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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52034

Frey, Bruno S; Luechinger, Simon (2002). Terrorism: Deterrence May Backfire. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 136, University of Zurich.

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Abstract

Present anti-terrorist policy concentrates almost exclusively on deterrence. It seeks to fend off terrorism by raising the cost of undertaking terrorist acts. This paper argues that deterrence policy is less effective than generally thoughtnand induces in some cases even more terrorism. This is, in particular, the case if deterrence policy induces a centralisation of decision-making in the polity and economy. Therefore, an effective anti-terrorist policy should focus more on reducing the expected benefits of terrorist acts to prospective terrorists. Such a policy is based on strengthening rather than weakening decentralised decision-making.

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
DDC:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:December 2002
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 21:26
Last Modified:09 Jul 2012 05:02
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ISSN:1424-0459
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

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