Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52195
Buehler, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin (2005). Intimidating Competitors Endogenous Vertical Integration and Downstream Investment in Successive Oligopoly. Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute No. 409, University of Zurich.
We examine the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and costreducing downstream investment in successive oligopoly. We start from a linear Cournot model to motivate our more general reducedform framework. For this general framework, we establish the following main results: First, vertical integration increases own investment and decreases competitor investment (intimidation effect). Second, asymmetric equilibria typically involve integrated firms that invest more into effciency than their separated counterparts. Our findings suggest that asymmetric vertical integration is a potential explanation for the initial difference between leader and laggard in investment games.
|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics|
Working Paper Series > Socioeconomic Institute (former)
|JEL Classification:||L13, L20, L22|
|Deposited On:||29 Nov 2011 23:32|
|Last Modified:||09 Jul 2012 07:03|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute|
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