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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52277

Gerber, Anke; Wichardt, Philipp C (2007). Finite-Order Beliefs and Welfare-Enhancing Instruments in the Centipede Game. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 322, University of Zurich.

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Abstract

This paper investigates the effectiveness of two instruments designed to defer termination in the centipede game: an insurance against termination by the opponent, and an option to offer the opponent a bonus for not terminating the game. The rational prediction in both cases is passing until close to the end. Empirically, however, only the bonus option is used by the subjects. The results indicate that subjects readily understand the strategic effect of the bonus, which, once offered, renders passing until close to the end the strictly dominant strategy for both players. Yet, they fail to realise the slightly more involved strategic signal entailed in the insurance, namely that passing until close to the end is a strictly dominant strategy for an insured player. In order to further investigate this effect, we propose a simple behavioural model based on level-k thinking and show that it is largely consistent with the data.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
DDC:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:December 2007
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 22:47
Last Modified:09 Jul 2012 05:03
Series Name:Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
ISSN:1424-0459
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

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