Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52197
Gaertner, Dennis (2004). Endogenizing Private Information: Incentive Contracts under Learning By Doing. Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute No. 413, University of Zurich.
This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents’ production technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over- or under-exploited crucially depends on whether learning effects increase or decrease the principal’s uncertainty about agents’ costs of production. Hence, what drives the over- or under-exploitation of learning effects is whether more efficient agents also learn faster (so costs diverge through learning effects) or whether it is the less efficient agents who learn faster (so costs converge). Furthermore, we show that if divergence in costs through learning effects is strong enough, learning effects will not be exploited at all, in a sense to be made precise.
|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics|
Working Paper Series > Socioeconomic Institute (former)
|JEL Classification:||D82, L14, L43, L51, O31|
|Deposited On:||29 Nov 2011 23:32|
|Last Modified:||09 Jul 2012 07:03|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute|
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