Quick Search:

uzh logo
Browse by:
bullet
bullet
bullet
bullet

Zurich Open Repository and ArchiveĀ 

Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52071

Berentsen, Aleksander; Lengwiler, Yvan (2003). Fraudulent Accounting and Other Doping Games. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 175, University of Zurich.

[img]
Preview
PDF
342Kb

Abstract

From a game theoretic point of view, fraudulent accounting to em-bellishnthe financial status of a firm and the use of drugs to enhancenperformance in sports are very similar. We study the replicator dy-namicsnof both applications within the same model. We allow for het-erogenousnpopulations, such as highly talented versus more mediocrenathletes, or high quality managers versus less able colleagues. Inter-estingly,nfor some parameters, the replicator dynamics is character-izednby cycles. Thus, we may see cycles of doping and clean sport,nand cycles of fraudulent and honest accounting. Moreover, in somencases, high ability players are more likely to commit fraud than lownability types.

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
DDC:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:December 2003
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 23:32
Last Modified:09 Jul 2012 07:02
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ISSN:1424-0459
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

Users (please log in): suggest update or correction for this item

Repository Staff Only: item control page