Quick Search:

uzh logo
Browse by:
bullet
bullet
bullet
bullet

Zurich Open Repository and Archive

Keloharju, Matti; Nyborg, Kjell G.; Rydqvist, Kristian (2005). Strategic behavior and underpricing in uniform price auctions: Evidence from finnish treasury auctions. Journal of Finance, 60(4):1865-1902.

Full text not available from this repository.

View at publisher

Abstract

We contribute to the debate on the optimal design of multiunit auctions by developingand testing robust implications of the leading theory of uniform price auctions on the bid distributions submitted by individual bidders. The theory, which emphasizes market power, has little support in a data set of Finnish Treasury auctions. A reason may be that the Treasury acts strategically by determining supply after observing bids, apparently treating the auctions as a repeated game between itself and primary dealers. Bidder behavior and underpricing react to the volatility of bond returns in a way that suggests bidders adjust for the winner’s curse.

Citations

11 citations in Web of Science®
15 citations in Scopus®
Google Scholar™

Altmetrics

Downloads

0 downloads since deposited on 06 Jul 2012
0 downloads since 12 months

Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Banking and Finance
DDC:330 Economics
Date:1 January 2005
Deposited On:06 Jul 2012 14:39
Last Modified:27 Nov 2013 16:38
Publisher:Wiley-Blackwell
Number of Pages:38
ISSN:0022-1082
Publisher DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00782.x
Official URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3694856
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:6928

Users (please log in): suggest update or correction for this item

Repository Staff Only: item control page