Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52276
Frey, Bruno S (2007). Overprotected Politicians. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 321, University of Zurich.
This paper argues that politicians are overprotected. The costs of politicalnassassination differ systematically depending on whether a private or a public point of view is taken. A politician attributes a very high (if not infinite) cost to his or her survival. The social cost of political assassination is much smaller as politicians are replaceable. Conversely, the private cost of the security measures is low fornpoliticians, its bulk – including time loss and inconvenience – is imposed on taxpayers and the general public. The extent of overprotection is larger in dictatorial than in democratic countries.
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|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
|Dewey Decimal Classification:||330 Economics|
|Deposited On:||29 Nov 2011 22:47|
|Last Modified:||05 Apr 2016 15:11|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics|
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