Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-61180
Ferber, Rafael (1988). Das normative "ist" und das konstative "soll". Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 74(2):185-199.
Despite the fact that Aristotle and Frege/Russell differ in how to understand the ambiguity in the meaning of the word "is", their theories share a common feature: "is" does not have a normative meaning, but a constative meaning. This paper, however, shows (1) that there is a normative meaning of "is" (and correspondingly a constative meaning of the word "ought") and (2) that the ambiguity of "is" is itself ambiguous. Furthermore, the paper proposes (3) a performative criterion for making a distinction between constative and normative "is". Thereby, it is possible to attack Searle's famous argument against Hume's law.
|Item Type:||Journal Article, refereed, original work|
|Communities & Collections:||06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy|
|Deposited On:||10 Mar 2012 14:58|
|Last Modified:||24 Dec 2012 17:05|
|Publisher:||Franz Steiner Verlag|
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