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Signaling, Globality, and the Intuitive Criterion


Ewerhart, Christian; Wichardt, Philipp (2004). Signaling, Globality, and the Intuitive Criterion. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 189, University of Zurich.

Abstract

A global signaling game is a sender-receiver game in which the sender is only imperfectly informed about the receiver's preferences. The paper considers an economically relevant class of signaling games that possessnmore than one Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For this class of games, it is shown that a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is una®ected by a small perturbation of the information structure if and only if it is consistent with a criterionnsuggested by Cho and Kreps (1987). Moreover, the equilibrium in the globalnsignaling game is essentially unique.

A global signaling game is a sender-receiver game in which the sender is only imperfectly informed about the receiver's preferences. The paper considers an economically relevant class of signaling games that possessnmore than one Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For this class of games, it is shown that a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is una®ected by a small perturbation of the information structure if and only if it is consistent with a criterionnsuggested by Cho and Kreps (1987). Moreover, the equilibrium in the globalnsignaling game is essentially unique.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:May 2004
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 22:32
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 15:10
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ISSN:1424-0459
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html
Permanent URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52085

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