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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52361

Schmutzler, Armin (2008). A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments. Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute No. 601, University of Zurich.

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Abstract

Many experimental studies implement two versions of one game for which agents’ behavior is fundamentally different even though the Nash prediction is the same. This paper provides a novel explanation of such findings. Starting from the observation that many of the games under consideration satisfy the strategic-complementarity property, I obtain predictions for the direction of adjustment in response to parameter changes which do not require calculation of the quilibrium. I show that these predictions explain the experimental evidence very well. Further, I provide a behavioral justification of the approach, and I explore the relation to alternative explanations based on equilibrium selection theories and the quantal response equilibrium.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Socioeconomic Institute (former)
DDC:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C70, C91
Language:English
Date:November 2008
Deposited On:29 Nov 2011 22:47
Last Modified:09 Jul 2012 05:04
Series Name:Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html

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