to common beliefs, fairness concerns may play an important role even at relatively high stake levels.
|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics|
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
|Deposited On:||29 Nov 2011 21:26|
|Last Modified:||09 Jul 2012 05:02|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics|
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