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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52355

Telser, Harry; Becker, Karolin; Zweifel, Peter (2008). Validity and Reliability of Willingness-to-Pay Estimates: Evidence from Two Overlapping Discrete-Choice Experiments. Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute No. 412, University of Zurich.

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Abstract

Discrete-choice experiments, while becoming increasingly popular, have rarely been tested for validity and reliability. This contribution purports to provide some evidence of a rather unique type. Two surveys designed to measure willingness-to-accept (WTA) for reform op-tions in Swiss health care and health insurance are used to provide independent information with regard to two elements of reform. The issue to be addressed is whether WTA values converge although the three overlapping attributes (a more restrictive drug benefit, a delayed access to medical innovation, and a change in the monthly insurance premium) are embedded in widely differing choice sets. Experiment A contains rather radical health system reform options, while experiment B concentrates on more familiar elements such as copayment and the benefit catalogue. While mean WTA values differ between experiments, they tend to vary in similar ways, suggesting at least theoretical validity and reliability.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Socioeconomic Institute (former)
DDC:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C35, C93, I11
Language:English
Date:March 2008
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 22:47
Last Modified:09 Jul 2012 05:04
Series Name:Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

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