Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52031
Engelmann, Dirk; Fischbacher, Urs (2002). Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 132, University of Zurich.
We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that while pure indirect reciprocity appears to be important, the helping choice seems to be influenced at least as much by strategic considerations. Strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.
|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics|
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
|Deposited On:||29 Nov 2011 22:26|
|Last Modified:||09 Jul 2012 07:02|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics|
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