Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52319
Berentsen, Aleksander; Strub, Carlo (2008). Central Bank Design with Heterogeneous Agents. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 365, University of Zurich.
We study alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents,nwhere monetary policy has redistributive effects. Inflation is determined by a policy board using either simple-majority voting, supermajority voting, ornbargaining. We compare the equilibrium inflation rates to the first-best allocation.
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|Item Type:||Working Paper|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)
|Dewey Decimal Classification:||330 Economics|
|Deposited On:||29 Nov 2011 22:47|
|Last Modified:||05 Apr 2016 15:12|
|Series Name:||Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics|
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