Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-61722
Nyborg, Kjell G.; Rydqvist, Kristian; Sundaresan, Suresh M (2002). Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidencefrom Swedish Treasury Auctions. The Journal of Political Economy, 110(2):394-424.
We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auctionawards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second,we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner 19s curse 13driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies.
|Item Type:||Journal Article, refereed, original work|
|Communities & Collections:||03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Banking and Finance|
|Date:||1 January 2002|
|Deposited On:||20 Jul 2012 20:27|
|Last Modified:||21 Dec 2013 04:34|
|Publisher:||University of Chicago Press|
|Number of Pages:||31|
|Other Identification Number:||merlin-id:6929|
|Citations:||Web of Science®. Times Cited: 25|
Scopus®. Citation Count: 33
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