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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-61722

Nyborg, Kjell G.; Rydqvist, Kristian; Sundaresan, Suresh M (2002). Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidencefrom Swedish Treasury Auctions. The Journal of Political Economy, 110(2):394-424.

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Abstract

We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auctionawards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second,we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner 19s curse 13driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies.

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Banking and Finance
DDC:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:01 January 2002
Deposited On:20 Jul 2012 22:27
Last Modified:21 Dec 2013 05:34
Publisher:University of Chicago Press
Number of Pages:31
ISSN:0022-3808
Publisher DOI:10.1086/338748
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:6929
Citations:Web of Science®. Times Cited: 25
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