Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52121
Osterloh, Margit; Frey, Bruno S (2005). Shareholders Should Welcome Employees as Directors. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 228, University of Zurich.
"The most influential theory of corporate governance, principal agency theory, does not take intonconsideration that the key task of modern corporations is to generate and transfer firm-specific knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the widespread corporate scandals, the interests of top management and directors should be increasingly aligned to shareholder interests by making the board more responsible to shareholders, and strengthening the monitoring of top management by independent outside directors. Corporate governance reform needs to go in another direction altogether. Firm-specific knowledge investments are, like financial investments, not ex ante contractible, leaving investors open to exploitation by shareholders. Employees therefore refuse to make firm-specific investments. To gain a sustainable competitive advantage, there must be an incentive to undertake such firm-specific investments. Three proposals are advanced to deal with this conflict: (1) The board should rely more on insiders. (2) The insidersnshould be elected by those employees of the firm making firm-specific knowledge investments.(3) The board should be chaired by a neutral person. These proposals have major advantages: they provide incentives for knowledge investors; they countervail the dominance of executives; they encourage intrinsic work motivation and loyalty to the firm by strengthening distributive andnprocedural justice, and they ensure diversity on the board while lowering transaction costs. These proposals for reforming the board may help to overcome the crisis corporate governance is in. At the same time, they connect agency theory with the knowledge-based theory of the firm."
268 downloads since deposited on 29 Nov 2011
94 downloads since 12 months
|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
|Deposited On:||29 Nov 2011 22:32|
|Last Modified:||09 Jul 2012 05:02|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics|
Users (please log in): suggest update or correction for this item
Repository Staff Only: item control page