Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52152
Buehler, Stefan (2000). A Further Look at Two-way Network Competition in Telecommunications. Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute No. 9904, University of Zurich.
This paper develops a simple reduced form model of two-way network competition with linear retail pricing. Using the techniques of supermodular games, it is demonstrated that the most important results from the existing literature do not depend on routinely invoked assumptions, such as specific functional forms or the symmetry of the network operators. In particular, it is demonstrated that (i) firms do not need to be symmetric or regulated to have incentives to collude in access pricing, and (ii) due to the effects on social welfare, enforcing colluding firms to behave noncooperatively is not necessarily desirable.
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|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Socioeconomic Institute (former)
|Dewey Decimal Classification:||330 Economics|
|JEL Classification:||D43, K23, L43, L51, L96|
|Deposited On:||29 Nov 2011 22:32|
|Last Modified:||09 Jul 2012 05:02|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute|
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