Quick Search:

uzh logo
Browse by:
bullet
bullet
bullet
bullet

Zurich Open Repository and Archive

Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-61180

Ferber, Rafael (1988). Das normative "ist" und das konstative "soll". Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 74(2):185-199.

[img]
Preview
Published Version
PDF
1MB

Abstract

Despite the fact that Aristotle and Frege/Russell differ in how to understand the ambiguity in the meaning of the word “is”, their theories share a common feature: “is” does not have a normative meaning, but a constative meaning. This paper, however, shows (1) that there is a normative meaning of “is” (and correspondingly a constative meaning of the word “ought”) and (2) that the ambiguity of “is” is itself ambiguous. Furthermore, the paper proposes (3) a performative criterion for making a distinction between constative and normative “is”. It is thereby possible to attack Searle’s famous argument against Hume’s law.

Cf. for the fallacy in Searle’s argument against "Hume’s law" also Ferber, Rafael (1994). Moral Judgments as Descriptions of Institutional Facts. In: Meggle, Georg; Wessels, Ulla: Analyomen 1, Proceedings of the 1st Conference "Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy". Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 719-729, esp. 722-724:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch/98246/

Citations

Downloads

29 downloads since deposited on 10 Mar 2012
9 downloads since 12 months

Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Language:German
Date:1988
Deposited On:10 Mar 2012 14:58
Last Modified:24 May 2016 12:16
Publisher:Franz Steiner Verlag
ISSN:0001-2343
Related URLs:http://www.zora.uzh.ch/98246/

Users (please log in): suggest update or correction for this item

Repository Staff Only: item control page