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Robust stochastic stability


Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Netzer, Nick (2014). Robust stochastic stability. Working paper series / Department of Economics 63, University of Zurich.

Abstract

A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary-action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of strategic complementarity suffices for robustness in this class of games. We also investigate the robustness of the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation.

A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary-action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of strategic complementarity suffices for robustness in this class of games. We also investigate the robustness of the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C72, D83
Uncontrolled Keywords:Learning in games, stochastic stability, radius-coradius theorems, logit-response dynamics, mutations, imitation
Language:English
Date:January 2014
Deposited On:17 Feb 2012 11:11
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 15:38
Series Name:Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number of Pages:40
ISSN:1664-7041
Additional Information:Revised version
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp063.pdf
Related URLs:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php
Permanent URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-59571

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