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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52035

Frey, Bruno S; Luechinger, Simon (2002). How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 137, University of Zurich.

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Abstract

Deterrence has been a crucial element in fighting terrorism, both in actual politics and rational choice analyses of terrorism. But there are superior strategies to deterrence. One is to make terrorist attacks less attractive. Another to raise the opportunity cost – rather than the material cost – to terrorists. These alternative strategies effectively dissuade potential terrorists. The strategies suggested here build on the “benevolence” system and tend to produce a positive sum game among the interacting parties. In contrast, the deterrence system is based on “threats” and tends to produce a negative sum game interaction.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:December 2002
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 21:26
Last Modified:09 Jul 2012 05:02
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ISSN:1424-0459
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

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