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Electoral terms and terrorism


Hodler, Roland; Rohner, Dominic (2012). Electoral terms and terrorism. Public Choice, 150(1-2):181-193.

Abstract

Many terror attacks occur at the beginning of electoral terms. We present a game
theoretical model with incomplete information to account for this empirical pattern. Both
terrorists and governments can be of weak or strong types. We find that the risk of terror
attacks is highest at the beginning of electoral terms, because striking early allows the terrorists
to collect valuable information about the government’s type, and also because terrorists
know that even initially weak governments sometimes retaliate to show toughness closer to
an upcoming election. The model’s predictions are consistent with anecdotal evidence.

Many terror attacks occur at the beginning of electoral terms. We present a game
theoretical model with incomplete information to account for this empirical pattern. Both
terrorists and governments can be of weak or strong types. We find that the risk of terror
attacks is highest at the beginning of electoral terms, because striking early allows the terrorists
to collect valuable information about the government’s type, and also because terrorists
know that even initially weak governments sometimes retaliate to show toughness closer to
an upcoming election. The model’s predictions are consistent with anecdotal evidence.

Citations

1 citation in Web of Science®
2 citations in Scopus®
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:January 2012
Deposited On:12 Jan 2012 16:14
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 15:23
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0048-5829
Additional Information:The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9697-3
Permanent URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-55227

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