Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52157
Buehler, Stefan (2001). How to Regulate Vertical Market Structure in Network Industries. Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute No. 102, University of Zurich.
This paper analyzes the equilibrium outcomes in a network industry under daccess pricing, investment, vertical foreclosureifferent vertical market structures. In this industry, an upstream monopolist operates a network used as an input to produce horizontally differentiated final products that are imperfect substitutes. Three potential drawbacks of market structure regulation are analyzed: (i) double marginalization, (ii) underinvestment, and (iii) vertical foreclosure. We explore the conditions under which these effects emerge and discuss when the breakup of an integrated network monopolist is adequate.
|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics|
Working Paper Series > Socioeconomic Institute (former)
|JEL Classification:||D43, L43|
|Deposited On:||29 Nov 2011 23:32|
|Last Modified:||09 Jul 2012 07:02|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute|
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