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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-61722

Nyborg, Kjell G; Rydqvist, Kristian; Sundaresan, Suresh M (2002). Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidencefrom Swedish Treasury Auctions. The Journal of Political Economy, 110(2):394-424.

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We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auctionawards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second,we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner 19s curse 13driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies.


28 citations in Web of Science®
37 citations in Scopus®
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62 downloads since deposited on 20 Jul 2012
40 downloads since 12 months

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Banking and Finance
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Date:1 January 2002
Deposited On:20 Jul 2012 20:27
Last Modified:05 Apr 2016 15:46
Publisher:University of Chicago Press
Number of Pages:31
Publisher DOI:10.1086/338748
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:6929

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