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Permanent URL to this publication: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-62416

Goeree, Jacob K; Zhang, Jingjing (2012). Communication and Competition. Working paper series / Department of Economics 74, University of Zurich.

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Abstract

Charness and Dufwenberg (American Economic Review, June 2011, 1211-1237) have recently demonstrated that cheap-talk communication raises efficiency in bilateral contracting situations with adverse selection. We replicate their finding and check its robustness by introducing competition between agents. We find that communication and competition act as "substitutes:" communication raises efficiency in the absence of competition but lowers efficiency with competition, and competition raises efficiency without communication but lowers efficiency with communication. We briefly review some behavioral theories that have been proposed in this context and show that each can explain some but not all features of the observed data patterns. Our findings highlight the fragility of cheap-talk communication and may serve as a guide to refine existing behavioral theories.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics
DDC:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C92
Uncontrolled Keywords:Cheap talk, adverse selection, competition, guilt aversion, lie aversion, inequality aversion, reciprocity
Language:English
Date:May 2012
Deposited On:16 May 2012 12:52
Last Modified:19 Mar 2013 13:02
Series Name:Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number of Pages:18
ISSN:1664-7041
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp074.pdf
Related URLs:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php

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