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Strategic behavior and underpricing in uniform price auctions: Evidence from finnish treasury auctions


Keloharju, Matti; Nyborg, Kjell G; Rydqvist, Kristian (2005). Strategic behavior and underpricing in uniform price auctions: Evidence from finnish treasury auctions. Journal of Finance, 60(4):1865-1902.

Abstract

We contribute to the debate on the optimal design of multiunit auctions by developingand testing robust implications of the leading theory of uniform price auctions on the bid distributions submitted by individual bidders. The theory, which emphasizes market power, has little support in a data set of Finnish Treasury auctions. A reason may be that the Treasury acts strategically by determining supply after observing bids, apparently treating the auctions as a repeated game between itself and primary dealers. Bidder behavior and underpricing react to the volatility of bond returns in a way that suggests bidders adjust for the winner’s curse.

We contribute to the debate on the optimal design of multiunit auctions by developingand testing robust implications of the leading theory of uniform price auctions on the bid distributions submitted by individual bidders. The theory, which emphasizes market power, has little support in a data set of Finnish Treasury auctions. A reason may be that the Treasury acts strategically by determining supply after observing bids, apparently treating the auctions as a repeated game between itself and primary dealers. Bidder behavior and underpricing react to the volatility of bond returns in a way that suggests bidders adjust for the winner’s curse.

Citations

13 citations in Web of Science®
18 citations in Scopus®
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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Banking and Finance
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Date:1 January 2005
Deposited On:06 Jul 2012 14:39
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 15:46
Publisher:Wiley-Blackwell
Number of Pages:38
ISSN:0022-1082
Publisher DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00782.x
Official URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3694856
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:6928

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