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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52173

Polk, Andreas; Schmutzler, Armin (2003). Lobbying against Environmental Regulation vs. Lobbying for Loopholes. Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute No. 301, University of Zurich.

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Abstract

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the competitor. We determine the lobbying equilibrium and discuss the resulting emission level. In many cases, a higher effectiveness of private lobbying is detrimental for firms and beneficial for environmental quality, as it induces firms to turn towards excessive amounts of relatively unproductive private lobbying.

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Socioeconomic Institute (former)
DDC:330 Economics
JEL Classification:D72, D78, L51
Language:English
Date:January 2003
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 22:32
Last Modified:09 Jul 2012 05:02
Series Name:Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

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