Quick Search:

uzh logo
Browse by:

Zurich Open Repository and Archive

Maintenance: Tuesday, 5.7.2016, 07:00-08:00

Maintenance work on ZORA and JDB on Tuesday, 5th July, 07h00-08h00. During this time there will be a brief unavailability for about 1 hour. Please be patient.

Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52242

Frey, Bruno S; Rohner, Dominik (2006). Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-GameBetween Terrorists and the Media. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 285, University of Zurich.



It has often been pointed out in the literature that a symbiotic relationship exists betweennterrorist groups and the media. As yet, however, no formal model has been built based on thisnissue and only very little empirical research has been done in this field. The presentncontribution builds a simple game theoretic model, focussing on the social interactionsnbetween terrorists and the media. The model has features of a common-interest-game andnresults in multiple equilibria. After a discussion of the policy implications of the model, annempirical analysis is performed. Using newspaper coverage, terror incidents and terror fatalities data, it is shown that media attention and terrorism do mutually Granger cause eachnother, as predicted by the model. Moreover, it is explained why terror attacks tend to ben“bloodier” in developing countries than in Europe and the United States.


388 downloads since deposited on 29 Nov 2011
112 downloads since 12 months

Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Date:April 2006
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 22:47
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 15:11
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

Users (please log in): suggest update or correction for this item

Repository Staff Only: item control page