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A Monetary Model with Strong Liquidity Effects

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Abstract

This paper studies the joint business cycle dynamics of inflation, money growth, nominal and real interest rates and the velocity of money. I extend and estimate a standard cash and credit monetary model by adding idiosyncratic preference shocks to cash consumption as well as a banking sector. The estimated model accounts very well for the business cycle data, a finding that standard monetary models have not been able to generate. I find that the quantitative performance of the model is explained through substantial liquidity effects.

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1 Introduction

This paper explores the business cycle dynamics of nominal money growth, inflation, nominal and real interest rates and the velocity of money. Accounting for the observed relationships among these variables has proved to be difficult in a variety of monetary models, such as cash-in-advance models, models with sticky prices or with segmented markets (Hodrick et al. (1991), Cooley and Hansen (1995), King and Watson (1996)). In particular, accounting for the negative correlation of inflation and nominal interest rates with nominal money growth, for the high volatility of money velocity and the weak correlation of inflation and nominal interest rates is still a challenge. Moreover, there are large and persistent deviations of the model-predicted money-demand relationship from its counterpart in the data.\(^1\) Certainly, a monetary model, which can successfully account for these empirical observations, would raise the confidence in the conclusions drawn from policy experiments.\(^2\)

I show that it is possible to overcome these shortcomings in a model with strong liquidity effects (Increases in nominal interest rates decrease real money demand and increase real interest rates). I find that these liquidity effects imply that the estimated model can closely match the business cycle facts that standard models have not been able to replicate. An important assumption in the theoretical model is that households are hit by idiosyncratic preference shocks, which determine their demand for money in a model with cash and credit goods. This assumption generates a significant precautionary demand for money and I demonstrate that it also induces strong liquidity effects.

The literature suggests that the failure of standard models can indeed be traced back to the absence of substantial liquidity effects.\(^3\) First, without these liquidity effects, real money and real interest rates are almost invariant with respect to monetary policy. The

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\(^1\)In the last 25 years, the demand-for-money relationship has become even more problematic, since the two monetary aggregates M1 and M2 are both positively correlated with nominal interest rates in the data, whereas this correlation is negative in the model.

\(^2\)For a critique of monetary models along these line see for example Prescott (1996) in a discussion of a sticky-price model.

\(^3\)Liquidity effects also serve to address other empirical ‘puzzles’, such as the ‘equity premium puzzle’ in Lagos (2005) and the ‘credit card debt puzzle’ in Telyukova (2007).
Fisher equation – the nominal interest rate equals the real interest rate plus the inflation rate – then implies that inflation, money growth and nominal interest rates move almost one-for-one in response to the observed persistent changes in nominal interest rates. Liquidity effects break this linkage and can thus potentially reconcile the predictions of an economic model with the data. Second, the lack of a strong precautionary demand for money also explains why velocity is not volatile enough (Hodrick et al. (1991)): households almost always hold the right amount of money to purchase the desired amount of cash goods. Changes in nominal interest rates therefore hardly affect the decision to acquire real balances, leaving velocity and real interest rates almost unchanged. Finally, rationalization of observed Federal Reserve monetary policy requires the existence of liquidity effects (see Ohanian and Stockman (1995)). Along the same lines, Alvarez et al. (2001) argue that the observed practice of increasing nominal interest rates to lower inflation would contradict the quantity theory of money in the absence of substantial liquidity effects.\footnote{In a related paper, I argue (Hagedorn (2006)) that New Keynesian models are not a candidate to reconcile observed monetary policy with model predictions. Indeed, I show that nominal interest rates should be uniformly lowered to implement a lower inflation target and that real interest rates are virtually unchanged in New Keynesian models, a result consistent with the quantity theory of money, but not with the experience during the Volcker disinflation.}

A crucial feature in this paper, which contributes to finding strong liquidity effects, is the presence of a commercial bank (à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983)).\footnote{Recently, Diamond and Rajan (2006) added money to a (Diamond & Dybvig-type) banking model. They explore complementary issues such as the interaction of monetary policy, bank credit and bank failures from which I abstract.} In the model, households have to acquire money and bonds and make deposits before they learn their individual preference shock to cash goods. The bank diversifies this risk, providing partial insurance against this source of uncertainty. Households deposit money with the bank before they learn the realization of their shock, but can withdraw money after the shock realization. In equilibrium, households are willing to accept a lower real return on their deposits if the bank allows them to withdraw more money ex-post. The bank therefore faces a trade-off between providing more real money, which is costly because of positive nominal interest rates, and paying a higher real return on deposits.
There are three reasons to add banking to the model. First, the bank’s simple trade-off leads to strong liquidity effects of monetary policy. In response to an increase in nominal interest rates, the bank provides households with less money, but pays a higher real return on deposits, establishing the presence of liquidity effects. These liquidity effects are strong because the volume of liquidity and not just changes in liquidity (as in models with money-in-the-utility) affect real interest rates. For example, an increase in the steady state level of real money leads to lower steady state real interest rates if the volume of liquidity matters, but has no effect if only first differences matter.\(^6\)

Second, the finding that households are willing to substitute a lower real return on their bank deposits for more money provided by the bank is useful for measuring households’ valuation of liquidity. This substitution effect reveals households’ precautionary demand for money and thus puts discipline on the choice of the unobservable idiosyncratic shocks. The substitution effect, together with the bank’s response to it, is consistent with the data as it implies a negative relationship between real deposit rates and real money.

Third, adding a bank takes seriously the fact that households receive non-negligible interest rates on their deposits, instead of adopting the standard, but counterfactual, assumption that monetary aggregates (M1 or M2) are non-interest-bearing assets.

I estimate the model using the simulated method of moments and show that the model is able to match the estimation targets simultaneously. This appears remarkable, given that Hodrick et al. (1991) find that many moments cannot even be replicated one at a time.

I then simulate the model to assess the quantitative properties along the same dimensions as in Hodrick et al. (1991). These researchers compute contemporaneous model correlations for nominal money growth, inflation, nominal and real interest rates and velocity and compare them with their empirical counterparts. I find that the estimated model is able to closely replicate the empirical correlations, among them the correlations of inflation, money growth and nominal interest rates, in the data; a result that standard models have

\(^6\)Interestingly, this model feature has also attracted some attention in the finance literature: the (trading) volume is associated with prices and volatility in the stock market (Cochrane (2003)).
not been able to generate.

The model also provides some guidance for the choice of the monetary aggregates. The theory requires a distinction between liquid assets (those with zero maturity) and illiquid assets (those with non-zero maturity). Identifying money with liquid assets defined in this way leads to a money-demand relationship that is well supported by the data. This finding appears remarkable given that the literature on money demand has had difficulties in identifying stable money demand relationships in U.S. data during the last 25 years (e.g. Lucas (2000)).

Prices are assumed to be flexible here, so that the model has some shortcomings in addressing the interaction of inflation and output, similar to the models analyzed in Cooley and Hansen (1995). However, the New Keynesian literature has demonstrated over the last ten years that integrating various rigidities into macroeconomic models can improve the quantitative model performance along this dimension (Woodford (2003)).\footnote{A possible response to the result that New Keynesian models cannot replicate key monetary facts would be to follow the reasoning of Woodford. He argues that monetary policy can be conducted in a cashless economy (Woodford (2003)) and that the quantity of money is orthogonal to all variables of interest (Woodford (2007)). However, these arguments are based on a model with large deviations between theory and data, and the arguments of Prescott (1996) apply: such large deviations do not raise the confidence in the author’s conclusions.} The same can be expected to apply here once the same rigidities are incorporated into the model.

Another class of monetary models with flexible prices that is developed to generate liquidity effects of monetary policy assumes that markets are segmented (for example, Alvarez et al. (2002)). This literature finds liquidity effects that are even weaker than those in New Keynesian models. As a result, the observed persistent changes in nominal interest rates then lead to a strong co-movement of nominal variables, generating the above-mentioned counterfactual implications.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in Section 2. I study the theoretical properties of this model in a simplified version, which allows for a closed-form solution, in Section 3. The quantitative analysis is performed in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. All proofs are delegated to the appendix.
2 The Economy

2.1 The environment

Time is discrete and the economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived agents of measure one. Each period $t \geq 0$ is divided into two distinct and successive sub-periods $t_1$ and $t_2$. At date $t$, the expected utility $V_t$ of an agent, which is written recursively because of the shock $\theta$ (explained below), evaluated at $t_1$ is

$$V_t = E_t\{c_t^1 + u(c_t^2) + \beta\theta V_{t+1}\},$$

where $c_t^1$ is the consumption level at $t_1$, $c_t^2$ is the consumption level at $t_2$ and $E_t$ denotes expectation formed at $t_1$. The utility function $u$ is continuously differentiable, concave and $u(0)$ is normalized to 0. The discount factor $\beta$ lies strictly between zero and one.

Households do not value leisure and provide one unit of divisible labor, which is the only input into production. At $t_1$, firms can transform $L$ units of labor into $z \cdot L$ units of consumption goods, which can be sold either at $t_1$ or at $t_2$. Both the goods market and the labor market are competitive. Aggregate output $zL$ at $t$ equals the sum of aggregate consumption at $t_1$ and at $t_2$

$$zL_t = E(c_t^1 + c_t^2)$$

Firms use $L_{t_1}$ units of labor to produce for period $t_1$ consumption and $L_{t_2}$ units of labor to produce for period $t_2$ consumption. The real wage rate is denoted $w_t$ and the nominal price is $P_t$ in both sub-periods. Households receive labor income $w_t L_{t_1}$ at $t_1$ and $w_t L_{t_2}$ at $t_2$.

The only source of uncertainty is a liquidity shock $\Theta_t$, that changes every agents’ personal rate of time preference. With probability $p$, a high shock $\theta_t = \bar{\theta} > 1$ realizes and makes one unit of date $t$ goods worth $\frac{1}{\beta \bar{\theta}} < \frac{1}{\beta}$ of date $t + 1$ goods to the agent. With

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8What is crucial for tractability is linearity in either consumption or labor. Nothing would change with quasi-linear preferences as in Hansen (1985) and in Rogerson (1988).

9This way of modeling liquidity follows Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Diamond and Rajan (2001). Two features of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) - every period is divided into sub-periods and agents face liquidity shocks in some but not all sub-periods - make the model similar to the framework developed
probability $p = 1 - \overline{p}$ a low shock $\theta_t = \overline{\theta} < 1$ realizes and makes one unit of date $t$ goods worth $\frac{1}{\beta^2} > \frac{1}{\beta}$ of date $t + 1$ goods to the agent. $\Theta$ has expectation one: $\overline{p} \cdot \overline{\theta} + p \cdot \theta = 1$. Every agent learns his individual realization of $\Theta_t$ at sub-period $t_2$ after trade at $t_1$.

Each household enters period $t_1$ with $A^0_t$ real assets (this amount depends on a household’s history, but does not affect its decision because of linear utility). Wealth at the beginning of $t_1$ equals

$$W_t = A^0_t + w_t L_{t_1} + T_t, \quad (3)$$

where $w_t L_{t_1}$ is households’ labor income at $t_1$ and $T_t$ denotes the sum of taxes and profits of the central and private banks (described below). Agents decide how much to consume ($c^1_t$) and they choose how many real government bonds they want to buy ($B^H_{t+1} \geq 0$) to maximize utility $V_t$.

Households can also sign a contract with a bank. The contract stipulates that agents transfer $A^1_{t+1}$ units of goods in period $t_1$ to the bank in exchange for $r_t A^1_{t+1}$ units of goods at $t + 1$. In addition, the agent can withdraw up to $M_{t+1}$ units of nominal money at $t_2$ for consumption ($c^2_t$) through the use of a check or a debit card. The terms “money” or “cash” refer here to these financial services exclusively provided by a bank and not to fiat money only. The household’s portfolio behaves like a demand deposit with an upper bound. The customer can show up at any time and withdraw $\tilde{M}_{t+1} \leq M_{t+1}$ funds in the form of cash. Let $\chi_t = 1$ if the agent accepts the bank’s offer in period $t$ and $\chi_t = 0$ otherwise. The household’s budget constraint is then given by

$$W_t = c^1_t + \chi_t A^1_{t+1} + B^H_{t+1}, \quad (4)$$

At the beginning of $t_2$, each household learns its individual $\theta_t$. If $\chi_t = 1$, agents can withdraw $\tilde{m}_{t+1} = \tilde{M}_{t+1}/P_t \leq M_{t+1}/P_t$ units of money at $t_2$. A cash-in-advance constraint (CIA) for consumption at $t_2$ provides a role for money:

$$c^2_t \leq \tilde{m}_{t+1}, \quad (5)$$

by Lagos and Wright (2005). However, the assumption in Diamond and Rajan (2001) that agents’ time preference rates are stochastic, improves the quantitative performance significantly.
Households receive their $t_2$ labor income $w_t L_{t_2}$ in the form of cash at the end of period $t_2$, after the firms have collected period $t_2$ revenues. This wage income is transferred to their deposit, if they have one.\textsuperscript{10} Any withdrawal of money decreases the household’s bank deposit and the repayment at $t + 1$ one for one. Next period’s real asset level $A_{t+1}^0$ then equals

$$A_{t+1}^0 = \chi_t r_t (A_{t+1}^1 + w_t L_{t_2} - \tilde{m}_{t+1}) + (1 - \chi_t) \frac{w_t}{\pi_{t+1}} L_{t_2} + \frac{R_t}{\pi_{t+1}} B_{t+1}^H,$$

where $\pi_{t+1} = P_{t+1}/P_t$ is the inflation rate between $t$ and $t + 1$ and $R_t$ is the nominal return on bonds. If agents signed a contract at $t_1$ ($\chi_{t_1} = 1$), the bank pays a real return $r_t$ on households’ deposit $A_{t+1}^1 + w_t L_{t_2} - \tilde{m}_{t+1}$, which is the sum of assets deposited at $t_1$, $A_{t+1}^1$, assets deposited at $t_2$, $w_t L_{t_2}$, minus assets withdrawn at $t_2$, $\tilde{m}_{t+1}$. Let $A_{t+1}$ denote the overall amount of assets deposited at $t$, $A_{t+1} := A_{t+1}^1 + w_t L_{t_2}$. If agents decide not to sign a contract ($\chi_{t_1} = 0$), they carry their labor income from period $t_2$ to the next period. Finally, they receive their bond income $\frac{R_t}{\pi_{t+1}} B_{t+1}^H$. The time line of events so far is summarized in Table 1.

There is only one bank which has monopoly power and can make positive profits.\textsuperscript{11} The bank engages in two distinct types of activities, one on each side of the balance sheet. On the asset side, the bank only buys government bonds $B_{t+1}^B \geq 0$. Since all assets are perfect substitutes (there is no aggregate uncertainty and there are no liquidity effects on the asset side), I can abstract from bank loans.\textsuperscript{12} On the liability side, the bank provides agents with

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\textsuperscript{10}Deposit-holders could opt for carrying the cash to the next period themselves. However, this is clearly suboptimal since they would forgo a positive nominal interest rate.

\textsuperscript{11}The assumption of imperfect competition - for example, banks are Cournot-Nash competitors - is prevalent in the banking literature (Freixas and Rochet (1997), Allen and Gale (2000)). For example, it allows interesting questions such as the effect of competition on financial stability (Allen and Gale (2000) and Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)) to be studied. In the quantitative analysis in Section 4, I allowed for Cournot competition (in a previous version), which as a limit case includes perfect competition, but the estimation selected a bank with monopoly power.

\textsuperscript{12}There is a straightforward way to add capital to the model to make it consistent with NIPA data. Suppose a fraction of firms needs to be monitored at a cost $c$ and can thus get credit from banks (who monitor them) only. These firms’ real interest rate then equals $(1 + c)R/\pi > 1/\beta$, whereas the majority of firms pays an real interest rate of $1/\beta$, which is unaffected by monetary policy.
Table 1: Timing of Events.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date $t_1$</th>
<th>Date $t_2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Household starts period with $A_t^0$ assets</td>
<td>1. The idiosyncratic shock $\theta_t$ realizes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Receive labor income $w_t L_{t_1}$, decide how much to consume $c_1^t$ and how many bonds to buy $B_{t+1}^H \geq 0$.</td>
<td>2. Household withdraws $\tilde{m}_{t+1}$ money from its account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sign a contract with a bank ($\chi_t = 1$).</td>
<td>3. Consume $c_1^2 \leq \tilde{m}_{t+1}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Transfer $A_{t+1}^1$ to the bank.</td>
<td>4. Transfer wage income $w_t L_{t_2}$ from $t_2$ to the bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$A_t^0$: Assets at beginning of period $t$

$A_{t+1}^1$: Assets deposited at $t_1$

$A_{t+1}$: Sum of assets deposited at $t_1$ and $t_2$

$\tilde{m}_{t+1}$: Money withdrawn at $t_2$

Money to trade at $t_2$. Banks thus funnel resources from households to debtors and money from the central bank to households.

At $t_1$, a bank offers a one-period contract to households.\(^{13}\) This contract is a portfolio that comprises an illiquid and a liquid asset (money) and specifies the overall amount of household investment $A_{t+1}$ (in equilibrium it is sufficient to specify the sum of assets deposited at $t_1$ and at $t_2$) and the real rate of return $r_{t+1}$. The bank also provides households with checks and a debit card, so that up to $M_{t+1}$ units of money can be withdrawn at $t_2$. A portfolio thus consists of $m_{t+1}$ liquid assets and of $A_{t+1} - m_{t+1}$ illiquid assets.

Once the contract is signed, the bank is obliged to fulfill the contract in any case. The bank chooses the contract and the number of bonds to maximize profits.

Money is provided by the central bank through open market operations, where bonds which pay an interest rate $R_t$ are traded for non-interest-bearing fiat money. Following the literature, I assume that the central bank can implement and control its interest rate target $R$ for the bond market. Profits $\frac{R_{t-1} - 1}{\pi_t} E_{t-1} \tilde{m}_t$ accrue at $t_1$ and are transferred to the household at $t_1$.

\(^{13}\) The linearity of preferences implies (shown below) that decisions at $t$ do not affect decisions at $t + 1$.  

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The rest of the government has a rather passive role. $B_{t+1}$ bonds are issued every period $t$ and lump-sum taxes $\frac{R_{t+1}}{\pi_t}B_t - B_{t+1}$ are levied to balance the budget. The amount of bonds $B_{t+1}$ is exogenous and bonds are bought by either commercial banks or households, $B_{t+1} = B^B_{t+1} + B^H_{t+1}$. Central and private banks’ profits are transferred to households directly at $t_1$.

\[2.2 \quad \text{A First Analysis}\]

In an equilibrium, the flow of money during a time period is as follows. At $t_1$, money starts in the central bank who trades it for bonds to the commercial bank. At $t_2$, households who want to consume $(c_2^2 > 0)$ withdraw money from their account. Finally firms collect the money they obtain for selling goods at $t_2$ and transfer it, as part of workers’ wage income, to their workers’ bank accounts to earn an interest rate $r$ at the end of the period $t_2$. The commercial bank then carries the money to the next period. All other transactions are conducted without money.

A household, endowed with $W_t$ units of wealth, consumes $c_1^1 = W_t - \chi_t \cdot A_{t+1} - B^H_{t+1}$ at $t_1$ and $c_2^2 = \chi_t \cdot \tilde{m}_t$ at $t_2$. At $t_1$ it derives expected lifetime utility

\[V_t(W_t) := c_1^1 + E_t u(c_1^2) + \beta E_t \theta_{t+1} V_{t+1}(W_{t+1}) \]

\[= W_t - \chi_t (A_{t+1} - E_t u(\tilde{m}_{t+1})) - B^H_{t+1} + \beta E_t \theta_{t+1} V_{t+1}(W_{t+1}), \tag{7}\]

where $W_t$ evolves according to (3) and $E_t u(c_1^2) = E_t u(\tilde{m}_{t+1}) = p \cdot u(\tilde{m}_{t+1}(\theta)) + \bar{p} \cdot u(\tilde{m}_{t+1}(\bar{\theta}))$.

At $t_2$, the household chooses how much money $\tilde{m}_{t+1}(\theta_t)$ to withdraw from the account to spend on consumption to maximize utility $u(c_1^2) + \beta \theta_t E_{t_2} V_{t_2}$.

At $t_1$, the household chooses $\chi_t$ and $B^H_{t+1}$ to maximize $V_t(W_t)$.

To maximize profits, the bank offers a contract that grants the household not more than its reservation utility $V^o_t$ in all periods. The reservation utility equals $V_t$, from equation (8), when no contract is signed with the bank ($\chi_t = 0$):

\[V^o_t(W_t) = W_t - B^H_{t+1} + \beta E_t \theta_{t+1} V_{t+1}(R_t/\pi_{t+1} B^H_{t+1} + w_{t+1} + T_{t+1}) \tag{9}\]

At date $t$, the household knows that at date $t+1$ it will not receive more than its reservation utility.
utility. $V_t$ can thus be rewritten by plugging in $V_{t+1}^o$ for $V_{t+1}$ into (8):

$$V_t(W_t) = c_t^1 + E_t u(c_t^2) + \beta E_t \theta_{t+1} \{W_{t+1}(\chi_t = 1) - B_{t+2}^H\} + \beta^2 E_t \theta_{t+1} \theta_{t+2} V_{t+2}(R_{t+2}/\pi_{t+2} B_{t+2}^H + w_{t+2} + T_{t+2})$$

where $W_{t+1}(\chi_t)$ is the wealth level at $t + 1$ conditional on the choice $\chi_t$ to accept the bank’s contract in period $t$.

$V_t^o$ can also be rewritten by substituting $V_{t+1}^o$ for $V_{t+1}$:

$$V_t^o(W_t) = W_t - B_{t+1}^H + \beta E_t \theta_{t+1} \{W_{t+1}(\chi_t = 0) - B_{t+2}^H\} + \beta^2 E_t \theta_{t+1} \theta_{t+2} V_{t+2}(R_{t+1}/\pi_{t+2} B_{t+2}^H + w_{t+2} + T_{t+2})$$

The fact that $V_t$ is linear in $W_{t+1}$ simplifies the analysis substantially. Any two contracts with different stipulated repayments in $t + 1$ offered by the bank in $t$, change $V_{t+1}$ by exactly this difference in repayments. In particular, periods later than $t + 1$ do not affect $V_t - V_t^o$. Therefore, the bank’s problem at date $t$ has to take into account periods $t$ and $t + 1$ only. A profit-maximizing portfolio $(A_{t+1}, m_{t+1}, r_{t+1})$ gives the household its reservation utility if

$$V_t(W_t) - V_t^o(W_t) = 0$$

$$\Leftrightarrow (10)$$

$$-A_{t+1} + p\{u(m_{t+1}(\theta)) + \beta\theta(r_t(A_{t+1} - \bar{m}_{t+1}(\theta)))\} + p\{u(m_{t+1}(\bar{\theta})) + \beta\theta(r_t(A_{t+1} - \bar{m}_{t+1}(\bar{\theta}))\} = 0$$

If all households accept the same contract $(A_{t+1}, m_{t+1}, r_t)$ at $t_1$, then, in equilibrium, low shock agents will withdraw $\bar{m}_{t+1}(\theta)$ units of real money and high shock agents will withdraw $\bar{m}_{t+1}(\bar{\theta})$ units of real money. The bank therefore needs $E_t m_{t+1} = \bar{p} \cdot \bar{m}_{t+1}(\theta) + \bar{p} \cdot \bar{m}_{t+1}(\bar{\theta})$ units of real money to meet all requirements. Households deposit $A_{t+1}^1 = A_{t+1} - E_t \bar{m}_{t+1}$ at $t_1$ and $E_t \bar{m}_{t+1} = w_t L_{t_2}$ at $t_2$. The bank buys $B_{t+1}^B = A_{t+1}^1$ bonds, but trades $E_t \bar{m}_{t+1}$ of them in an open market operation for money. Only $B_{t+1}^B - p \cdot \bar{m_t}(\theta) - \bar{p} \cdot \bar{m}_{t+1}(\bar{\theta})$ bonds earn the return $R_t$.\(^{14}\)

\(^{14}\)This acquisition of money through open market operations is equivalent to borrowing money at an interest rate $R$.\)
The function $r(A,m)$ is defined as solving (10) for $r$ and is thus the lowest interest rate such that the household saves $A_{t+1} - m_{t+1}$ in illiquid assets and $m_t$ in liquid assets. The repayment in $t+1$ then equals $C(A_{t+1}, m_{t+1}) = r(A_{t+1}, m_{t+1}) \cdot (A_{t+1} - E_t\hat{m}_{t+1})$.

The bank’s problem, which is to choose a profit-maximizing contract $(A_{t+1}, m_{t+1})$, can now be formulated. The bank gets revenue from buying government bonds at an interest rate of $R_t$. Money is acquired through open market operations from the central bank. Finally, the bank has to pay $P_{t+1}C(A_{t+1}, m_{t+1})$ to its customers. The bank chooses $(A_{t+1} = B^B_{t+1} + E_t\hat{m}_{t+1}, B^B_{t+1}, m_{t+1})$ to maximize (nominal) profits:

$$R_tP_tB^B_{t+1} - (R_t - 1)P_t(p \cdot \hat{m}_{t+1}(\bar{\theta}) + \bar{p} \cdot \hat{m}_{t+1}((\bar{\theta}) - P_{t+1}C(A_{t+1}, m_t), \quad (11)$$

such that the household can afford it:

$$A^1_{t+1} = A_{t+1} - E_t\hat{m}_{t+1} \leq W_t - B^H_{t+1}. \quad (12)$$

I adjust labor productivity $z$ to ensure that this constraint is never binding. This preserves the linear structure of the model, which is needed for tractability. All households then sign the same contract, independent of their individual shock in the preceding periods. I can thus identify all variables with their aggregate counterparts.

An *equilibrium* is a sequence of prices $r$, $w$, $R$ and $P$, together with bond holdings $B^H$ and $B^B$, allocations $c^1$, $c^2$, $L_1$, $L_2$, $m$ and $T$ and decisions $\chi$ and $\hat{m}$ such that the households maximize utility, banks maximize profits, the government and the household budget constraint hold and the bond market, the money market and the goods market clearing conditions are satisfied.

3 Interest Rates, Money and Inflation: Theoretical Results

In this Section, I derive some theoretical results in a simplified version of the model. In particular, I show that nominal interest rates and inflation do not move one-for-one, although prices are flexible.
3.1 Characterizing Equilibrium

In this section I assume that preferences at $t_2$ are linear:\(^{15}\)

$$u(c^2_t) = c^2_t,$$ \hspace{1cm} (13)

which allows me to explicitly solve for the equilibrium. I assume that this equilibrium is interior and I will provide a sufficient condition for this assumption later.

I first solve for the optimal portfolio offered by the bank. A necessary condition for an equilibrium is $R/\pi \beta \leq 1$, since $R/\pi \beta > 1$ would imply an infinite demand for bonds. Thus I assume and verify later that $R/\pi \beta < 1$ holds in equilibrium, i.e that it is consistent with the bank’s problem. In particular, households do not hold bonds themselves $B^H = 0$.\(^{16}\)

Linear utility implies that a simple withdrawal rule $\tilde{m}$ at $t_2$ is optimal. In the case of a low shock, the maximum amount of money is withdrawn $\tilde{m}_t(\theta) = m_t$ and $\beta r_{t+1} \theta$ is smaller than one. Assumption 1 below ensures that for the optimal contract $\beta r_{t+1} \tilde{\theta} > 1$, and thus $\tilde{m}(\tilde{\theta}) = 0$ holds. The bank then buys all bonds $B^B = B_t = B$ and trades $pm$ of them for money, such that $B^B - pm = B - pm$ bonds earn an interest rate of $R$.

This all-or-nothing withdrawal rule allows me to solve equation (10) for $r(B, m) := r(A - pm, m)$ and $C(B, m) = r(B, m) \cdot B$, where both $r$ and $C$ are expressed in terms of $B = B^B$ and $m$. Define $\gamma = p \cdot (1 - \theta)$.\(^{17}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
  r(B, m) & = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\gamma m}{B}} \\
  C(B, m) & = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{B}{1 + \frac{\gamma m}{B}}
\end{align*}
\] \hspace{1cm} (14)\hspace{1cm} (15)

The bank’s optimal plan is given as a solution to first order conditions since the cost function is (weakly) convex.

---

\(^{15}\)To ensure an interior solution, the subsequent analysis with linear utility should be considered as a limiting case of a specification with strictly concave utility, for example when $u(c) = c^\delta$ and $\delta \rightarrow 1$.

\(^{16}\)That households do not buy bonds by themselves is not a special feature of a model with linear utility. Private banks always find it advantageous that households save with banks only. In case households are active in the bond market, banks will bid up the real price of bonds and may improve the conditions of agents’ contracts until no agent is active in the bond market anymore.

\(^{17}\)If $\beta = 1$, $\gamma$ is the percentage utility gain (in consumption equivalents) of making consumption state-contingent.
Lemma 1 $C(B, m) = \frac{B}{1 + \gamma \pi}$ is a convex function.

Households follow a simple strategy: They always accept the contract ($\chi = 1$) and do not buy bonds ($B^H_t = 0$).

Given a sequence of (rationally expected) $R_t$, an equilibrium is determined once the amount of money $m_t$ and the inflation rate $\pi_t$ are known.\textsuperscript{18} An interior equilibrium $(m_t, \pi_t)$ solves the bank’s first order conditions:

\begin{align*}
C_B(B, m_t) \cdot \pi_{t+1} &= R_{t+1} \\
C_m(B, m_t) \cdot \pi_{t+1} &= p(1 - R_{t+1}).
\end{align*}

I denote by $m_t(R, \ldots), \pi_t(R, \ldots)$ the unique solution to (16) and (17).

Obtaining an explicit solution for the inflation rate is the crucial step in solving for an equilibrium. The next proposition accomplishes this.

**Proposition 1** The inflation rate equals

\[ \pi_t = \frac{\beta (R_t \gamma + p \cdot (R_t - 1))^2}{4p\gamma (R_t - 1)} \]  

Given this explicit expression for the inflation rate, $m_t$ can be determined:

\[ m_t = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{R_{t+1}}{p(R_{t+1} - 1)} - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right) \cdot B \]  

Money will be held in equilibrium ($m_t > 0$) if the marginal value $-C_m(B, m = 0)$ exceeds the marginal costs $p \cdot (R - 1)/(\pi(m = 0))$ for the bank. This holds if

\[ \gamma > \frac{\beta p(R - 1)}{\pi(m = 0)} \]  

\[ \Leftrightarrow \gamma > \frac{p \cdot (R - 1)}{R} \]  

\textsuperscript{18}Sargent and Wallace (1975) and Woodford (2003) point out that an exogenous sequence of interest rates can lead to (local) indeterminacy (there is a continuum of other equilibria which are arbitrarily close to a given equilibrium). However, following the arguments in Woodford (2003), it is easy to show that the following interest rate rule renders $\pi_t$ and $m_t$ a determinate equilibrium: $\tilde{R}_t = R_t + \alpha \mid \tilde{\pi}_t - \pi_t \mid$, for a large $\alpha$, where $\tilde{\pi}_t$ is the inflation rate in a (potentially) different equilibrium.
I also make an assumption that liquidity is too expensive to be given to both low and high types. Otherwise there would be no liquidity premium, i.e. the real interest rate paid to households \( r \) and the real return banks earn, \( R/\pi \), would coincide, which is rejected by the data. The assumption states that \( R \) has to be high enough so that liquidity is low enough and therefore \( r \) is high enough.

**Assumption 1**

\[
R > \frac{p(1 - p + 2\gamma)}{\frac{1}{p} - \frac{p^2}{2} - \gamma + 3p\gamma},
\]

(22)

which is equivalent to \( \beta r_{t+1}^\theta = \frac{2p(R-1)}{\gamma R^2 p(R-1)} \cdot \frac{1+\gamma-p}{1-p} > 1 \).

With this assumption, the following proposition can be proved.

**Proposition 2** *The sequence \((m_t(R,\ldots), \pi_t(R,\ldots))\) is the unique equilibrium. \( R_t/\pi_t \beta < 1 \) for all \( t \).*

### 3.2 Results

I can now develop the links between monetary policy, modeled as changes in nominal interest rates, real interest rates and inflation in the simplified version of the model with linear utility. The same mechanism will work in the general case in Section 4.

Banks provide households with liquidity since a more liquid portfolio makes agents willing to accept a lower return \( r \) on their savings. The optimal provision of liquidity balances the banks’ benefit from lowering repayments \( r \cdot B \) and the banks’ costs of lending money, which is proportional to \( R - 1 \).

A tightening of monetary policy (a higher \( R \)) increases the bank’s costs of borrowing money from the central bank, but makes it more attractive to invest in the asset market. This leads to a swap of liquid for illiquid assets. Households then hold a less liquid portfolio \( \left(\frac{m}{B}\right) \) is lower), but receive a higher real deposit rate, which reflects a higher liquidity premium \( \left(\frac{1}{1+\gamma}\right) \). This increase in bank’s costs then prevents nominal interest rates and inflation from moving one-for-one.

For a given level of \( R \), equations (16) and (17) determine the two endogenous variables
\[ \pi = \frac{m}{B} \quad (C_B \text{ and } C_m \text{ are functions of } x \text{ only}). \] To obtain a graphical illustration, both equations are solved for \( \pi \) as a function of \( R \) and \( x \):

\[
\pi^{BM}(R, x) = \frac{R}{C_B(x)} = \frac{R\beta(1 + \gamma x)^2}{1 + 2\gamma x}, \tag{23}
\]

\[
\pi^{MM}(R, x) = \frac{p(1 - R)}{C_m(x)} = \frac{p(1 - R)\beta(1 + \gamma x)^2}{-\gamma}, \tag{24}
\]

where \( \pi^{BM} \) is the solution to the BondMarket equation (16) and \( \pi^{MM} \) is the solution to the MoneyMarket equation (17). Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration. The equilibrium is located at point \( Y = (x^Y, \pi^Y) \), where the two solid lines intersect. \( \pi^{BM} \) slopes upward since a higher amount of liquidity \( x = \frac{m}{B} \) lowers \( r \), the real interest rate households receive on their bank deposits. For a given \( R \), the inflation rate then has to be higher for the bond market to be in equilibrium. The \( \pi^{MM} \) curve slopes upward since the cost function \( C \) is convex.

Exogenous changes in \( R \) reveal further interesting properties of the model, which turn out to be crucial to match the data. The dashed lines in Figure 1 show the two curves after an increase in \( R \) to \( \hat{R} \). The \( \pi^{MM} \) curve is shifted to the left since, for a fixed level of the inflation rate, a higher \( R \) leads to a less liquid portfolio (a lower \( x \)). The \( \pi^{BM} \) curve is also shifted to the left since, for a fixed level of \( x \), a higher \( R \) leads to a higher inflation rate.

The next two propositions prove that these effects of changes in \( R \) on \( x \) and \( r \) also hold in equilibrium, as suggested by the intersection of the two dashed curves in point \( Z = (x^Z, \pi^Z) \) in Figure 1. First, there is a nominal liquidity effect. An increase in nominal interest rates leads to a decrease in money (more precisely liquidity) demand.

**Proposition 3** An increase in \( R_t \) decreases \( \frac{m_{t+1}}{B} \).

This property, together with the result that a higher \( x \) leads to a lower \( r \), implies a real liquidity effect: A higher level of nominal interest rates increases the real return on deposits \( r \).

**Proposition 4** An increase in \( R_t \) increases \( r_t \).

Whereas propositions 3 and 4 hold in general, several properties of Figure 1 do not. The slope of the BM curve is not necessarily steeper than the MM curve and the location of
Figure 1: Equilibrium of the model for two different levels of nominal interest rates, $R$ and $\hat{R}$.

the equilibrium $Y$ also depends on parameters.

Increasing $\gamma$ makes the BM curve steeper. In a special case of the model, when $\gamma$ approaches 0, the BM curve is horizontal. In this case, there is no role for liquidity. A one percent increase in $R$ leads to a one percent increase in $\pi \sim R\beta$ and leaves liquidity unaffected. In terms of these implications, the model with $\gamma$ close to 0 is then equivalent to a basic Cash-in-Advance model with a binding CIA constraint.

The location of the equilibrium at point $Z$ in Figure 1 suggests that an increase in $R$ implies an increase in $\pi$ and a drop in $x$. Figure 2, however, shows that the inflation rate can also decrease in response to an increase in $R$. For this to be the case, the value of liquidity, which is proportional to $\gamma$, has to be sufficiently high relative to its costs, which are proportional to $p(R - 1)$. The next proposition characterizes the response of inflation to changes in nominal interest rates.

**Proposition 5** At an interior solution ($m > 0$), the elasticity of inflation with respect to nominal interest rates is smaller than 1:

$$\epsilon_{\pi,R} = \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial R} \frac{R}{\pi} < 1.$$  \hspace{1cm} (25)
Figure 2: Equilibrium of the model for two different levels of nominal interest rates, $R$ and $R'$. 

If, in addition, $R < \frac{p+2\gamma}{\gamma}$, then an increase in $R$ decreases $\pi$.

In a CIA model with a binding CIA constraint, $\epsilon_{\pi,R} = 1$. Not surprisingly, this elasticity becomes smaller or even negative if liquidity is sufficiently important. The condition in proposition 5 states that this is the case if $\gamma$ is high and $p$ and $R$ are low enough.

An implication of this result is that $\epsilon_{\pi,R} < 0$ if nominal interest rates are low enough, so that the market is liquid enough. The next proposition provides a generalization of this result.

**Proposition 6** The inflation rate $\pi$ is a convex function of $R$. The response of $\pi$ to an increase in $R$ is the larger the higher is $R$.

In this section, I have established several properties of the model, which are crucial to explain the data. An increase in nominal interest rates leads to a decrease in money demand and a higher real return on deposits. In addition, there is no perfect co-movement of inflation and nominal interest rates ($\epsilon_{\pi,R} < 0$).

In the next section, I quantify a more general version of the model to assess whether the model can simultaneously account for the data.
4 Interest Rate, Money and Inflation: A Quantitative Assessment

For illustrative purposes, I used a simplified model in the previous section, which provides a closed form solution. In this section, I add some elements of generality to the model, which improve the model’s ability to match the data. Before I turn to the description of the data and the estimation, I first describe how the model is generalized.

The linear utility specification at $t_2$ implies an interest rate elasticity of money that is far too high for a realistic ratio of liquid to illiquid assets. I therefore assume utility at $t_2$, $u(c_2)$, to be strictly concave. Utility is still linear at $t_1$, so that the model is still tractable. The heterogeneity in wealth does not matter, banks at $t$ take into account periods $t$ and $t+1$ only and offer a contract $(A, m, r)$ that makes agents indifferent between acceptance and rejection. $R/\pi \cdot \beta > 1$ is again no equilibrium and households do not hold any bonds ($B^H = 0$). What changes is the withdrawal rule at $t_2$. In equilibrium, low types still withdraw all liquid assets, but high types withdraw a positive amount of money. This results in an implicit solution for the real interest rate paid on deposits:

$$r(B, m) = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{B + p \cdot [\tilde{m}(\theta) - u(\tilde{m}(\theta))] + \bar{p} \cdot [\tilde{m}(\overline{\theta}) - u(\tilde{m}(\overline{\theta}))]}{B + \bar{p} \cdot (\overline{\theta} - 1) \cdot (m - \tilde{m}(\overline{\theta}))}$$

(26)

The cost function then equals

$$C(B, m) = r(B, m) \cdot B$$

(27)

Furthermore, I take into account that there are substantial non-interest incomes and expenses, such as managing costs, fee income and valuation gains.\(^{20}\) For the bank’s decision, it is only relevant what fraction of these incomes and expenses is marginal, i.e. changes with the amount of assets. But this fraction is unobservable. I therefore capture marginal

\(^{19}\)It is an implicit solution because $\tilde{m}$ depends on $r$.

\(^{20}\)In the year 2000 all FDIC-insured commercial banks had non-interest income of 154.2 billion $ and noninterest expenses of 216.8 billion $. Noninterest income and expenses are thus a large fraction of total income since interest income equaled 428.1 billion $ and interest expenses equaled 224.6 billion $.
incomes and expenses through a function $c(B)$.\footnote{In a previous version, I also allowed for a cost to manage $m$, but the cost function for $m$ was virtually zero in any estimation.}

Finally, I allow the velocity at $t_2$ to be different from one.\footnote{Velocity in the whole economy equals $\frac{\Delta GNP}{\Delta t}$, which depends on the nominal interest rate. In particular, it is not constant and not equal to one.} Households spend $\overline{\hat{p}m}(\theta) + \overline{\hat{p}m}(\overline{\theta})$ at $t_2$, but the bank has to hold $v(\overline{\hat{p}m}(\theta) + \overline{\hat{p}m}(\overline{\theta}))$ only, where $v$ is smaller than 1 and describes how fast money ‘circulates’ at $t_2$. The velocity at $t_2$ then equals $1/v$.\footnote{Another feature that could be added is more competition in the banking sector. Some degree of monopoly power is useful since otherwise the whole difference between real deposit returns and banks’ real return on assets is attributed to liquidity preferences only. How households value the liquidity provided by banks is measured, taking into account monopoly rents, through agents’ willingness to accept an interest rate below the market return. Insurance against uncertainty at $t_2$ is orthogonal to potential uncertainty in the centralized (unemployment insurance, health, car, etc.). Banks provide a certain type of insurance and households are paying a price that reflects their valuation of this specific insurance.} I also allowed for Cournot competition (in a previous version), but it turns out that a monopoly describes the data best. With all the added features, the first order conditions read as:

$$R = \pi \cdot r_B(B, m)B + \pi \cdot r(B, m) + \pi c'(B)$$  \hspace{1cm} (28)$$

$$p(1 - R)v = \pi r_m(B, m)B.$$ \hspace{1cm} (29)$$

4.1 Data

There is a well documented structural change in the U.S. economy in the first half of the 1980s.\footnote{Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) were the first to point this out. A detailed discussion and further references can be found in Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2002).} Stock and Watson (2002) suggest that financial market reforms embodied in the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 could be causal. Since I want to avoid too much overlap with this period of substantial changes in the financial sector, my sample starts in 1984 and then comprises the years 1984-2005.

The model provides some guidance on how to map the assets, termed liquid and illiquid for convenience, to the data. These assets should be held through institutions that provide...
Figure 3: Nominal bank return $R$ and liquidity $\frac{m}{A}$

households with cash or deposits, that makes these institutions subject to supervision by the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). I therefore consider data on commercial banks and savings institutions, which are taken from the Federal Reserve Database\textsuperscript{25} and the FDIC\textsuperscript{26}.

The distinguishing feature of liquid assets in the model is that they have zero maturity. The counterpart of liquid assets in the data thus includes $M1$, the monetary aggregate usually used for highly liquid assets, e.g. in Lucas (2000). I add saving deposits, which both have zero maturity and have the feature that they pay some interest and cash can be withdrawn without prior notice.

The distinguishing feature of illiquid assets is that they have non-zero maturity. Money can be withdrawn only after some time has elapsed. I therefore choose small and large time deposits as illiquid assets in the data.

The central bank controls a short-term nominal interest rate, which in this model corresponds to the return on all assets. Thus $R$ should equal the nominal return on banks’

\textsuperscript{25}URL: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 and http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases.

\textsuperscript{26}URL: http://www.fdic.gov.
assets. Data on these are available from the FDIC, but only at an annual frequency. I therefore cannot use the correct measure directly. Instead, I follow the literature on money demand (e.g. Lucas (2000)) and consider a short-term interest rate.\textsuperscript{27} I then adjust the mean of this short-term rate to match the nominal return on banks’ assets, which is 1.76% per quarter (the real return is 1.14%). This requires adding 0.0053 to the short-term interest rate series. The correlation between my measure (annualized) and the correct measure from the FDIC is 0.938. The procedure thus seems to be fairly reliable. The only substantial difference in the two time series is that the FDIC measure has no spike in 1995. Figure 3 shows the time series of the (adjusted) nominal interest rate and of the ratio of liquid to illiquid assets; two time series which are strongly negatively correlated in the model (proposition 3). Figure 3 confirms this model prediction.

The bank pays $X := r(A - p\tilde{m}_t(\theta) - \tilde{p}_t(\theta))$ to households in every period. The implicit real interest $r$ in the model then equals the average real interest rate paid to households, $\frac{X}{A - p\tilde{m}_t(\theta) - \tilde{p}_t(\theta)}$. Fortunately, there are publicly available data on the average return on household deposits. The St. Louis Fed provides a times series, M2Own, which is a weighted average of interest rates, paid on assets in $M_2$. This is, to my knowledge, the most reliable measure of deposit returns available. I thus use this average return on M2 (M2Own) as my measure of the average nominal return on deposits. To obtain a measure of the real return on deposits, I subtract inflation expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.\textsuperscript{28} The (ex-post) inflation rate is computed from the GDP deflator. Figure 4 shows the nominal quarterly return on banks’ assets and the real quarterly return on deposits. The model predicts a positive correlation between these two series (proposition 4) and Figure 4 again confirms this prediction.

\textsuperscript{27}Secondary Market Rate of a six-month Treasury bill.
\textsuperscript{28}Available at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/spfshortlong.html.
Figure 4: Nominal quarterly return on banks’ assets $R$ and the real quarterly return on deposits $r$. 
4.2 Estimation

I now estimate the model using the simulated method of moments. The model time period is a quarter.\textsuperscript{29} The utility derived from consumption at $t_2$ is assumed to be:

$$u(c^2) = \kappa \cdot (c^2)^\delta.$$  

(30)

The income/cost function $c(B)$ is assumed to be linear:

$$c(B) = \alpha B + \epsilon_c,$$  

(31)

where $\epsilon_c \sim N(0, \sigma^2_c)$. In addition to costs being stochastic, there is an interest rate reaction function which describes monetary policy:

$$\log(R_t) = \bar{R} + \rho_1(\log(R_{t-1}) - \bar{R}) + \rho_2(\log(R_{t-2}) - \bar{R}) + \epsilon_R$$  

(32)

where $\bar{R}$ is the mean of $\log(R)$ and $\epsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2_R)$. To render the exercise comparable to Hodrick et al. (1991), the monetary policy rule does not depend on variables other than $R$. Including more lags than two does not change the dynamics of the interest rate rule in the model. Including just one lag leads to a statistically significantly autocorrelated residual $\epsilon_R$. The amount of assets $A$ is assumed to be constant at the level $\bar{A}$.

Thirteen parameters have to be determined: the time preference rate $\beta$, the probability of a low shock $p$, the value of liquidity $\gamma$, the velocity parameter $v$, the two utility parameters $\kappa$ and $\delta$, the income/cost function parameter $\alpha$, the five parameters describing the evolution of $R$, $A$ and $c$: $\rho_1$, $\rho_2$, $\sigma_R$, $\sigma_c$ and $\bar{A}$ and the level of productivity $z$.

I normalize the level of the data series $A_t$ to be one in the third quarter of 1984 and then set $\bar{A}$ in the model equal to 1.199, the mean of this normalized series. The productivity parameter $z$ is chosen to match the velocity of liquid assets, which equals 2.590 in the data. I also choose to match the following seven statistics: The mean levels of the inflation rate, $E(\log(\pi)) = 0.6212\%$, of the real deposit return, $E(\log(r)) = 0.139\%$, and of the ratio of liquid assets to all assets, $E(\log(\frac{m}{A})) = -0.445$; the standard deviations of the

\textsuperscript{29}This is the standard choice in business cycle models. A shorter period length - a month or a week - which may render the CIA constraint more appealing, does not change the results of this paper.
inflation rate, $\sigma_{\log(\pi)} = 0.00176$, of the real deposit return, $\sigma_{\log(r)} = 0.000938$, and of $\frac{m_A}{A}$, $\sigma_{\log(\frac{m_A}{A})} = 0.0338$ (all HP-filtered with smoothing parameter 1600); two elasticities computed from the following two regressions of $\frac{m_A}{A}$ on $R$:

$$\log\left(\frac{m_A}{A}\right) = \alpha_0 + \epsilon_{m_A,R} \log(R),$$ (33)

and of $r$ on $\frac{m_A}{A}$:

$$\log(r) = \beta_0 + \epsilon_r \frac{m_A}{A} \log\left(\frac{m_A}{A}\right).$$ (34)

I find $\epsilon_{m_A,R} = -19.293$ and $\epsilon_r \frac{m_A}{A} = -0.0214$.

These statistics, reported in Table 2, quantify the key mechanisms of the model. $\epsilon_{m_A,R}$ and $\frac{m_A}{A}$ describe money demand and $\epsilon_r \frac{m_A}{A}$ describes households’ willingness to substitute liquidity for a lower real return on their deposits. Targeting not only $\epsilon_r \frac{m_A}{A}$, but also $\sigma_{\log(r)}$ takes into account that $r$ is less volatile than the real return on bonds. The three remaining targets - the means of $\pi$, $r$ and $\frac{m_A}{A}$ - are natural choices as they make sure that the model replicates some averages in the data.

Table 3 shows the estimated parameter values that generate the best fit of the model with respect to the targets specified above. The remaining parameter values describing the interest rate rule, the average level of $A$ and $z$ are contained in Table 4. The second column of Table 2 describes the performance of the model in matching the targets. The targets are hit very well what can be considered a first success of the model. Hodrick et al. (1991) find that many moments cannot be replicated in the model one at a time, whereas here all targets are matched simultaneously for one set of parameters.

Although the parameters are chosen to match all targets simultaneously, some parameters can be assigned to specific targets. The cost parameter $\alpha$ makes sure that the model replicates the mean of inflation in the model and $\sigma_c$ does the same for the volatility of inflation. The remaining model parameters are then chosen to match real targets only. In particular, matching the co-movement of inflation with other variables is not part of the estimation, but provides a way to assess the success of the model. The policy function is found to be quite persistent with $\rho_1$ larger than one, reflecting the fact that changes in monetary policy are followed by changes into the same direction (increases by further
Table 2: Matching the Estimation Targets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mean inflation, $E(\log(\pi))$,</td>
<td>0.622 %</td>
<td>0.631 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mean real deposit return , $E(\log(r))$,</td>
<td>0.139 %</td>
<td>0.136 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mean fraction of liquid assets $E(\log(m_A))$,</td>
<td>-0.445</td>
<td>-0.443</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. S.d. of inflation, $Std(\log(\pi))$,</td>
<td>0.176 %</td>
<td>0.169 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. S.d. of real deposit return , $Std(\log(r))$,</td>
<td>0.122 %</td>
<td>0.089 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. S.d. of fraction of liquid assets $Std(\log(m_A))$,</td>
<td>3.384 %</td>
<td>3.675 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Elasticity of $r$ w.r.t. $m_A$, $\epsilon_r, m_A$,</td>
<td>-19.293</td>
<td>-18.553</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Elasticity of $m_A$ w.r.t. $R$, $\epsilon_{m_A,R}$,</td>
<td>-0.0214</td>
<td>-0.0231</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note - Column 2 (“Model“) is based on the parameter estimates described in Tables 3 and 4.

increases and decreases by further decreases). It is this persistency of the interest rate rule that leads to a strong co-movement of nominal variables in standard models. Finally, the parameters can be used to compute the implied volatility of consumption at $t_2$, which equals 9% in percentage terms. This number seems reasonable, but is smaller than the 20 – 25% reported in Telyukova (2007), who measures the volatility of cash goods in the Consumption Expenditure Survey. But this is expected since, first, there is measurement error in the data and, second, not all cash good smoothing is done through a bank and bank instruments (deposits, checks, . . . ). Since the model picks up only this type of insurance, finding this smaller number (9%) is comforting.

A first test of the model is to explore whether the model can replicate the data. I therefore feed the time series of $R_t$ and $A_t$, as observed in the data between the first quarter of 1984 and the fourth quarter of 2005, into the model. I then compute the model predictions for the share of liquid assets $\frac{m_A}{A}$ and the real interest rate paid on deposits $r$ and compare them.
Table 3: Parameter Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>p</th>
<th>γ</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>v</th>
<th>κ</th>
<th>δ</th>
<th>α</th>
<th>σc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.865</td>
<td>0.858</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.927</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Parameter Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ρ1</th>
<th>ρ2</th>
<th>σR</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>z</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.217</td>
<td>-0.333</td>
<td>0.118 %</td>
<td>1.199</td>
<td>1.994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

with their counterparts in the data. Figures 5, 6 and 7 show the result for \( \frac{m}{A} \), \( m \) and \( r \). The three figures demonstrate that the model replicates the data very well, although only a small number of targets and parameters is used.

A prerequisite for a good match between the model and the data is that there is no perfect co-movement between inflation and nominal interest rates. To assess the size of liquidity effects, I compute the nominal interest rate elasticity of inflation. To this end, I simulate the model with different values for the mean level of \( R \) and compute the average inflation rate. Figure 8 shows the result, where \( R \) is on the x-axis and the mean inflation rate is on the y-axis. The average interest rate elasticity of inflation is 0.38, which suggests that the model can potentially match several facts in the data, such as the low correlation of inflation and nominal interest rates, but also the negative correlation of the money growth rate and the nominal interest rate. Figure 8 also shows that the elasticity is higher if

\[30\text{The two figures reveal two minor problems. There is a lag between the data on money and the model predictions what suggests that some form of portfolio adjustment costs would be helpful to explain the data. Second, the largest deviation between the data and the model occurs in the year 1995, which is exactly the year in which my measure of banks’ return differs from the correct FDIC measure.}\]
Figure 5: Ratio of liquid assets $m/A$: data and model

Figure 6: Money $m$: data and model
nominal interest rates are higher and can be become negative for low values of $\bar{R}$, confirming proposition 6.

4.3 Simulation

In this section, I perform an exercise similar to that in Hodrick et al. (1991). I simulate the model to generate predictions for the endogenous variables. I then compare statistics computed from the model-generated data with sample statistics computed from quarterly U.S. time series.

I examine the following statistics: the standard deviation of inflation, of velocity and of the real return on deposits. I also consider the means of the inflation rate, of the real return on deposits and of velocity; I calculate the correlations of inflation with nominal interest rates, with the real return on bonds, with the real return on deposits, with velocity and with the money growth rate. I also compute the correlation of nominal interest rates with velocity and with the nominal money growth rate and the correlation of velocity and
Figure 8: Average Quarterly Inflation Rate as a function of Average Quarterly Nominal Interest Rate $\overline{R}$. 
the nominal money growth rate,\textsuperscript{31}

To simulate the model, I use a pseudo-random number generator to calculate the two shocks $\epsilon_R$ and $\epsilon_c$ at each point in time. Using the policy rule (32), I first compute $R_t$ (I set $R_2 = R_1 = \bar{R}$) and then $\pi_t, m_t$ and $r_t$. Since utility is linear, I can solve for the equilibrium in each period separately, once $R_t$ is known. I throw away the first 1000 “quarters” and then generate 88 data points, corresponding to quarterly data from 1984 to 2005. I repeat this 10000 times to generate the means and standard deviations of the model-generated data. Table 5 shows the results for the statistics computed from the simulated data and the sample statistics from U.S. data, which were described in Sub-section 4.1. The first eight statistics replicate the finding that the eight targets are hit very well. The remaining ten statistics are not targeted in the estimation and can thus be used to further assess the quantitative performance of the model.

The main conclusion from the simulation is that the model statistics are close to their counterparts in the data. In particular, the correlation of inflation with various other variables is remarkably close. The low correlation of inflation and nominal interest is replicated by the model as well as the negative correlation of inflation and nominal money growth rate. Another aspect, the correlation of inflation and the real interest rate has attracted a lot of attention since other models fail along this dimension (Hodrick et al. (1991)). Table 5, however, shows that this is not the case here. The correlation with both real returns - on bonds and on deposits - is in line with the data. The co-movement of the money growth rate with the nominal interest rate and with velocity is also of the same magnitude as it is in the data. Finally, the correlation of velocity and nominal interest rates is hit almost perfectly in the simulation. Interestingly, the model performs quantitatively well although utility at $t_1$ is linear. The potential concern that linear utility limits the model’s ability to replicate the data is thus not warranted, at least not for the statistics considered here.

Although the model does very well in matching all 18 statistics, there are two key statistics. The correlation of inflation and nominal interest rates (row 11) and the stable

\textsuperscript{31}All variables are logged before filtering with the HP-filter. All correlations are contemporaneous.
Table 5: Simulation Results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mean inflation, $E(\log(\pi))$,</td>
<td>0.622 %</td>
<td>0.631 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02 %)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mean real deposit return, $E(\log(r))$,</td>
<td>0.139 %</td>
<td>0.136 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019 %)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mean fraction of liquid assets $E(\log(\frac{m}{A}))$,</td>
<td>-0.445</td>
<td>-0.443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. S.d. of inflation, $\text{Std}(\log(\pi))$,</td>
<td>0.176 %</td>
<td>0.169 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012 %)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. S.d. of real deposit return, $\text{Std}(\log(r))$,</td>
<td>0.122 %</td>
<td>0.089 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015 %)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. S.d. of fraction of liquid assets $\text{Std}(\log(\frac{m}{A}))$,</td>
<td>3.383 %</td>
<td>3.675 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.555 %)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Elasticity of $r$ w.r.t. $\frac{m}{A}$, $\epsilon_{r,\frac{m}{A}}$,</td>
<td>-0.0214</td>
<td>-0.0230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Elasticity of $\frac{m}{A}$ w.r.t. $R$, $\epsilon_{\frac{m}{A},R}$,</td>
<td>-19.293</td>
<td>-18.553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.759)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Mean velocity, $E(\log(\frac{z}{m}))$,</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>0.952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. S.d. of velocity $\text{Std}(\log(\frac{z}{m}))$,</td>
<td>3.554 %</td>
<td>3.675 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014 %)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Correlation of inflation and nominal interest rate,</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Correlation of inflation and nominal money growth rate,</td>
<td>-0.178</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Correlation of inflation and real deposit return,</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Correlation of inflation and real bond return,</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Correlation of inflation and velocity,</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Correlation of nominal interest rate and nominal money growth rate,</td>
<td>-0.501</td>
<td>-0.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Correlation of nominal interest rate and velocity,</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>0.815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Correlation of nominal money growth rate and velocity,</td>
<td>-0.260</td>
<td>-0.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note - Column 2 ("Model") is based on the parameter estimates described in Tables 3 and 4. The lower part of the Table (row 9 - row 18) describes statistics not targeted in the estimation. All correlations are contemporaneous. The nominal money growth rate equals $\frac{\Delta P_m}{\Delta P_{m-1}}$. Bootstrapped standard errors from 10000 model simulations are reported in parentheses.
money demand curve described in row 8 and row 17. The first property breaks the co-
movement between nominal interest rates and nominal variables (not only inflation, but
also the nominal money growth rate). The first and the second property together imply
that the inflation rate and real balances are negatively correlated. This correlation is strong
enough to lead to a negative correlation of inflation and the nominal money growth rate
(which is the sum of the real balance growth rate plus inflation).

5 Concluding Remarks

I have developed a model that extends the basic Cash-in-Advance (CIA) model. The key
new features of the model are that households face idiosyncratic shocks, which determine
their demand for liquidity, and that banks provide them with liquidity when they need it.

A key finding is that the model is characterized by strong liquidity effects: Changes in
real money (liquidity) holdings change the real interest rate on deposits. Qualitatively, this
feature is not new. In standard models where money enters the utility function, changes in
real balances also affect the real interest rate if the utility function is non-separable between
consumption and money. Quantitatively, however, the difference is substantial.

In my model, the elasticity of $r$ with respect to $m$ equals $-0.023$. Woodford (2003)
shows that a value of $-0.02$ does not change the quantitative implications in standard
new Keynesian models much. The reason is that in such models, a change in money
changes the marginal utility of consumption (because of non-separability) and thus affects
real interest rates through the Euler equation. For example, if money holdings go up 10%
today and in the next period, the marginal utility today and in the next period change by
the same amount and thus the real interest rate today remains unaffected. Since changes
in monetary policy are very persistent, this example explains much of what is going on in
the new Keynesian model.

In my model, by contrast, the real rate on deposits decreases today and in the next
period if money holdings go up 10% today and in the next period. In other words, the
level of real balances matters here, whereas first differences of real balances matter in NK
models.
In the quantitative analysis, I show that these strong liquidity effects indeed imply that the model predictions are close to their empirical counterparts. In particular, nominal interest rates and inflation do not move one-for-one, although prices are flexible. This result can potentially address a shortcoming of new Keynesian models, expressed in Hagedorn (2006). In that paper, I compute the optimal path of nominal interest rates to implement a lower inflation target. I find that nominal interest rates are uniformly lowered, whereas central bankers’ conventional wisdom suggests the opposite: Nominal interest rate should be increased to attain this goal (The Volcker disinflation is a good example). This inconsistency can be traced back to the absence of strong liquidity effects in standard monetary models. Since, by contrast, liquidity effects are strong here, adding some short-run frictions to the model, such as sticky prices, is a promising avenue for future research.

Appendix

Derivation of the cost function

Given that $\tilde{m}_t(\theta) = m_t$ and $\tilde{m}_t(\theta) = 0$, the contract gives the household its reservation utility (see equation 10) if (ignoring time indices)

\[ -A + p(m + \beta \theta r(A - m)) + \bar{p} \beta \theta r A = 0 \]

\[ \Leftrightarrow r = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{A - pm}{A - \bar{p} \theta m} = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{B}{B + p(1 - \theta)m} \]

Thus

\[ r(B, m) = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \cdot m/B} \quad \text{and} \quad C(B, m) = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{B}{1 + \gamma \cdot m/B} \]

Proof of Lemma 1 I first calculate second derivatives.

\[ C_{22}(B, m) = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{2 \gamma^2}{B \cdot (1 + \gamma m/B)^3} \]

\[ C_{12}(B, m) = C_{21}(B, m) = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{-2 m \gamma^2}{B^2 \cdot (1 + \gamma m/B)^3} \]

\[ C_{11}(B, m) = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{2 m^2 \gamma^2}{B^3 \cdot (1 + \gamma m/B)^3} \]
Since $C_{22}(B,m) \cdot C_{11}(B,m) - C_{12}(B,m) \cdot C_{21}(B,m) = 0$ and $C_{11}(B,m) > 0$, the Hesse matrix of $C$ has a positive and a zero eigenvalue. Thus $C$ is convex.

**Proof of proposition 1** I first calculate the first derivatives of the cost function. All time indices will be ignored.

\[
C_B(B,m) = \frac{1}{\beta} \left( 1 + \frac{2\gamma m}{B} \right) \tag{35}
\]

\[
C_m(B,m) = \frac{1}{\beta} \left( \frac{-\gamma}{1 + \frac{\gamma m}{B}} \right) \tag{36}
\]

Equilibrium conditions 16 and 17 (the bank’s first order conditions) imply that

\[
\frac{R}{p(R-1)} = \frac{C_B}{-C_m} = \frac{1 + 2\gamma m/B}{\gamma} \quad \text{and} \quad R - \frac{p(R-1)m}{B} = \pi C_B + \pi C_m m/B = \frac{\pi}{\beta} \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma m}{B} \right)
\]

Solving the first equation for $m/B$ and the second for $\pi$ results in:

\[
m/B = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{R}{p(R-1)} - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad \pi = \beta(1 + \frac{m}{B}) \cdot (R - \frac{p(R-1)m}{B})
\]

Plugging $m/B$ into the last equation proves the claim:

\[
\pi = \beta \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{\gamma R}{p(R-1)} + 1 \right) \left( R + \frac{p(R-1)}{\gamma} \right) \tag{37}
\]

\[
= \beta \frac{(R\gamma + p \cdot (R - 1))^2}{4p\gamma(R - 1)} \tag{38}
\]

**Proof of proposition 2**

For $(m_t(R,\ldots),\pi_t(R,\ldots))$ to be an equilibrium, it remains to be shown that $R_t/\pi_t \beta < 1$ and $\beta r \bar{\theta} > 1$ (ex post verification). Equilibrium condition 16 says that

\[
\frac{R}{\pi} = C_B(B,m) \tag{39}
\]

Equation (35) in the proof of proposition 1 shows that $R/\pi \beta < 1$ is equivalent to

\[
\frac{1}{\beta} \left( \frac{1 + 2\gamma m/B}{(1 + \gamma m/B)^2} \right) < \frac{1}{\beta} \tag{40}
\]
The left-hand side is smaller than $1/\beta$ thus $R/\pi\beta < 1$.

Since

\[ r = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \cdot m/B} \quad \text{and} \quad m = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{R}{p(R-1)} \right) - \frac{1}{\gamma} \cdot B \tag{41} \]

it follows that

\[ r = 2 \frac{p(R-1)}{\beta(pR - p + \gamma R)} \tag{43} \]

As

\[ \bar{\theta} = \frac{1 - p + \gamma}{1 - p} \tag{44} \]

\[ \beta r \bar{\theta} > 1 \tag{45} \]

is (after some simple algebra) equivalent to

\[ R > \frac{p(1 - p + 2\gamma)}{p - p^2 - \gamma + 3p\gamma} \tag{46} \]

what is exactly assumption 1.

**Proof of propositions 3, 4, 5 and 6** Since I have derived an explicit solution for all variables, the proof amounts to calculating derivatives. First I show that $m/B$ is decreasing in $R$ (Proposition 3):

\[
\frac{\partial m/B}{\partial R} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial}{\partial R} \left( \frac{R}{p(R-1)} - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right)
= \frac{-1}{4(R-1)^2 p}
< 0.
\]

Since equation 14 implies that $r$ is a decreasing function of $m/B$, $r$ is increasing in $R$ (which proves proposition 4).

To prove proposition 5, I first compute the first derivative of $\pi$ with respect to $R$:

\[
\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial R} = \beta \frac{2(pR - p + R\gamma)(p + \gamma)(R - 1) - (pR - p + R\gamma)^2}{4p\gamma(R-1)^2}
= \frac{\beta(\gamma R + p(R-1))(R\gamma - 2\gamma + p(R-1))}{4p\gamma(R-1)^2}
\]
It follows that

\[ \epsilon_{\pi,R} = \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial R} \frac{R}{\pi} = \frac{R(R\gamma - 2\gamma + p(R - 1))}{(R - 1)(R\gamma + p(R - 1))} \]

Some simple algebra then shows that \( \epsilon_{\pi,R} < 1 \) is equivalent to \( \gamma R > \frac{p}{R - 1} \), which again is equivalent to \( m > 0 \).

Since

\[ \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial R} < 0 \]

\[ \iff R\gamma - 2\gamma + p(R - 1) < 0 \]

\[ \iff R < \frac{p + 2\gamma}{p + \gamma}, \]

all claims in Proposition 5 are proved.

Computing the second derivative of \( \pi \), which equals

\[ \frac{\partial^2 \pi}{\partial^2 R} = \frac{\beta \gamma}{2p(R - 1)^3} > 0, \]

also proves Proposition 6.

References


